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An Economy of Violence: Financial Crisis




The South Sea bubble burst suddenly in September 1720, the second in
a chain of panics that struck Paris, London, and Amsterdam in quick
succession. The crash in London was by far the most severe; within weeks
two-thirds of England's nominal wealth had evaporated, public credit had
collapsed, and London's most distinguished banking houses tottered on
the brink of ruin. Commerce ground to a halt, leaving a forest of half-built
ships rotting in city harbors and a thicket of unfinished mansions in
London's fashionable districts.' One awestruck correspondent compared
the event to "a blazing Comet, [which] by its sudden and amazing Rise
and Progress alarm'd all Europe, and now by a more sudden Downfall has
greatly affected all the Nation." A second insisted that the "fire of London
or the plague ruin'd not the number that are now undone, all ranks of
people bewayling their condition in the coffee houses & open streets." A
third alluded, succinctly, to "the death of our prosperity."2 These anxious
* I am grateful to Eric Beerbohm, Greg Conti, Christine Desan, David Golove, David Grewal,
Stephen Holmes, Daniel Hulsebosch, Sungho Kimlee, Janet Kwok, Eric Nelson, William Nelson,
Steven Pincus, Frank Stewart, Lauri Tahtinen, and Laura Valentini, as well as audiences at Harvard
and New York University, and the editors at the YJLH, for comments on an earlier draft. Special
thanks to Sabeel Rahman for commenting on multiple successive drafts, to William Deringer for
sharing his work in progress with me, and to Jos6 Argueta Funes for his detailed reading of the final
draft. All dates given in N.S.
1. Condensed from JOHN CARSWELL, THE SOUTH SEA BUBBLE 144-71 (2d ed. 1993). For general
historical background see also P.G.M. DICKSON, THE FINANCIAL REVOLUTION IN ENGLAND 90-157
(1967); JOHN G. SPERLING, THE SOUTH SEA COMPANY (1962).
2. AN ESSAY FOR DISCHARGING THE DEBTS OF THE NATION, BY EQUIVALENTS: IN A LETTER TO
THE RIGHT HONBLE CHARLES, EARL OF SUNDERLAND. AND THE SOUTH-SEA SCHEME CONSIDER'D, IN
A LETTER TO THE RIGHT HONBLE ROBERT WALPOLE 57 (London 1720); Sir John Perceval, Letter to
William Byrd, 15 Oct. 1720, in 1 THE CORRESPONDENCE OF THE THREE WILLIAM BYRDS OF
WESTOVER, VIRGINIA, 1684-1776 330 (Marion Tinling ed., 1977; THOMAS GORDON, I CATO'S
LETTERS (II) (Nov. 12, 1720), (Ronald Hamowy, ed., 1995) , 41 [hereafter CL]. Although pages are
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assessments were grounded in a mounting sense of social disorder and a
flickering faith in the legitimacy of the Hanoverian regime, which had
been intimately involved in promoting and profiting from the bubble.
George I was forced to organize a new ministry in the face of a corruption
scandal that decapitated the Whig party, while London pulsated with
rumors of a coming Jacobite coup d'dtat.3 On the Thames, investors
mobbed Parliament demanding the annulment of their contracts in South
Sea stock, and could be dispersed only by a reading of the Riot Act.4 In
the boroughs, petitions circulated soliciting the "exemplary Punishment"
of the bankers and politicians responsible for the "[d]esolation of their
country."' Philippe Destouches, an attach6 with the French embassy in
London, wrote in a dispatch to Paris that the scale of popular unrest
recalled 1688.6 The failure of the South Sea Company precipitated not
merely a financial and commercial disaster,7 but a political and
constitutional crisis that shook the British state to its foundations.8
But while the South Sea bubble has been recognized as an epochal event
by economic, literary, and cultural historians, it has left only a faint trace
on constitutional history. This is particularly surprising given the
.increasing prominence of the concepts of "emergency" and "reason of
state" in legal scholarship, a trend that has been particularly marked since
given in the Hamowy edition, original spellings and emphases have been maintained.
3. Arthur Onslow, in 1720 an MP for Guildford and later the Speaker of the House of Commons,
would write that "the rage against the Government was such for having as they thought drawn them
into this ruin, that I am almost persuaded, the King being at this time abroad [in Germany], that could
the Pretender have then landed at the Tower, he might have rode to St. James's with very few hands
held up against him." See Arthur Onslow, An Account of the Onslow Family [undated], in
MANUSCRIPTS OF THE EARL OF BUCKINGHAMSHIRE, THE EARL OF LINDSEY, THE EARL OF ONSLow.,
LORD EMLY, THEODORE J. HARE, ESQ., AND JAMES ROUND, ESQ. 504, Historical Manuscripts
Commission, Fourteenth Report, Appendix, Part IX (1895). James III did make some limited efforts to
exploit the distress, pronouncing rather mildly against the "new set of people, who must at any rate
enrich themselves by the spoil of their country" and calling for the election of a "free" Parliament
(Anon, A LETTER FROM AN ENGLISH TRAVELLER AT ROME 14 [1721]), but his own financial
difficulties, his natural timidity, and his tepid support from the French regency militated against
further action.
4. LONDON J., Aug. 12, 1721, at 2.
5. A COLLECTION OF THE SEVERAL PETITIONS OF THE COUNTIES, BOROUGHS, &C. PRESENTED TO
THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, COMPLAINING OF THE GREAT MISERIES... 17 [Reading], II [St. Albans]
(1721)
6. EVELINE CRUICKSHANKS & HOWARD ERSKINE-HILL, THE ATTERBURY PLOT 66-67 (2004).
7. See JEREMY BLACK, POLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY IN THE AGE OF GEORGE 1 132 (2014) ("As
Bank of England and East India Company stock also fell heavily, there was a danger of widespread
financial collapse.").
8. See [Daniel Defoe], THE COMMENTATOR (London), No. LXVIII, Aug. 26, 1720 ("it has been
no doubt such an Attack upon the Government, and upon the Laws and Constitution of Great-Britain,
as the like was scarce ever known or read of, either in this Government, or in any other Kingdom or
Country in Europe"); "TRUE LOVER OF HIS COUNTRY", A LETTER TO THE SUB-GOVERNOR.. &
DIRECTORS OF THE SOUTH SEA COMPANY 2 (1721) ("has done more in One Year towards the
Overturning our Constitution, than the late King James did in Four"); "Philo Britannus", Letter
XXXVII, 2 A COLLECTION OF MISCELLANY LETTERS, SELECTED OUT OF MIST'S WEEKLY JOURNAL
109 (4 vols.) (1722); cf CRUICKSHANKS & ERSKINE-HILL, supra note 6, at 238 ("a crisis of
government comparable to that of 1659-60, if not even more grave").
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September 11. Law professors, often citing classics of legal thought by
A.V. Dicey, Carl Schmitt, and Hans Kelsen, have relentlessly explicated
and criticized the paradigm of "emergency government," often in relation
to the seemingly unending War on Terror, generating voluminous
literatures in legal history, constitutional theory, and human rights law.9
The pervasive assumption of this wave of scholarship is that emergency
action threatens the underpinnings of republican government, above all by
concentrating the power to imprison and kill in an increasingly
"monarchial" executive branch.'o The category of "economic emergency,"
the mobilization of extraordinary state powers to contain market panics
and solve crises of distribution, has been comparatively neglected. In the
words of one recent analyst, nearly a decade after the 2008 financial crisis
there is still "little if any focus. . .on economic rather than security
emergency," despite the plethora of emergency extralegal measures taken
across the developed West to contain the chaos of bank runs and debt
defaults." And the most exacting studies of the concept tend to focus
inordinately on two twentieth century cases-Weimar Germany and New
Deal America-without considering the possibility of earlier antecedents.
9. See, e.g., Kim Lane Scheppele, Law in a Time ofEmergency, 6 J. CONST. LAW 5 (May 2004);
John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, The law of the exception: a typology of emergency powers, 2
ICON 210 (2004); Jeremy Waldron, Security and Liberty: the Image of Balance, POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY 191 (2003); David Dyzenhaus, States of Emergency, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 442, (Michael Rosenfeld & AndrAs Saj6 eds., 2012); Oren
Gross & Fionnuala Ni Aolin, LAW IN TIMES OF CRISIs: EMERGENCY POWERS IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE (2006); ADRIAN VERMEULE & ERIC POSNER, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND (2011); Evan J.
Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent, Human Rights, Emergencies, and the Rule of Law, 34 HUM. RTS. Q. 39
(2012).
10. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2010);
CHRIS EDELSON, EMERGENCY PRESIDENTIAL POWER (2013); STEPHEN GRIFFIN, LONG WARS AND
THE CONSTITUTION (2013).
11. Claire Kilpatrick, On the Rule of Law and Economic Emergency: The Degradation of Basic
Legal Values in Europe's Bailouts, OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 325, 329 (2015). For attempts to demarcate
the boundaries of the concept prior to 2008, see William E. Scheuerman, The Economic State of
Emergency, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1869 (2000) (discussing the concept of economic emergency in
Weimar legal thought); Sanford M. Levinson, Constitutional Norms in a State of Permanent
Emergency, 40 GA. L. REV. 699 (2006), 719-35 (Blaisdell as a paradigmatic case of emergency power
in a constitutional republic); Rebecca M. Kahan, Constitutional Stretch, Snap-Back, and Sag: Why
Blaisdell Was a Harsher Blow to Liberty than Korematsu, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 1279 (2005) (advancing
a libertarian argument against "emergency" economic regulations); and Bernadette Meyler, Economic
Emergency and the Rule ofLaw, 56 DE PAUL L. REV. 539 (2007) (articulating a concept of "economic
emergency" and tracing its relevance in American constitutional law, with reference to the work of
Giorgio Agamben). For attempts to grapple with the concept in the aftermath of 2008, see Eric Posner
& Adrian Vermeule, Crisis Governance and the Administrative State: 9/11 and the Financial
Meltdown of 2008, U. Chi. L. & Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 442 (2009) (drawing parallels
between "emergency lawmaking" after 9/11 and after 2008); Slavoj 2ifek, A Permanent Economic
Emergency, 64 NEW LEFT REV. 8 (2010) (Eurozone austerity as an exemplar of "exceptional"
politics); Christina Binder & August Reinisch, Economic Emergency Powers: A Comparative Law
Perspective, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW, 503, 505
(Stephan W. Schill ed. 2010), (discussing the Argentine crisis of 2001-2, and tracing the concept of
economic emergency to the First World War); and PHILIP WALLACH, TO THE EDGE: LEGALITY,
LEGITIMACY, AND THE RESPONSES TO THE 2008 FINANCIAL CRISIS 52-53, 69-96, 105-7 (2015).
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This cramped view of history has in turn underwritten a simplistic
narrative about emergency rule as an existential threat to republican order,
and as an instrument of elite domination.
The claim of this essay is that the South Sea bubble should be central to
our understanding of this tension between the rule of law and the survival
of the market economy, which now appears as one of the fundamental
problems of our time. It was the South Sea bubble that, for the first time,
brought reason of state into the domain of financial markets. In response
to an unprecedented destabilization of national commerce, Whig and Tory
radicals demanded the nullification of contracts and the trial by Parliament
of the South Sea directors, who were widely blamed for looting the nation
and casting thousands into penury. And, notably in light of contemporary
claims about the "monarchial" valence of emergency power, they pressed
these measures in a classically republican language that would have been
unimaginable in ordinary times. As in England's serial crises of the
seventeenth century, the call to suspend ordinary rules and procedures in
the name of "the safety of the people" came primarily from those who
opposed existing configurations of power and authority. It was the
reformists who demanded summary executions, forcible redistributions of
property, and ad hoc tribunals; it was the party of order that rallied to the
banner of personal liberties and natural rights. This curious inversion may
tell us something about the nature of "republican liberty," a favored
category in political theory and the history of political thought since the
1960s. Indeed, it may have something to tell us about the nature of liberty
more generally, and in particular the antinomy between collective and
individual visions of free republican life that continues to structure our
fiercest political debates.
The paper proceeds as follows. Part I offers a brief overview of the
South Sea scheme and its cataclysmic failure, and explains why ordinary
legal processes seemed insufficient to stem the rising tide of crisis. Part II
argues that the concept of "financial reason of state" emerged for the first
time in the political literature of 1720-21, as writers began to compare the
havoc that could be wrought by market downturns to the devastation of
war, plague, and rebellion. For commentators on both sides of the debate,
the logical endpoint of these analogies was martial law and temporary
dictatorship. Part III establishes that this politics of emergency had a
specifically republican tincture, linked indelibly to images of the Roman
republic and the English Commonwealth. To act beyond the limits of the
law was to conjure the specter, not of royal absolutism, but of popular
government, civil war, and regicide. Finally, Part IV addresses the origins
of the radical Whig ideology, which would go on to exert a decisive
influence on Anglophone political theory in the later eighteenth century.
The radical Whigs-preeminently, John Trenchard, Thomas Gordon, and
Viscount Molesworth-are remembered today as rigid defenders of
168 [Vol. 29:2
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personal liberties in the face of Britain's increasingly powerful fiscal-
military state. But it is a striking fact that Cato's Letters originated with
calls to suspend traditional laws and norms in order to subject the South
Sea directors to summary trial and execution, and to divide the property of
speculators among the public. Most histories of the radical Whig ideology
have understated the violent populism of these writings, leaving us with a
sanitized picture of opposition politics in the eighteenth century.
This exercise in historical recovery highlights the remarkable extent to
which financial capitalism depended in its formative period on the
conceptualization and exercise of extraordinary state power. It calls
attention to the inescapably republican imprimatur of emergency politics
in this period, particularly when applied to state action that targeted elites,
confiscated property, or undermined contractual rights. And it offers a new
reading of the eighteenth century "commonwealth" tradition that has
played such a prominent role in histories of political thought, challenging
contemporary efforts to enlist the radical Whigs into the ranks of
liberalism, neorepublicanism, and other fashionable modem ideologies.,
It goes without saying that the great questions that consumed English
politics in 1721-the accountability of financial and political elites, the
fate of civil liberties in times of emergency, and the dangerous instability
of global markets-remain urgent concerns of the present. It is my hope
that in reconstructing the intellectual history of financial capitalism's first
crisis, and in excavating the debate over constitutional limits and
emergency powers that helped to define it, we will recover not only a
distant mirror for our present troubles, but perhaps also a black mirror
with blurry intimations of our future.
I. "THE SHIPWRECK OF THE YEAR TWENTY" 1 2
The South Sea bubble was set in motion by two interlocking political
forces: the domestic party struggle between Whigs and Tories, and the
great power competition between England and France. As England moved
from a tacit alliance with France to a belligerent policy of confrontation
and encirclement, it keenly felt the need for new modes of financing its
growing public debts.13 At the same time, the Whig elites who ascended to
power on the stepladder of revolution desired new financial institutions
that would both enact their preferred economic policies and cement their
place atop the new social order.'4 The result of these twin pressures was a
new political economy-a "financial revolution"-whose core principle
12. Edward Gibbon, Autobiography [Memoirs of My Life and Writings] (1796), in 1 WORKS 10
(John Murray ed. 1907).
13. STEVEN PINCUS, 1688 337-57 (2009); cf id. at 388.
14. Id. at 399.
2017] 169
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was the stimulation of manufacturing, and whose crown jewels were the
Bank of England and the renovated East India Company. These
institutions were quickly colonized and staffed by Whigs, becoming both
the symbol and the guarantor of their preeminence in the postrevolutionary
state.
Tories and Jacobites aggressively resisted this transformation, which
they correctly understood as a frontal assault on the agrarian and
mercantilist policies they favored. Their first counter-stroke was the
founding of a Land Bank in 1696; the hope was that this new institution
would bolster traditional agrarian elites by tying the price of goods and
services to land rather than specie. The project collapsed quickly and
ignominiously, after raising only £7,100 of a projected £2.5 million. But
the construction of a viable alternative to the Bank of England remained a
live preoccupation of the Tory leadership. One of the earliest proponents
of the land bank, the Tory MP Robert Harley, would return fifteen years
later with a new scheme to challenge the Bank of England's hegemony.1 6
Harley's opportunity arrived in 1710, when a combination of court
intrigue and public weariness with Whig militarism vaulted him to the
head of the government. Immediately he was forced to grapple with an
acute credit crisis, driven in part by the metastasizing war debt, and in part
by the reluctance of the Bank to lend to a Tory government.7 Harley
surmounted the crisis through a series of deft political maneuvers,
extracting a new stopgap loan from the City, winning approval for fresh
revenues from Parliament, and deflecting the Tory backbenchers impatient
to confront the hated Bank.18 By the spring of 1711 these temporary
expedients had calmed the credit markets, and Harley now turned his
attention to achieving a more permanent solution.
Harley's blueprint was a proposal submitted by his advisor, the financier
John Blunt, to liquidate a portion of the burgeoning national debt through
the formation of a new joint-stock company.19 In Blunt's vision, nearly
15. See BRUCE G. CARRUTHERS, CITY OF CAPITAL] 44-51 (1999).
16. See CARL WENNERLIND, CASUALTIES OF CREDIT (2011), 121. For Harley's shifting position
amidst the ideological flux and party realignments of Williamite England, see B.W. HILL, ROBERT
HARLEY 34-84 (1988).
17. JAMES MACDONALD, A FREE NATION DEEP IN DEBT 176-77 (2003); WENNERLIND, supra
note 16, at 162-72.
18. See B.W. Hill, The Change of the Government and the 'Loss of the City', 1710-1711, 24
ECON. HIST. REv. 395 (1971). Also see id at 408 on the so-called "October Club", extreme Tories
who threatened to mutiny against Harley for his reluctance to investigate his Whig predecessors and to
declare war on the Bank. Harley placated the October Club in part through the selection of one of their
own, MP John Aislabie, for a ministerial portfolio.
19. John Blunt to Robert Harley, 5 October 1710, included as the "Appendix" in Hill, supra note
18, at 412. Between 1700 and 1708 Blunt founded and then ran the Sword Blade Bank, a private
corporation whose purpose was to "cut into the monopoly which the Bank of England had established
in public finance." In 1708, the Sword Blade was prohibited from carrying on these activities. See
SPERLING, supra note 1, at 5.
170 [Vol. 29:2
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£10 million of Britain's floating debt would be converted to shares in this
enterprise, which would in turn be assigned a monopoly over all future
trade with the Spanish colonies of South America. The current owners of
this debt would be repaid not from English revenues, but out of the
immense profits expected from the South Sea trade.20 The South Sea
House would acquire a guaranteed annual source of revenue in
government interest payments on the consolidated debt. The government
would obtain a markedly lowered interest rate. And the Bank of England
would be ejected from its privileged position in state finance.2 1
While Tory pamphleteers extravagantly praised the new arrangement,
skeptical Whigs complained from the outset that the project was a fraud.22
One, impersonating a "Merchant from Amsterdam," expressed relief that
Britain would waste its capital on the strategically inconsequential ports of
South America, rather than attempting to exploit more lucrative markets in
Europe.23 Another noted that one of the Company's earliest backers was
William Paterson, the architect of Scotland's disastrous Darien expedition,
who now plotted to "bubble the whole Nation with his Chimeras a second
time. "24 Arthur Maynwaring gave these criticisms a popular form in the
satirical ballad An Excellent New Song, call'd Credit Restor'd, which went
through five editions in 1711.
Thus our Debts being clear'd from the fruitful South-Seas,
In Wealth we shall daily grow stronger
Tho Stock-Jobbing fails, why dismay'd should we be,
Since we want to be trusted no longer?25
The stanza proved prescient. Although Spain did eventually assign
Britain a contract to carry slaves to the South Atlantic,26 the gains from
20. The conversion of these annuities into South Sea stock was effectively compulsory, in
contrast to the voluntary exchange of 1720. See RICHARD DALE, THE FIRST CRASH 48 (2004).
21. See LARRY NEAL, I AM NOT MASTER OF EVENTS 96 (2012); cf Carruthers, supra note 15, at
154.
22. A comprehensive overview of the 1711 debate can be found at WENNERLIND, supra note 16,
at 203-34. For highlights of the Tory literature, see: A LETTER TO A MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT, ON THE
SETTLING A TRADE TO THE SOUTH-SEA OF AMERICA (1711), 4 and 8 ; HERMAN MOLL, A VIEW OF THE
COASTS, COUNTRYS & ISLANDS WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THE SOUTH-SEA COMPANY 231 (2d ed.
1712);[Daniel Defoe?], A TRUE ACCOUNT OF THE DESIGN, AND ADVANTAGES OF THE SOUTH-SEA
TRADE (1711), Jonathan Swift, Examiner No. XLIV (June 7, 1711), in 3 WORKS OF JONATHAN SWIFT
505 (Sir Walter Scott ed.1883).
23. A LETTER FROM A MERCHANT IN AMSTERDAM TO A FRIEND IN LONDON ABOUT THE SOUTH
SEA TRADE 4-5 (1712).
24. SOME QUERIES, WHICH BEING NICELY ANSWERED MAY TEND VERY MUCH TO THE
ENCOURAGEMENT OF THE SOUTH-SEA COMPANY (1711). Paterson had also helped to found the Bank
of England, but this went unmentioned.
25. [ARTHUR MAYNWARING], AN EXCELLENT NEW SONG, CALL'D CREDIT RESTOR'D (London,
1711); cf AN EXCELLENT NEW SONG, CALLED, AN END TO OUR SORROWS (1711).
26. The Asiento de Negros, a contract formerly held by France. See DICKSON, supra note 1, at 67
("The company was to deliver annually 4,800 slaves. . ."). Britain made deliveries of slaves in 1716,
1717, and 1718, but far fewer than the promised 4,800, in part due to the deadly incompetence of the
South Sea managers (many slaves died en route), and in part due to red tape imposed by the hostile
2017] 171
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this trade were limited; the South Sea Company never generated more
than £20,000 in annual profits, against its capitalization of £10 million. By
1718 England was once again at war with Spain, and even this limited
trade ground to a halt.2 7 The profits of the South Sea Company remained,
in every sense, merely speculative.28
The South Sea Company lost its raison d'Otre at the same moment that
John Law's spectacular innovations in debt and public finance threatened
to upend the balance of power between France and England.29 Law, a
Scottish economist and financier, had long admired the South Sea
Company, and wrote a letter to Harley in 1711 in hopes of obtaining a
position in his ministry." Beginning in 1716 he engaged the French court
in a similar project to modernize its fiscal state and liquidate its debts. But
Law's version of the South Sea scheme was far more ambitious: he
proposed to convert the entire French debt of E400 million into equity in a
joint-stock company that would control the French colonial trade," with
the paper notes issued by this company replacing specie as the primary
medium of exchange in France.3 2 Law promised to retire this debt at a
scarcely believable three percent annual interest rate,3 3 predicting that the
French economy, now freed from the artificial shackles of metallic
currency and paper debts, would grow prodigiously.34 If France succeeded
in liberating itself from debt through these maneuvers, it was widely
assumed that it would gain a decisive edge in the struggle for commercial
and military supremacy. Lord Stair, the ambassador to Versailles, relayed
Law's boast "that he will set France higher than ever she was before, and
colonial government.
27. MACDONALD, supra note 17, at 208.
28. CARSWELL, supra note 1, at 46-47; DALE, supra note 20, at 49-51; Peter Temin & Hans-
Joachim Voth, Riding the South Sea Bubble, AM. ECON. REv. 1654, 1655 (December 2004). HELEN J.
PAUL, THE SOUTH SEA BUBBLE: AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF ITS ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES 54-65
(2010), argues that the Asiento had a reasonable chance of turning a profit, and can thus be considered
a legitimate investment opportunity, while Shinsuke Satsuma, The South Sea Company and its plan for
a naval expedition in 1712, HIST. RES. 410 (2012), underscores its serious (though unrealized)
aspirations to expand the frontiers of the British Empire.
29. Under the terms of the Anglo-French alliance of 1716 England and France were officially
aligned, but the two great powers continued to regard one another with a mutual wariness. This
hostility was intensified once Law, a committed Jacobite, took the reins of state. See CRUICKSHANKS
& ERSKINE-HILL, supra note 6, at 37-42, 233.
30. CARSWELL, supra note 1, at 65. He renewed the request in 1713 through an intermediary; see
Neal, supra note 21, at 33-34.
31. WENNERLIND, supra note 16, at 232.
32. For sophisticated recent treatments of Law's "system", see Antoin E. Murphy, JOHN LAW:
ECONOMIC THEORIST AND POLICYMAICER ( 1997); Frangois R. Velde, Was John Law's System a
bubble? The Mississippi Bubble revisited, in ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS 99-119, ed. Jeremy Atack and Larry Neal (Jremy Atack and Larry Neal eds., 2009).
33. Compared to the ten percent interest rate at which the Regency borrowed on the open market.
See MACDONALD, supra note 17, at 198.
34. Law had argued as early as 1705 that the major restraint on economic growth in Europe was
its artificially constrained money supply. See John Law, Money and Trade consider'd (1705), in 1
(EUVRES COMPLETES 46 (Paul Harsin ed., 1934).
172 [Vol. 29:2
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put her in a condition to give the law to all Europe; that he can ruin the
trade and credit of England and Holland, whenever he pleases; that he can
break our bank, whenever he has a mind."35 And as speculative capital
flooded the rue Quincampoix and the price of shares in Law's venture
tripled almost overnight,3 6 London began to ask how the apparent success
of the French "system" might be replicated.37
35. Lord Stair, Letter to Secretary Craggs, 9 September 1719, in 2 MISCELLANEOUS STATE
PAPERS, FROM 1501 TO 1726 593 (1778); see also "Gentleman of America", SOME CONSIDERATIONS
ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE FRENCH SETTLING COLONIES ON THE MISSISSIPPI 2 (1720) ; DANIEL
DEFOE, THE CHIMERA: OR, THE FRENCH WAY OF PAYING NATIONAL DEBTS 5-6 ( 1720); cf the
retrospective judgment of Voltaire, Of Commerce and Luxury [1738], in COMMERCE, CULTURE, AND
LIBERTY 277 (Henry C. Clark trans. and ed. 2003).
36. [Defoe], "Bubble Mania in France", MIST'S WEEKLY J. (London), Sept. 12, 1719; SOME
CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 35, at 2.
37. See James English, To the Honourable and Skilful Managers of the South-Sea Stock," in
OBSERVATIONS ON THE NEW SYSTEM OF THE FINANCES OF FRANCE (1720); cf SPERLING, supra note
1, at 26 ("politicians and financiers believed that similar measures had to be carried out in England if
the island kingdom was not to fall behind in the competition for power"); WENNERLIND, CASUALTIES
OF CREDIT, supra note 16, at 234; see also Genoa, in DAILY POST, May 3, 1720..
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Figure 1. "The Fairground of the Action-men, or the pleasure and sorrow
of thieving. " Printed in the Netherlands, 1720, and included in the
collection The Great Mirror of Folly (Het groote tafereel der dwaasheid),
vol. 1, no. 22. According to a poem that appears below, the figure
standing on the chariot vomiting shares (marked "Rotterdam, "
"Mississippi, " and "South Sea") is John Law. The banners flying over the
square read "Quincampoix" and "Bombario," the latter an insulting
nickname for the great financier. In the clouds above, Jupiter prepares to
banish the stockbrokers to "eternal darkness."38
38. For additional detail, see 1650. De Kermis-Kraam, in CATALOGUE OF PRINTS AND DRAWINGS
IN THE BRITISH MUSEUM, DIVISION I, VOLUME II-JUNE 1689 TO 1733 489-91 (1873).
174 [Vol. 29:2
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Once again it was John Blunt who stepped into the breach. Since the
death of Queen Anne and the fall of Harley in 1714, the South Sea House
had distanced itself from its Tory roots and cultivated friends in the new
Whig-Hanoverian administration.39 Capitalizing on these connections, as
well as Law's innovations in public finance, Blunt now proposed that the
Company be permitted to purchase the rest of Britain's outstanding
national debt-more than £31 million-using new issues of Company
stock, with the rate of conversion set by market demand.40 In exchange for
consolidating its debt, the government would pay the Company an annual
six percent interest rate, versus the nine percent it paid on the
unconsolidated debt. Blunt gambled that England's ongoing economic
boom would bolster the price of South Sea stock, driving down the cost of
repurchasing the national debt, and thus generating a large surplus for the
Company that could be used to fund new projects and enrich the major
stockholders.41 The Company sought to further inflate the price of its stock
by permitting buyers to purchase on margin, by allowing shareholders to
pledge existing shares as security for loans, 'and by secretly buying up its
own stock when demand flagged.42 In addition, large numbers of shares
were gifted to prominent courtiers and political figures, including John
Aislabie, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Stanhope and Sunderland, the
dominant figures in the reigning Whig government, and the Duchess of
Kendall, the mistress of George I. The King himself was widely reputed to
be an investor. Such celebrity investors were part of the Company's
39. See MACDONALD, supra note 17, at 208-9; CRUICKSHANKS & ERSKINE-HILL, supra note 6, at
57 The Whig essayist and MP Joseph Addison stated in a 1714 letter that the South Sea Company had
attempted to bribe him in exchange for supporting its projects. See Joseph Addison, Letter to Charles
Montagu, Earl of Halifax, 30 November 1714, in LETTERS 307 (1941).
40. Blunt's original plan was to assume the entire national debt, including that held by the East
India Company and the Bank of England, but this proved politically impossible. See SPERLING, supra
note 1, at 28.
41. Although the South Sea Company conceded many points as it negotiated with Parliament in
the spring of 1720, even agreeing to make a one-time payment of E7 million to the Exchequer for the
privilege of consolidating the national debt, one principle it steadfastly refused to compromise was a
floating rate of exchange between national debt and South Sea stock. This is because, lacking actual
revenues from trade, the Company could only pay dividends to investors through the issuance of new
stock. DICKSON, supra note 1, at 101, explains the scheme concisely: "the ratio of exchange was not
defined in advance. If, therefore, prices could be got up to 300, 400, or over, and the government's
creditors agreed to an exchange at this level, the amount of the new stock that the company could sell
for its own account would steadily increase. For example, if the whole E31m. of subscribable debts
were exchanged for only E7.75m. new South Sea stock valued at 400, the company, which would as
before be entitled to increase its capital by £31m., could sell the remaining E23.35m. stock in a rising
market. Conversely, if the price of South Sea Stock remained too low, the whole scheme would be in
danger of foundering. For the government's creditors would not agree to a disadvantageous exchange
unless they had the prospect of reselling on a rising market. . Everything depended, therefore, on the
'rise of the stock."' Cf DERINGER, CALCULATED VALUES (manuscript in progress), chapter 5,
42. P.H. Kelly, 'Industry and Virtue versus Luxury and Corruption': Berkeley, Walpole, and the
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advertising campaign.4 The publicity helped to supercharge the economic
boom; between February and July the price of South Sea stock soared
from E125 to £1050.
Its stratospheric ascent fostered a climate of avarice and speculative
expectation; throughout the summer of 1720 advertisements for new
ventures in trade and finance littered Exchange Alley." Fired by rumors of
joint ventures with the South Sea House, the market capitalization of the
Royal African and East India companies more than doubled. Observers
both mocked and marveled at the brave new world in which vast paper
fortunes might be made and lost overnight.45 The preface to the comic play
Exchange-Alley, or the stock-jobber turned gentleman (1720) depicted a
nation under the spell of an obsession:
If you Resort o any publick Office, or place of Business, the whole
Enquiry is, How are the Stocks? if you are at a Coffee-House, the
only conversation turns on the Stocks. . if you Repair to a Tavern,
the edifying Subject (especially to a Philosopher) is the South-Sea
Company; ifyou wait on a Lady of Quality, you'll find her hastening
to her House ofIntelligence in Exchange-Alley.46
A bemused columnist for Applebee's Weekly, the quintessential
administration newspaper, lampooned the delirious consumption of
parvenus who "buy South Sea Jewels; hire South Sea Maids; take new
Country South Sea Houses.. .set up South Sea Coaches, and buy South
Sea Estates."4 7 And Thomas Gordon, writing as the "Humourist" and
already precociously anti-clerical, cracked that "there is now-a-days more
to be got by the Alley than the Altar," and that the only churchmen in
England who still preached against the South Sea fever were the bitter few
with nothing invested.48
This orgy of speculation seemed increasingly unmoored from reality,
and at the bubble's apex nothing was more common than predictions of
imminent disaster and universal ruin.49 Many supposed, with the comic
43. SILKE STRATMANN, MYTHS OF SPECULATION: THE SOUTH SEA BUBBLE AND 18TH-CENTURY
ENGLISH LITERATURE 41-42 (2000).
44. 2 WILLIAM ROBERT SCOTT, THE CONSTITUTION AND FINANCE OF ENGLISH, SCOTTISH, AND
IRISH JOINT-STOCK COMPANIES (1910), 445 lists twenty-nine new projects advertised in May 1720,
and eighty-eight in June at the height of the bubble. DICKSON, supra note 1, at 145 adds that while
many of these new corporations "were quite blatantly swindles," many others were legitimate
enterprises.
45. Thomas Gordon, A compleat History of the late Septennial Parliament (1722), in 2
COLLECTION OF TRACTS BY THE LATE JOHN TRENCHARD AND THOMAS GORDON 56 (1751).
46. ANON, EXCHANGE-ALLEY: OR, THE STOCK-JOBBER TURN'D GENTLEMAN 6 (1720).
47. APPLEBEE'S ORIGINAL WEEKLY JOURNAL (London), Aug. 6, 1720.
48. [Thomas Gordon], Of the Bubbles (1720), in 2 THE HUMOURIST: BEING ESSAYS UPON
SEVERAL SUBJECTS 16 (1725).
49. See, e.g., THE BUBBLERS MEDLEY, OR A SKETCH OF THE TIMES (1720); THE SOUTH-SEA
BALLAD, SET BY A LADY (1720); THE HUBBLE BUBBLES A BALLAD TO THE TUNE OF O'ER THE HILLS
176 [Vol. 29:2
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versifier Edward Ward, that its ending would necessarily be
catastrophic-and violent.
But should our South Sea Babel fall,
What Numbers would be Frowning,
The Losers must then ease their Gall
By Hanging or by Drowningo
For a glimpse of their future Britons in the summer of 1720 needed only
to glance across the Channel, where Law's vaunted "system" lay in ruins,
the victim of its own vaulting ambitions.5 1 And yet when the day of
reckoning arrived in early autumn, Alexander Pope would claim to have
been taken by surprise. "Most people thought the time wou'd come," he
wrote to Atterbury, "but no man prepar'd for it; no man consider'd it
would come like a Thief in the night, exactly as it happens in the case of
our death."5 2
In late August the stock wobbled, and then plunged precipitously. By
September shares were trading at fifteen percent of their peak value, the
Sword Blade Bank had failed, and a cascading panic produced runs on
every bank in the City.5 3 John Blunt petitioned the ministry for a
bodyguard after being shot at in the street by a disappointed speculator.'
By October the implosion of credit was the most urgent topic of discussion
in the British Isles; Jonathan Swift reported from Dublin that the
"Conversation is full of nothing but South-sea, and the Ruin of the
Kingdom, and scarcity of money."" In Amsterdam, where South Sea
shares had been a fashionable investment, rioters torched a coffeehouse
frequented by British traders.5 6 And in England, citizen petitions described
shuttered workshops, deepening misery, and popular indignation: "the
Cries and Clamours of an injur'd People from all Parts are loud for
Justice."57
AND FAR A WAY (1720).
50. EDWARD WARD, THE DELIGHTS OF THE BOTTLE: OR, THE COMPLEAT VINTNER. WITH THE
HUMOURS OF BUBBLE UPSTARTS 58 (1720).
51. For a sensitive analysis of why Law's Systbme failed, assigning blame to both political
opposition in the French court and Law's own errors, see MURPHY, supra note 32, at 230-43.
52. Alexander Pope, Letter to Bishop Atterbury, 23 Sept. 1720, in 2 CORRESPONDENCE (1956)
53. Cf SOME CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 35.
53. SOME CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 35, at 16,
54. CARSWELL, supra note 1, at 150; cf Lady A. Irwin, Letter to [Lord Carlisle], Dec. 24, 1720,
in MANUSCRIPTS OF THE EARL OF CARLISLE, Historical Manuscripts Commission, Fifteenth Report,
Appendix, Part VI (1897), at 26.
55. Jonathan Swift, Letter to Vanessa [Esther van Homrigh], Oct. 26, 1720, in 2
CORRESPONDENCE 361 (Harold Williams ed., 1963)..
56. CARSWELL, supra note 1, at 166.
57. COLLECTION OF THE SEVERAL PETITIONS supra note 26 [Colchester],; cf Gordon, Of Stock-
Jobbers (1720), in 2 THE HUMOURIST, supra note 48, at 20 ("High Expectations and great Plenty are
succeeded by general Diffidence, prevailing Fears, Bankruptcy and Poverty"); Gordon, 1 CL (II),
supra note 2, at41 (12 November 1720); Trenchard and Gordon, I CL (X), supra note 2, at 80 (Jan. 3,
2017] 177
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As the corrupt dealings between the South Sea Company and Parliament
gradually came into focus,8 the citizens of Bristol pleaded "[t]hat no
man's greatness, ill-gotten riches, or flight from justice, may screen him
from public punishment."9 The outcry for accountability echoed in the
halls of Westminster. Joseph Jekyll's resolution for "punishing the
authors" of the crisis passed unanimously, while "[o]thers tooke exception
to itt as too tender."a An investigative Committee was formed, whose
membership included radical backbenchers of both parties,61 and which
issued scathing reports at regular intervals.6 2 Every Director of the South
Sea Company was imprisoned in the Tower, where they were joined by
the partners of the Sword Blade Bank and John Aislabie, the Chancellor of
the Exchequer, whose arrest was celebrated with bonfires in London.63
After a humiliating examination on the floor of the Commons, Sunderland,
the head of the Whig government, resigned in disgrace."' The South Sea
Sufferer's Bill, passed in May, stripped the ex-directors of varying
fractions of their fortunes, and used it to repay the Treasury for the
emergency loans keeping the Company and its stockholders afloat.65
Edward Gibbon, whose grandfather was among those dispossessed by
the Sufferer's Bill, would later excoriate these "violent and arbitrary
1721); APPLEBEE'S ORIGINAL WEEKLY J. (London), Oct. 29, 1720 ("It has reduc'd thousands of
Families, who liv'd tolerably well before, to want Bread; and has fill'd our Streets with Objects of
Misery inexpressible"); ANON, FURTHER REASONS OFFER'D. . FOR MAKING VOID AND ANNULLING
FRAUDULENT AND USURIOUS CONTRACTS 1 (1721); Arthur Onslow, Letter to [Hon. John
Molesworth], Feb. 4, 1721, in 8 REPORTS ON MANUSCRIPTS IN VARIOUS COLLECTIONS (LINDLEY
WOOD; CLEMENTS; UNWIN) 297, Historical Manuscripts Commission (1913) Some contemporaries
doubted the more extreme reports, particularly as the economy rebounded the following year, see, e.g.,
COMPLEAT SET OF ST. JAMES'S JOURNALS Dec. 12, 1722, Issue 33, 7.
58. It was revealed in the spring of 1721 that the Company had recorded fictitious "sales" of its
stock to leading politicians and courtiers, bribes amounting to a total of E574,000. The full entries
were locked in the secret "green ledger" of its Treasurer, Robert Knight, who fled to Antwerp. See
CARSWELL, supra note 1, at 100-5; CRUICKSHANKS & ERSKINE-HILL, supra note 6, at 58-9.
59. "City of Bristol" (Apr. 1721), in 7 COBBETT'S PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND 768
1811).
60. Thomas Brodrick to Lord Chancellor Middleton, Dec. 10, 1720, in 2 WILLIAM COXE,
MEMOIRS OF THE LIFE OF SIR ROBERT WALPOLE 202 (1798); cf Sir William Robinson to [Lord
Carlisle], Jan. 12, 1721, in MANUSCRIPTS OF THE EARL OF CARLISLE, supra note 54, at 27.
61. Its membership included the leading parliamentary critics of the South Sea scheme: Thomas
Brodrick (its chair), Viscount Molesworth, Joseph Jekyll, and Archibald Hutcheson. Eleven of its
thirteen members were either Tories or Independent Whigs.
62. See REPORTS OF THE COMMITTEE OF SECRECY.. RELATING TO THE SOUTH-SEA DIRECTORS
(1721). That the Committee's collected reports were reprinted by Trenchard and Gordon as a pamphlet
in 1721 should give some idea of their tone.
63. See CARSWELL, supra note 1, at 187-206, 219-34.
64. Sunderland was narrowly acquitted of wrongdoing in a vote of the Commons. See The
Commons take into Consideration that Part of the Report which relates to the Earl of Sunderland (Mar.
15, 1721), in 7 COBBETT, supra note 59, at 755-56; CARSWELL, supra note 1, at 204-6. The Earl of
Stanhope, his partner in the administration, died of a stroke before his culpability could be decided.
The fall of both men cleared Walpole's path to the premiership. Sunderland then began an ambiguous
flirtation with the Pretender, cut short by his own death in 1722.
65. CARSWELL, supra note 1, at 220-21.
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proceedings" as "the sport of a lawless majority" and a violation of long-
established English liberties:
a bill of pains and penalties was introduced-a retroactive statute to
punish the offences which did not exist at the time they were
committed. Such a pernicious violation of liberty and law can only be
excused by the most imperious necessity; nor could it be defended on
this occasion by the plea of impending danger or useful
example.. .Against a bill of pains and penalties it is the common
right of every subject to be heard by his counsel at the bar: ... their
prayer was refused, and their oppressors, who required no evidence,
would listen to no defence.66
As an index of the arbitrary atmosphere prevailing in Parliament,
Gibbon pointed to a notorious speech given by "that ardent Whig" Robert
Molesworth, urging the accelerated trial and execution of the South Sea
directors.67
In spite of these apparent victories, the party of vengeance felt
continually frustrated by its inability to fully expose and punish the
originators of the financial crisis.68 The South Sea conspirators were
quietly released in the summer of 1721. None would be sentenced to
prison. And while Parliament levied financial penalties on nearly all of the
Directors, creative accounting of assets allowed most to retain a
comfortable living, so that the Duke of Wharton could quip scathingly that
they were left with only "Thirty Thousand Pounds to furnish them with
Bread and Water."69  Saint John Brodrick, nephew of the Secret
Committee's Chair, would lament in a letter of May 1721 that "the
directors and their friends" were likely to "slip thro' [the] fingers" of
Parliament, "and that nothing further will be done as to confiscation,
hanging, &c." The Committee's inquest had been "baffled by a set of men
66. GIBBON, AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 12, at 10-12.
67. Id. at 10-11 ("The speech of Lord Molesworth, the author of the state of Denmark, may shew
the temper, or rather the intemperance, of the House of Commons. . .").
68. See [Daniel Defoe?], A BRIEF DEBATE UPON THE DISSOLVING OF THE LATE PARLIAMENT 16
(1722) ("That they shewed us the Knavery, but sat still, and let the Knaves escape, That they trac'd the
Crime till they found the Criminals were too near them to be touch'd; and, That they let the little
Agents sink under the weight of their Resentment, but let the Great Ones slip thro' their Fingers and
escape.").
69. [Philip, Duke of Wharton], TRUE BRITON (London), July 26, 1723, at 123; cf Gordon, supra
note 45, at 60 (". . as to the Directors Estates, they gave in Inventories so very inferior to their real
Fortunes. . ."). SPERLING, supra note 1, at 35, estimates total confiscations of £2,400,000. DICKSON,
supra note 1, at 189, calls the financial penalties "a severe but not fatal blow. In the cases which can
be traced they seem to have retained enough to support themselves and help endow their descendants."
Aislabie, for instance, retained £115,000 out of his estate of £150,000. The exception proves the rule:
the Whig leadership ensured that John Blunt was left with only scraps of his vast fortune as
punishment for his turn as "star witness" in the Committee's investigations. See CARSWELL, supra
note 1, at 228.
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whom guilt, money, &c. have link't in the closest bond."70 He was
alluding to Robert Walpole," the new head of government, who labored
indefatigably to prop up the damaged credit markets, soften the
punishment of the accused, and conceal the deep complicity of the Whig
party and the Hanoverian court in their ruinous profiteering.7 2 Although he
was unable to derail the inquest entirely, Walpole's mastery of
parliamentary tactics and international diplomacy kept sanctions against
politicians and bankers to a minimum.73
As public opinion gravitated toward exceptional measures capable of
punishing the guilty and relieving the public, the administration and its
defenders retreated to the ramparts of due process, the ancient constitution,
and the rule of law. For the MP Grey Neville the procedural irregularities
of the Sufferer's Bill rendered it a subversion of "our boasted liberty" and
"our happy constitution," and amounted to "tearing up parliaments by the
roots." 74  Anthony Hammond, a former aide-de-camp to the Duke of
Chandos, blended his skeptical appraisal of the South Sea prosecutions
with a paean to "our invaluable Constitution," the Magna Charta, and all
"those excellent Laws by which the Liberty of our Persons, and the
70. Saint John Brodrick, Letter to Lord Middleton, 24 May 1721, in Coxe,, supra note 60, at 216;
cf Viscount Molesworth, Letter to Hon. John Molesworth, May 19, 1721, in REPORTS ON
MANUSCRIPTS IN VARIOUS COLLECTIONS, supra note 57, at 312; 2 Gordon, Septennial, 59.
71. Walpole had been excluded from the Stanhope-Sunderland ministry in 1717 (the so-called
"Whig Split"), and was on record against the South Sea Act, making him the obvious choice for party
leadership after the crash. On the other hand, like many of his distinguished contemporaries (Newton,
Pope, and Viscount Molesworth) Walpole was a substantial investor in the scheme.
72. The cri de cwur of Gordon, I CL (XXVIII), supra note 2, at 205-6 (May 1721) is
characteristic: "Who is it that openly screens open guilt? Who is it that conceals the evidence of guilt?
Who is it that browbeats the pursuers of guilt? Who is it that throws obstacles in the Parliament's way?
Who is it that lengthens out the process? Who is it that strives to defeat the enquiry?" The gloss of
Coxe, supra note 60, at 251, his early biographer, is much more flattering: "we have already
mentioned his endeavours to stem the torrent of parliamentary vengeance.. he did not shrink from
avowing his sentiments, when any flagrant act of injustice was going to be committed." Walpole's
chief motivation was probably to curry favor with the crown by helping to cover up its deep
involvement in the scheme.
73. On Walpole's "bailout" of the financial system, finalized on August 10, 1721, see DICKSON,
supra note 1, at 176; and DALE, supra note 20, at 146-47.On Walpole's mobilization of partisan
loyalties to block the investigation of Whig dignitaries, see the paraphrase of his speech in the letter of
Thomas Brodrick to Lord Middleton, Mar. 16, 1721, in Coxe, supra note 60, at214. On Walpole's
efforts to delay the inquiry until the departure of Country Tories for the harvest in autumn 1721 could
assure him a floor majority, see the letter of Saint John Brodrick to Lord Middleton, May 24, 1721, in
Coxe, supra note 60, at 215. Walpole's most audacious maneuver was to orchestrate the flight of
Robert Knight, treasurer of the South Sea Company, to the Austrian Netherlands, along with his
infamous "green book" of bribes to politicians. Knight was arrested in Antwerp, where the local
constitution (theoretically) barred extradition. In public, George I and Walpole demanded Knight's
return; in private, through diplomatic backchannels, it was made clear that a refusal to extradite would
be received favorably, and might result in English recognition of Hapsburg claims in Italy. The
parliamentary opposition suspected a corrupt bargain along these lines, but was unable to establish
definite proof. See CARSWELL, supra note 1, at 207-18; cf Defoe, supra note 60, at 18; Trenchard &
Gordon, supra note 2, 1 CL (XXII), 159 (Mar. 25, 1721).
74. Mr. Grey Neville's Speech in the House of Commons in favour of Mr. Aislabie (June 26,
1721), in 7 COBBETT, supra note 59, at 854-56.
16
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol29/iss2/2
Lebovitz
Enjoyment of our Estates are preserv'd."7  Hammond insisted that the
people were being whipped into a fervor by "the Great Cato" and his
confederates, and were in danger of returning to the worst abuses of the
Star Chamber in their attempt to hold the accused to account. John
Aislabie, defending himself before the House of Lords, declared he was
"cut off at one Stroke from the Commonwealth, and stript of the Birth-
rights and Privileges of Englishmen."76 He added that the Sufferer's Bill
was illegal even under the malleable standards governing attainder, since
it omitted a formal recitation of facts, and won passage in the upper
chamber only by being joined to a revenue bill.7 7 Even Lord Molesworth's
son, though "a great lover of justice," confessed his doubts about its
"overeager pursuit" in this case. "We are at a sad pass," he rued, "when
our remedy is as much to be feared as the disease."7 8
The emerging constellation of anti-Walpolean thinkers and writers was
distinctly unimpressed by these self-pitying evocations of Anglo-Saxon
liberty. It was not the allies of reform who had placed the rights and
freedoms of the nation in jeopardy, but rather the camarilla of politicians
and bankers that Walpole so fiercely protected. Like the son of Aeolus in
Montesquieu's Persian Letters, they had sold the people bags of wind and
left them to reap the whirlwind.79 In these circumstances, nalve talk of
rights and liberties was highly misleading. "No Man has greater regard for
our Laws than myself," averred the unsigned treatise Considerations on
the Present State of the Nation. But it was now necessary to enjoin those
laws in order to repair the ravaged economy and unwind the piratical
South Sea scheme. Britain's tangled skein of laws, rules, and precedents
had become a fagade for plunder and predation. "I think every one will
allow, we have been living in a sort of lawless State for some
Months.. .We can hardly say we have been acting under a Law, but have
rather been in Hobbes's State of Nature for some time, and are now
returning to the State of Society."" In these circumstances the rule of law
was lawless, and only its temporary suspension could guarantee its
eventual return. To understand how English political thought arrived at
75. ANTHONY HAMMOND, A MODEST APOLOGY 7, 16, 8, 12, 35 (1721), The Duke of Chandos
was one of the most prominent speculators in the bubble, and lost a significant part of his fortune in
1720.
76. JOHN AISLABIE, SPEECH OF THE RIGHT HONOURABLE. . 18, 20, 21.[July 19] (1721).
77. Id. at 3; cf Sir J. Vanbrugh, Letter to [Lord Carlisle], Apr. 22, 1721, in MANUSCRIPTS OF THE
EARL OF CARLISLE, supra note 54, at 33 ("the Lords should not have passed it, had it come single").
78. [Richard Molesworth?], Letter to Hon. John Molesworth, Jan. 27, 1721, in REPORTS ON
MANUSCRIPTS IN VARIOUS COLLECTIONS, supra note 57at 296.
79. Montesquieu, 2 PERSIAN LETTERS 257-66 (Letter CXXXVI) (John Ozell trans., 1722), (the
famous satire of John Law, who appears as the mythical offspring of Aeolus and a Scottish nymph,
and sells bags of wind to the inhabitants of Fednelon's pastoral idyll Betica). Cf Dror Wahrman and
Jonathan Sheehan, INVISIBLE HANDS 94-96 (2015).
80. ANON, CONSIDERATIONS ON THE PRESENT STATE OF THE NATION 61-62 (1720).
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this startling terminus, we must return to the Glorious Revolution and the
origins of financial raison d'dtat.
II. ECONOMIC REASON OF STATE
A. National Securities
It is now widely accepted that "reason of state" had from its inception
an economic as well as a military dimension, and that it was this
commercial face of raison d'dtat that would become most prominent in
the eighteenth century.8 ' As large territorial states began to coalesce in
sixteenth century Europe, it became clear that military prowess was
intertwined with questions of commerce, population, and agricultural
surplus. And so from its first formulation in the work of Giovanni Botero
and his contemporaries, reason of state involved "the explicit opening up
of politics and statecraft to economic concerns."82 In late Tudor and early
Stuart England this involved a close imbrication of reason of state
doctrines with fiscal and monetary policy, climaxing in judicial decisions
that lashed these financial powers firmly to the royal prerogative.83
But our understanding of this phenomenon remains incomplete.
Although historians as diverse as Istvan Hont and Michel Foucault have
explored the extension and application of raison d'dtat to matters of trade,
debt, and agricultural planning in the mid-eighteenth century, and Michael
Sonenscher has established the centrality of public debt to the French
Revolution, no one has yet remarked on the earlier penetration of this style
of thought into the domain of financial markets, which began in the
decade following the 1688 revolution.' While it was only in the panicked
atmosphere of 1720 that these ideas cohered into a new theory of the
English constitution, its basic components had already been in circulation
for more than two decades, reshaping England's political imagination in
ways that have gone largely unnoticed. This set of authors, in particular
the novelist and newspaperman Daniel Defoe, was the first to recognize
81. See, e.g., THOMAS POOLE, REASON OF STATE 132-67 (2015) on ideas of global trade in the
eighteenth century British Empire.
82. Sophus A. Reinert, Introduction, in ANTONIO SERRA, A SHORT TREATISE ON THE WEALTH
AND POVERTY OF NATIONS 39 (Jonathan Hunt, trans., Reinert ed., 2011).
83. On coinage see The Case of mixed Money, Trin. 2 Jacob. L 1605, in A REPORT OF CASES AND
MATTERS IN LAW, RESOLVED AND ADJUDGED IN THE KING'S COURTS IN IRELAND 48-77, (Sir John
Davies ed, trans., 1762), esp. 50 (citing Bodin) and 60 (citing Rome's war with Hannibal). For
commentary, see CHRISTINE DESAN, MAKING MONEY 267-74 (2014). On revenues, see Proceedings
in the case of Ship-Money, between the King and John Hampden, esq. in the Exchequer, 13 Charles I.
1637, in 3 COBBETF'S COMPLETE STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS 825-1314 ( 1809).
84. ISTvAN HONT, JEALOUSY OF TRADE 8-15, 325-53 (2005); MICHEL FOUCAULT, SECURITY,
TERRITORY, POPULATION: LECTURES AT THE COLLEGE DE FRANCE, 1977-1978 337-40 (Graham
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and conceptualize the potentially lethal speed and instability of financial
markets, and to propose as a remedy the abrogation of established rights
and liberties on grounds of "emergency"; that is to say, they inaugurated a
conversation on markets, social acceleration, and constitutional law that
would move to the center of British public life during the South Sea
catastrophe. In this section I offer a history of financial reason of state in
the years before 1720, in order to make legible the political and legal
developments that followed."
The Glorious Revolution brought with it an unprecedented surge in
incorporation. "In the period 1690-1695," reports Richard Dale, "there
was a boom in company flotations for general subscription . . . by 1695
there were at least 140 companies with a combined capital of E4.5
million."86 This furious development was inseparable from England's
increasingly bellicose foreign policy; many of the new companies were
chartered either to supply war matiriel, or to replace the traffic in French
commodities interrupted by hostilities, or to export to overseas markets
captured in battle. Dazzled by this new prosperity, investors flocked to
Exchange Alley, a cluster of coffeehouses ranged on a narrow street in
central London, to engage in a series of increasingly sophisticated
financial transactions."
The new possibilities of finance and investment produced a moral panic,
but critics of "stock-jobbing" also registered a more serious complaint: in
an age where public debt was bought and sold in international markets,
shadowy financiers now held a vast and illegitimate sway over the
commonwealth.89 "The Wealth of the Nation," as one observer put it in
1696, was now at "the mercy of some self-interested crafty Knaves.""
Daniel Defoe, in one of his first publications, gave these anxieties full
85. In this section, and indeed throughout the paper, I will refer mostly interchangeably to "reason
of state," "salus populi," "necessity," and "emergency." I am aware that these terms come out of
different historical traditions (sixteenth century Italy, the Roman republic, the Roman Codex, medieval
canon law, etc.), and that careful scholarship will enforce these distinctions where possible and
appropriate. But the sources I rely on in this paper do not adhere to these definitional boundaries with
anything like the rigor we might prefer, tracking freely and fluidly between these different
appellations. The exception is "reason of state", which is rarely used by any source quoted in this
paper, and which I sometimes employ here for the sake of linguistic variety. I am comfortable doing
this in part because I don't recognize anything in the "reason of state" tradition, broadly understood,
that excludes its application to this material.
86. DALE, supra note 20, at 25-26.
87. Giles Parkinson, War, Peace and the Rise of the London Stock Market, in THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF EMPIRE IN THE EARLY MODERN WORLD 131, 134-35 (Sophus Reinert & Pemille Roge
eds., 2013).
88. STUART BANNER, ANGLO-AMERICAN SECURITIES REGULATION 28-31 (1998); Parksinson,
supra note 87, at 141.
89. See, e.g., LAURA JEAN ROSENTHAL, INFAMOUS COMMERCE: PROSTITUTION IN EIGHTEENTH-
CENTURY BRITISH LITERATURE 77-80 (2006); CATHERINE INGRASSIA, COMMERCE AND GENDER IN
EARLY EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 17-39 (1998); BANNER, supra note 88, at 65-72.
90. POST MAN AND THE HISTORICAL ACCOUNT (London), Oct. 22, 1696.
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expression. The people, he wrote,
ought to have a Care of afronting Men, in whose Power it lay so
much to check the most essential point of the Cities prosperity, their
Trade; and to let the Government see too, that they are Men of such
Figures and Authority in the Nation, and can at their Pleasure so
manage the Cash and Trade of the Town, that they can stop our
Credit, break our Goldsmiths, sink our Stocks, embarrass the Bank,
and ruine Trade at their Will and Pleasure.91
We can distinguish two concerns in this critique. First, the state's
increasing reliance on private bankers and speculators to fund its public
ventures risked corroding the foundations of sovereignty and self-
government. Defoe put the point most sharply in his 1719 Anatomy of
Exchange Alley: "Is this an Advantage fit to be put into the Hand of a
Subject? Are the King's Affairs to go up and down as they please, and the
Credit of his Majesty's Councils rise and fall as these Men shall please to
value them? This would be making them Kings."92 Defoe may have had in
mind the 1710 "Loss of the City," in which the Bank of England warned
Queen Anne that it would refuse to lend to a Tory administration. Harley,
then about to be named First Lord of the Treasury, deplored that "private
persons.. .should have the presumption to take upon them to direct the
sovereign," adding bitterly that "[i]f this be so let us swear allegiance to
these [men], and give them a right to our passive obedience."93 But Defoe
had in fact foreseen something like this scenario nine years earlier,
warning that "Mercenary Brokers and Companies" would inevitably
attempt to dictate terms to the government by precipitating an artificial
"Scarcity of Money," paralyzing the national commerce and bankrupting
the state.94 When Defoe raged against royal bankers and "Slavery to
Creditors," he was not speaking merely figuratively; the power exercised
by those at the center of these new networks of information and exchange
seemed terrifyingly unlimited.95
Second, this new class of speculators constituted an intrinsic danger to
91. DANIEL DEFOE, THE VILLAINY OF STOCK-JOBBERS DETECTED 10 (1701). Defoe was more
mild in his earlier ESSAY UPON PROJECTS 32 (1697), where stock-jobbing is criticized as "a Modem
way of Thieving.. .by which honest men are guil'd", omitting the suggestion of wider social danger.
92. DANIEL DEFOE, AN ANATOMY OF EXCHANGE ALLEY 59 (1719); cf ROGER NORTH, THE
GENTLEMAN ACCOMPTANT 291-92 (1714).
93. [Robert Harley], Letter to Arthur Moore, June 19, 1710, in 5 MANUSCRIPTS OF HIS GRACE
THE DUKE OF PORTLAND 545 (1891).
94. DEFOE, supra note 91, at 9.
95. DANIEL DEFOE, FAIR PAYMENT NO SPUNGE 92 (1717); cf DANIEL DEFOE, THE
CONSOLIDATOR: OR SUNDRY TRANSACTIONS FROM THE WORLD OF THE MOON 158 (1705). Consider
also Trenchard, 1 CL (XX) 143, supra note 2, Mar. 11, 1721, ("The dregs of the people, and the scum
of the Alley, can buy Italian and German sovereigns out of their territories; and their levees have been
lately crowded with swarms of dependent princes, like Roman consuls, and Eastern monarchs").
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the public safety, whether or not it attempted to seize the levers of
government. Thomas Baston offered an extended corporeal metaphor
intended to illustrate the folly of devolving responsibility for managing the
national fisc to a nebulous network of private interests:
for as the Body Politick may be compar'd to the Body Natural, so the
Coin of a Kingdom may be compar'd to the Vital Blood in the Body
of a Man, which if it lodges only in one part, and does not duly
circulate throughout the whole, causes Plurisies, Apoplexies,
Convulsions; and, in short, endangers, or destroys the
Constitution. .96
Often, it was thought, these "Convulsions" were deliberately engineered
by predatory investors; Defoe accused traders of "Coning false News, this
way good, that way bad; whispering imaginary Terrors, Frights, Hopes,
Expectations, and then preying upon the Weakness of those, whose
Imaginations they have wrought upon."97 Thus the private financial
markets on which England depended might easily, through malignancy or
incompetence, misallocate credit and stop the wheels of commerce. The
Jacobite rebellion of 1715, Defoe reminded his reader, had been
accompanied by a run on the Bank, bringing England perilously close to
default. Had the Pretender actually landed, the financial panic might have
been equivalent to a loss on the battlefield. "Is it not absolutely Necessary
then to Great Britain," he queried, "to put it out of the Power of her
Enemies to throw her into such FITS?" 98
The danger was not merely hypothetical; Defoe argued it was
ineluctably in the interests of financiers to foment panics and runs, since it
was precisely in the midst of such pandemonium that hey made their
greatest windfalls. A foreign invasion-or a second Jacobite uprising-
would offer an irresistible temptation to profit from the upheaval and
uncertainty of the state.
[W]hen ever any Wickedness is in hand, any Mischief by the worst of
the Nations Enemies upon the Wheel, the Stock-Jobbers are naturally
made assistant to it, that they become Abettors of Treason, assistant
to Rebellion and Invasion.. .we are oblig'd to expose a Sort of Men,
who are more dangerous than a whole Nation of Enemies Abroad, an
96. THOMAS BASTON, THOUGHTS ON TRADE, AND A PUBLICK SPIRIT 6 (1716). See also THOMAS
HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (1651), ch. XXIV ("the sanguinification of the commonwealth").
97. DEFOE, supra note 92, at 3. Defoe would have had a number of specific examples in mind.
His Review reported in 1704 that a cabal of "Exchange-Alley Jockeys" was suspected of having
disseminated a false report that the French had captured St. Helena in order to profit from the ensuing
disarray. See D. Foe, "ADVICE from the Scandalous CLUB", DEFOE'S REVIEW, Aug. 5, 1704, at 191;
cf Thomas Gordon, An Essay on the Practice ofStock-Jobbing (1724), in 2 COLLECTION OF TRACTS,
supra note 45, at 83.
98. DEFOE, supra note 95, at 101.
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Evil more formidable than the Pestilence, and in their Practise more
fatal to the Publick than an Invasion of Spaniards.9
Capital, in other words, has no country. Thomas Baston arrived at a
similar conclusion three years earlier: "these wretched Men thrive best
when the Nation is in a Ferment, in times of War, Rebellion, and publick
Calamity, which they make a Market of." 1" The critique of stock-jobbing,
then, was not merely that it permitted a small coterie of men to exercise an
astonishing degree of power over the social and economic life of the
nation; this new class of financial projectors also had an incentive to sow
discord, spread alarming rumors, and foment crises in order to reap profits.
And yet defenders insisted that no law punished the free trade in
securities, and that Magna Charta barred Parliament from acting to
suppress the merchants of Exchange Alley.i"1 For Jonathan Swift, the
celebrated poet, novelist, and "country" polemicist, this gap between
criminality and illegality posed an insuperable paradox for England's free
government. "When," he lamented "a Law is made to stop some growing
Evil, the Wits of those, whose Interest it is to break it with Secrecy or
Impunity, are immediately at Work," with the result that "a Stock-jobber,
and many other Retailers of Fraud.. .find out new Inventions, to elude the
Force of any Law made against hem." Swift connected the speculator's
skillful evasion of prohibitions on fraud to a more general failing of the
rule of law, its inability to grapple with sudden or unexpected events. The
parallel he drew to the recent assassination attempt against the Prime
Minister underscores the extent to which Swift considered the new
financial regime a clear and present danger to national stability:
Nay, what is almost incredible, had Guiscard surviv'd his detestable
Attempt upon Mr. Harley's Person, all the inflaming Circumstances
of the Fact, would not have sufficed, in the Opinion of many
Lawyers, to have punish'd him with Death; and the Publick must
have lain under this Dilemma, either to Condemn him by a Law, ex
post Facto (which would have been of dangerous Consequence, and
from an ignominious Precedent) or undergo the Mortification to see
the greatest Villain upon Earth escape unpunished, to the inifinite
Triumph and Delight of Popery and Faction.. .From these Defects in
our Laws, and the want of some discretionary Power safely lodg'd, to
exert upon Emergencies; as well as from the great Acquirements of
able Men, to elude the Penalties of those Laws they break, it is no
99. DEFOE, supra note 92, at 14-15.
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wonder, the Injuries done to the Publick, are so seldom redress'd.102
Swift diagnosed the pathology, but was unwilling to prescribe the strong
medicine it demanded; he dismissed the possibility of ex post facto laws or
emergency government to correct the slow-motion of criminal law in
dealing with fast-evolving forms of financial fraud. He was thus left,
rather weakly, to hope that comic "Satyr" and public shame might restrain
criminals too crafty or well-connected to be deterred by law. Defoe
evinced no such caution. He readily conceded that speculators were not
traitors within the letter of the law, but the state's jurisdiction was
grounded in its inherent right to defend itself, and to prosecute treason.
Will they tell us that running upon the Bank, and lowering the Stocks,
was no Treason? We know, that litterally speaking, those things are
no Treason: But is there not a plain constructive Treason in the
Consequences of it? Is not a wilful running down the publick Credit,
at a Time when the Nation is threatn'd with an Invasion from Abroad,
and Rebellion at Home?103
Where there was a violation of the social order, there must be a
punishment. And Defoe did not hesitate to enlist the heaviest artillery in
the armory of the British constitution against speculators who proved too
novel or clever for ordinary laws.
Defoe's invocation of constructive treason breathed new life into a legal
idea that had been at the crux of Whig opposition to James II.10
Throughout the seventeenth century, and particularly in the late Stuart
period, judges liberally construed the statutory definition of treason in
order to secure convictions against prominent Whig dissenters, from Lord
Russell to Algernon Sidney.10 As a result, "constructive treason" was
anathema to the generation of 1688; in the first year of the new regime
John Hawles petitioned "to prohibit the Judges to make any other than a
literral Construction" of the Treason Statute, while Robert Atkyns stated
succinctly that "[t]here ought to be no such thing as Constructive
Treason."l06
It is telling that Defoe, a vigorous exponent of the principles of 1688,
102. Jonathan Swift, THE ExAMINER, Apr. 26, 1711, at 1.
103. DEFOE, supra note 92, at 28; cf id.at 31 (if not "Literal Treason, and within reach of the
Statute, yet the Crime is in it self of the same Nature.").
104. See, e.g., Robert Harley, Speech in Parliament, 18 November 1692, in PARLIAMENTARY
DIARY OF NARCISSUS LUTrRELL, 1691-1693 237, (Henry Horwitz ed., 1972); Richard Hampden,
Speech in Parliament, 9 April 1689, in GREY'S DEBATES IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 226 (Anchitell
Grey ed., 1769).
105. Alexander H. Shapiro, Political Theory and the Growth of Defensive Safeguards in Criminal
Procedure, L. & HIST. REV. 215, 221 (1993).
106. SIR JOHN HAWLES, A REPLY TO A SHEET OF PAPER 36 (1689); SIR ROBERT ATKYNS, A
DEFENCE OF THE LATE LORD RUSSEL'S INNOCENCY 6 (1689)
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would flirt with the revival of this doctrine to bring some semblance of
order to the lawless frontier of high finance.'07 Indeed, he added that this
might already be, sub rosa, the official position of the government: in
1707, he reported, the crown had considered taking measures against two
wealthy Jacobite sympathizers suspected of organizing a run on the Bank
of England. "If things had gone on to extremities"-that is to say, had a
Stuart rising actually materialized-"they had doubtless been marked out
as persons the government were to take care of."'08 Defoe's willingness to
revise core tenets of the revolutionary catechism underlines the mounting
unease, even among mainstream writers, with the new model of
commercial society. And it pinpoints a genuine paradox of economic
citizenship: once the state locates its security in the stability of its markets,
it can be difficult to distinguish barter and exchange from sabotage and
treason.
Thus on the eve of the South Sea bubble many of the elements of a
financial raison d'tat had fallen into place. First, a dynamic economy was
now assumed to be critical to fighting wars and repressing rebellions, so
that any interruption in the flow of credit was understood as a threat to the
national security. Second, the new financial markets were visualized as a
space of turbulence and danger, where sudden, unforeseen commotions
might require rapid state interventions. And finally, speculators were
portrayed as amoral cosmopolitan mercenaries, willing to traffic in the
ruin of their country for a modest profit.
We can also discern the outline of a subtler idea: tumults and panics
might themselves constitute conditions of emergency, given their potential
to unleash destitution and spark social unrest. The resulting havoc might
reproduce the horrors of armed conflict without the firing of a single shot.
In the spring of 1720 it was commonly believed that John Law had
launched a concerted attack against the London market, buying and then
dumping large volumes of South Sea stock in the hopes of detonating
British credit.'" The prospect of a virtual war between the great powers,
107. The revolutionaries distinguished between constructive treason tried by judges, and
constructive treason tried by Parliament; the latter was at least in theory acceptable. See The Trial of
Algernon Sidney (1683), in 3 COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS 738, (Salmon ed., 1730). It is
not obvious what Defoe has in mind, but his loose usage of highly charged terminology is itself
indicative.
108. DEFOE, supra note 92, at 28. The bankers in question were Sir Richard Hoare and Sir Francis
Child, who were rumored to have hoarded over £100,000 in bank notes, demanding full payment in
specie at a moment when an invasion by James III was widely expected.
109. See John Law, Idde gndrale du nouveau systeme des finances (1720), in 3 (Euvres, supra
note 34, at 90 ("The English and the Dutch, the only commercial rivals of France, are scarcely in a
position to oppose the System, and if they had the temerity to try, France would be able to ruin their
credit."); Bishop Atterbury, Letter to James III, May 6, 1720, in 2 HISTORY OF ENGLAND 311, (Lord
Mahon ed., 1853) ("They have great sums of money in our stocks, which they may draw out at once,
and sink them if they please."). Regarding the suspicions of the English cabinet that Law planned to do
precisely that, see EDGAR FAURE, LA BANQUEROUTE DE LAW 400 (1977); Daniel Pulteney to James
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conducted by means of high-velocity trades and clandestine purchases,
underscored the lethal volatility of the new commercial world. But only in
the apocalyptic summer of 1720 did it become decisively clear that
economic disorder, generated neither by a foreign power nor in a time of
war, but only by the unpredictable gyrations of the market, could devastate
the nation.
The new danger was spotted by many, and summarized with particular
concision by Erasmus Philips:
It will hardly be credited in future Ages, that England Great as it
must be in History, was brought almost o the Brink of Ruin, in a few
days, without the Calamities either of a Foreign Invasion, or an
Intestine War; when they shall read how far our Arms have extended
their Conquests, that we held the Balance of Power of Europe, that
our Credit was so great, that it reached the utmost Limits of the
World, when they shall read that England's inviolable Faith, brought
our Enemies at all times to supply us with Money to carry on the War
against themselves; how is it possible they will believe that a few
days cou'd put a Period to this Greatness."l0
The crash was, in short, a state of emergency, equivalent in magnitude
to international or civil war."' And it was a natural next step to conclude
that the same unlimited powers that were activated in times of war and
rebellion should now be mobilized to contain the rising financial chaos.
"Cato", the pen name shared by John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon,
stood at the vanguard. "It is a Jest," they wrote, "for any Man to flatter
himself, that any State will not save the whole People, by the Ruin of a
Part of the People; when the Ruin of a Part is absolutely necessary to the
Preservation of the Whole." If the state refused to sacrifice Exchange
Alley through expropriations and extraordinary punishments, it too would
Craggs, Apr. 10, 1720, quoted in Murphy, supra note 32, at 240 Law, in turn, suspected that England
was behind the December 1719 run on the Banque Royale; see the dispatch of Lord Stair, Dec. 11,
1719, in 2 MISCELLANEOUS STATE PAPERS, supra note 35, at 600.
110. ERASMUS PHILIPS, I AN APPEAL TO COMMON SENSE; OR, SOME CONSIDERATIONS OFFER'D
TO RESTORE PUBLICK CREDIT 3-4 (1720).
111. Cf Gordon, 1 CL (VIII), supra note 2, at 67, (Dec. 24, 1720) ("All our losses, pillages, and
oppressions, since the Conquest, do not balance the present great calamity."); Gordon, 1 CL (II) 40
("at MARSEILLES. . .[the plague] has destroy'd, we are told, about sixty thousand Lives; ours has done
worse, it has renderd a much greater Number of Lives miserable"); Trenchard, I CL (XVI), supra note
2, at 122, (Feb. 11, 1721) ("crimes, which have no less object in view than the ruin of nations, and the
destruction of millions"); Trenchard, I CL (XX), supra note 2, at 141 (".. ruin millions, subvert the
policy and ceconomy of nations, and create general want, and its consequences, discontents,
insurrections, and civil wars"); [Daniel Defoe], THE DIRECTOR (London), Oct. 5, 1720 ("These men
have murder'd many Thousands.. they have made the whole City a Place of Rapine and Violence");
Mist's Weekly Journal, or Saturday's Post (London), Issue 101, Nov. 5, 1720 ("Fire, Plague, or Civil
War"); APPLEBEE'S ORIGINAL WEEKLY J. (London), Jan. 7, 1721, 17 ("every Body are pointing their
Weapons at some Body or other").
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be consumed in the general conflagration of credit.' 12 As support they
brandished the classical slogan of state necessity, salus populi suprema
lex.1 3 "[T]is a Maxim worth observing," wrote Gordon,
that the word Salus in this Place does not barely signify the Safety,
but also the Reputation and flourishing State of the People. It is
scarce a Question, surely, Whether our Coin has not been more
drain'd, and our Publick Credit more lessen'd by the Contrivances of
this Scheme, than by the Force of our Debts, the Weight of Taxes,
and the Expence of tedious Wars, all thrown in the Balance against
them?'1 4
No written or unwritten law could obstruct the state from taking action
when its markets were in jeopardy. This translation of the classical
doctrine of state necessity into the sphere of political economy would
exert a decisive influence on the political and constitutional debates that
followed.
B. Capital punishment
The failure of the South Sea scheme left thousands of British subjects
suddenly immiserated, and directed unprecedented public fury toward
those thought to be responsible for shattering the national economy."1
This anger quickly found its voice in an outpouring of broadsheets and
pamphlets imploring the exemplary punishment of the South Sea directors,
their allies in Parliament, and the "money'd men" who had conspired to
inflate the price of the stock. A petition circulated in the name of the cities
of Warwick and Stafford demanded a full accounting, followed by "the
taking exemplary Vengeance on all that are Sharers in the Guilt of it."" 6
Jonathan Swift, an outspoken early supporter of the South Sea Company,
now captured the public mood in a poem that pictured the directors
swinging from the gallows.
Antceus could, by Magick Charms
Recover Strength whene'er he fell;
112. Trenchard & Gordon, 1 CL (X), supra note 2, at 77; cf id., 80 ("Are we to save ourselves at
the expence of the gentlemen of the Alley? Or are we to perish together with them? The choice is easy.
Can they be so weak, as to form a pretended necessity, to bring their country into such unhappy
circumstances; and yet not fear that wise and honester men may take advantage of a real necessity, to
get out of such unhappy circumstances?").
113. Gordon, I CL (XI), supra note 2, at 87 (Jan. 7, 1721) ("Salus populi suprema lex esto: That
the benefit and safety of the people constitutes the supreme law, is an universal and everlasting maxim
in government; It can never be altered by municipal statutes"). Cf. Gordon, I CL (XVI), supra note 2,
at 122.
114. THOMAS GORDON, FRANCIS LORD BACON 58 (1721).
115. See, e.g., Thomas Brodrick, Letter to Lord Middleton, Mar. 7, 1721, in COXE, supra note 60,
at 209; Gordon, I CL (XXVIII), supra note 2, at 205.
116. SEVERAL PETITIONS, supra note 5, at 15 [Warwick and Stafford].
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Alcides held him in his Arms,
And sent him up in Air to Hell.
Directors thrown into the Sea,
Recover Strength and Vigour there;
But may be tam'd another way,
Suspended for a while in Air" 7
The author of A New-Year's-Gift for the Directors thought the scaffold
too light, urging instead that "the Authors of this Universal Calamity" be
skinned alive and then beheaded, their skulls "fix'd upon Poles in
Exchange Ally" as a memento mori for stockbrokers of the future."' And
Rev. Moses Browne, an amateur poet in the pay of Viscount Molesworth,
issued an extravagant ode depicting his patron as an angel of death, sent to
redeem the rule of law in England through a purge of its state criminals:
"The Magistrate that by Tyrannic stealth,/Robs Cities of their
Wealth,/.. .Let him Impal'd, around the Stake wreath Bloody as his
Mind.""' But it was the Whig pamphleteers Trenchard and Gordon who
did the most to quicken the pulse of public debate. Although Cato's
Letters are often remembered as early monuments of the civil libertarian
ideology,'20 its pages overflow with calls for the summary trial and violent
execution of the South Sea conspirators-a group that included not just
the Directors and their political enablers, but also the legion of
stockbrokers who profited from the bubble.'21 "[T]he People at last,"
Gordon exulted, "seem apprized of a merciless Conspiracy, to deceive and
plunder a free, believing Nation, to enrich a vile Tribe of Stock-
jobbers."22
Trenchard and Gordon imagined graphic punishment as the justified
retribution of a bankrupted public. The Second Letter announces, matter-
of-factly, "a thousand Stock-Jobbers, well truss'd up, beside a diverting
Sight, would be a cheap Sacrifice to the Manes of Trade." 23 The Twenty-
First Letter is written from the perspective of the hangman, busily
preparing halters and axes for what he anticipates will be a bloody summer
of reprisals.12 4 But it is a passage from the Third Letter that best
117. JONATHAN SWIFT, THE BUBBLE: A POEM 11 ( 1721); cf id. at 13 ("never shall our Isle have
Rest,/Till those devouring Swine run down").
118. A NEW-YEAR'S-GIFT FOR THE DIRECTORS 28-29 (1721).
119. REV. MOSES BROWNE, THE THRONE OF JUSTICE; A PINDARIC ODE; HUMBLY DEDICATED TO
THE RIGHT HONORABLE LORD VISCOUNT MOLESWORTH 4 (1721). The poem's epigraph is taken from
Gordon, CL (XXIX), supra note 2, at 212-13 (May 13, 1721): "he who screens from the gallows those
that deserve it. . .ought to swing in their room."
120. See Part IV, infra.
121. This is made exceptionally clear in Gordon, CL (XXI), supra note 2, at 153-55 (Mar. 18,
1721).
122. GORDON, OF STOCK-JOBBERS, supra note 97, at 2:22.
123. Gordon, I CL (II), supra note 2, at 1:41.
124. Gordon, CL (XXI), supra note 2, at 1:148-55.
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exemplifies the chilling calm with which Cato could contemplate
"extraordinary" punishment:
as to the Class of Ravens, whose Wealth has cost the Nation its
All ... no Man can call them his Neighbours; they are Rogues of
Prey ... Your Terrour lessens, when you liken them to Crocodiles
and Cannibals, who feed, for Hunger, on humane Bodies.. .Well; but
Monsters as they are, what would you do with them? The Answer is
short and at hand, Hang them; ... I would have no new Tortures
invented, nor any new Death devised. In this, I think, I shew
Moderation ... As to their Wealth, as it is the manifest Plunder of the
People, let it be restored to the People, and let the Publick be their
Heirs.'25
This pitiless attitude toward the financial elite instantly made Cato one
of Britain's most celebrated authors, while scandalizing the moderate
press.12 6 Anthony Hammond fretted that "Blood and Death are Words very
frequent now, among our Pamphleteers; and, from them, among the Scum
of the People, where indeed they are dangerous."'27 One administration
newspaper denounced the "Assassinating Principle" animating the Letters,
while another sputtered that he logical endpoint of "this Doctrine of the
Great Cato" was "Neighbours and Fellow Citizens Butchering each other"
in the streets.12 8 And a writer calling himself Timothy Telltruth attacked
Cato and his confederates in a lengthy satire that presented the trial of the
South Sea directors as a circus of extremist rhetoric led by a rabble-
125. Gordon, I CL (III), supra note 2, at 1:44-5. For similar language, see Gordon, I CL (II), at
1:27 (". . this Sort of Vermin. . ."); Gordon, I CL (IV), at 50 (Nov. 26, 1720) 1:50 ("money-leaches");
Gordon, I CL (V), at 51 (Dec. 3, 1720) ("the cannibals of credit"); Trenchard and Gordon, I CL (X),
at 1:78 ("desperate hard-hearted parricides"); Trenchard, 1 CL (XII), at 99 (Jan. 14, 1721) (". . .the
Murtherers of our Credit"); Trenchard, I CL (XX), at 140 ("new kinds of vengeance, new tortures,
and new engines of misery ought to be invented"); Gordon, 1 CL (XXI), at 1:149 ("the blood-suckers
of the people"); Gordon, I CL (XXIX), at 1:213 ("a destroyer-general..a mad dog, with ten thousand
mouths, who scatters poison, wounds, and death all around him").
126. A.B., Letter to Lord Carteret, Aug. 16, 1721, in STATE PAPERS, DOMESTIC, GEORGE I
(1981), SP 35/28 ff. 32 ("The general Cry among the common People is of late, Oh! This is a fine
Paper"); "Aristarchus", MIST'S WEEKLY JOURNAL (London), 15 Apr. 1721 ("the unusual Success of
[his] Writings"); Daily Journal (London), May 5, 1721, at 89 ("But to pass over a whole herd of
Grubstreet-Scribblers.. how industrious has a certain Hebdomadal Writer been, in spreading his
dangerous Notions amongst the People!"); READ'S WEEKLY JOURNAL OR BRITISH GAZETEER
(London), May 13, 1721 ("the Prince of News-Writers"); APPLEBEE'S ORIGINAL WEEKLY JOURNAL
(London), Sept. 2, 1721 ("notwithstanding all the Applauses which are bestow'd on the Great, the
Immortal Cato. . ."); "Britannicus", FLYING POST (London), Dec. 14-16, 1721 ("Cato of late is so full
of himself, and so sure of Success, that he seems to think that his ipse dixit will go as far now as
Aristotle's once did"); PASQUIN (London), Mar. 13, 1723 ("Cato's late Reasonings . which in the
Case of the South Sea Affair were so highly applauded, that they have established his Reputation, and
made him a very popular Writer ever since"). Modern estimates put the peak circulation of the London
Journal at I 0,000-see DAVID A. COPELAND, THE IDEA OF A FREE PRESS 100 (2006).
127. HAMMOND, supra note 17, at 17 . cf id. at 10.
128. "The Fariy-Tatler No. 9", READ'S WEEKLY JOURNAL OR BRITISH GAZETEER (London), Feb.
3, 1722; FLYING POST (London), Dec. 14-16, 1721.
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rousing prosecutor who delivers a speech copied verbatim from Cato's
Third Letter.129
For Cato's contemporaries, it was obvious that the popularity of the
Letters was closely connected to their advocacy of extreme measures and
their hypnotic mantra of "Necessity" and "imminent danger."'30 But
historians of all stripes and schools have typically refused to take these
outbursts seriously, preferring to view the South Sea letters in a splendid
isolation from the rest of Cato's work and far away from its core
arguments.131 Closer to the mark are those readings, descended from
J.G.A. Pocock, which present Trenchard and Gordon's South Sea writings
as the expression of a vengeful Machiavellian tendency, with its
concomitant emphasis on spectacular acts of violence and punishment. But
Pocock hastens to add that Cato "was not primarily a constitutional
theorist, and to the extent that he was not the concept of virtue dictated a
politics of personal morality."l32 The effect is the same in both cases: to
bracket Cato's ferocious populism and his avant-garde constitutional
claims as peripheral to his political theory of individual civic virtue. But
this is sustainable only if we ignore the many other writings that
Trenchard and Gordon produced in this period, and only if we detach the
Letters from their immediate context, a highly fraught constitutional
debate over the limits of parliamentary power.
At the core of the argument was the extent of parliament authority to
punish South Sea conspirators. Establishment Whigs and Tories argued
frequently and confidently that however reckless their behavior, none of
the actions of the South Sea conspirators was obviously illegal.133 They set
out three major legal claims. First, any prosecution based on a new law
would violate the deeply entrenched norm against punishments ex post
facto.134 Second, imprisonment, expulsion from Parliament, or
confiscation of property without proper judicial procedures would
129. TIMOTHY TELLTRUTH, MATrERS OF FACT 7-13 (1720). Telltruth offers the following
description of "Clamour": "Pride, Indignation, Self-Conceit, and Malice, were visible in his Eyes; his
Voice was loud as Stentors, and which he always exerted to make Noise go down for Reasons, and
bold Assertions for Truth and Justice, still breathing nothing but Death and Destruction; whoever he
spoke against never met with milder Names than Rogue, Villain, Miscreant, Traytor, Pick-Pocket,
Robber, and the like."
130. [MATTHEW TINDAL], A DEFENCE OF OUR PRESENT HAPPY ESTABLISHMENT; AND THE
ADMINISTRATION VINDICATED 4 (1722).
131. See, e.g., SHELLEY BURTr, VIRTUE TRANSFORMED: POLITICAL ARGUMENT IN ENGLAND 69
(1992).
132. J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT 469-71 (1975).
133. "Somersetshire", APPLEBEE'S ORIGINAL WEEKLY J. (London), Jan. 21 1721.
134. ANON, REMARKS ON THE OCCURRENCES OF THE YEARS 1720 AND 1721 91 (1724). Cf
ANON, SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE BILL Now DEPENDING IN PARLIAMENT 3 (1721); ANON, LAWS,
Ex POST FACTO; OR THE ANNULLING OF LEGAL BARGAINS, INCONSISTENT WITH THE BRITISH
CONSTITUTION, AND THE PRIVILEGES OF A FREE PEOPLE (1721); AISLABIE, supra note 76, at 18
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contravene the sacred guarantees of Magna Charta.1 35 Finally, allowing
Parliament to serve as both prosecutor and judge would make a travesty of
due process.136 John Aislabie, the only notable British politician to be
convicted for his role in the South Sea saga, nicely summarized the three
arguments in his warning: "Precedents, my Lords, will advance, and this
Precedent will not sleep. The Violence of the Times, and the Rage of
Parties is too great to drop a Precedent so useful as this will be."'37
For the radicals, on the other hand, it was intolerable for the
conspirators to be screened from justice by legal technicalities.'38 Britain,
thundered Gordon, "will not let a People's Ruin go unpunish'd, because
Frauds and Injuries have been too subtly couch'd for the Statute-Law." 39
But even Joseph Jekyll, the distinguished jurist then serving as Master of
the Rolls, believed that "where the laws are deficient, the legislative
authority may and ought to exert itself ... he hoped a British parliament
would never want a vindictive power to punish national crimes."'4
Indeed, neither Gordon nor Jekyll could endorse mere mob justice, and
they took seriously the warning that "extraordinary measures" might
acquire a logic and a momentum of their own. And so they, like and their
fellow opposition writers, sought to anchor their program of elite
accountability in the depths of the British constitutional tradition. We can
separate the radical argument into three main currents.
135. HAMMOND, supra note 17, at 16; Aislabie, SPEECH supra note 76, at 21(".. .and shake even
MAGNA CHARTA itself"); REMARKS ON THE. . ., supra note 134, at 4.
136. AISLABIE, supra note 76, at 20.
137. Id.; cf REMARKS ON.. ., supra note 134, at 9 ANON, FAIR WARNING TO THE GOOD PEOPLE OF
ENGLAND 49 (1721).
138. We can distinguish between two kinds of "technicalities" that the party of vengeance worried
would frustrate the ends of justice. First, the conduct in question might have been technically legal:
creative criminals will always discover loopholes, since it "is impossible to devise laws sufficient o
regulate and manage every occurrence and circumstance of life." See Gordon, 2 CL (XLII), supra note
2, at 290 (Aug. 26, 1721). This is particularly true given the influence of the criminals in Parliament,
their ability to obtain generous charters and helpful legislation. See Gordon, I CL (III), supra note 2, at
45. Second, the flight of Robert Knight (and his green book) to Antwerp meant that the evidence
collected against the Directors and their backers, no matter how persuasive, might be too
circumstantial to satisfy the burden of proof in an ordinary trial. See [Daniel Defoe?], VINDICATION OF
THE HONOUR AND JUSTICE OF PARLIAMENT 16-20 (1721); Trenchard and Gordon, Sense ofthe People
(1720), in 2 COLLECTION OF TRACTS, supra note 45, at9 (". . all other Proof neglected and
discouraged by the Name of Hearsay Evidence"). Hence the resort to "extraordinary" process.
139. GORDON, supra note 114, at 57.See also id. at 52 ("Must not a Government stand upon a
very tottering Foundation, if Villains may make Attempts with Impunity, whenever they can find out a
By-way of slipping thro' the Statute-Law?"); cf SALUS POPULI SUPREMA LEX; SHEW'D IN THE
BEHAVIOUR OF BRITISH PARLIAMENTS TOWARDS PARRICIDES 38 (1721) (". . .how many vile
Criminals have been acquitted for default of legal Evidence, Errors in their Indictments, &c. though
manifestly guilty in the Opinion both of Court and Jury?"); GORDON, 2 CL (XI), supra note 2, at46
("That they may overtum all Law, and yet escape by not being within the express Words of any
particular Law.").
140. Debate in the Commons on the Motion for Address (Dec. 8, 1720), in 7 COBBETT, supra
note 59, at 683; cf SALUS POPULI, supra note 139, at 9; PHILIPS, AN APPEAL TO COMMON
SENSE.. PART II 3-4 (1721) ("'Twoud indeed be a shameful Defect in a Government, if such a Power
were not lodg'd somewhere.. [when there is] no other expedient left to save the Nation").
194 [Vol. 29:2
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One possible source of law for punishing the directors was the lex
naturalis, and the very particular gloss on it given in Locke's Second
Treatise. There Locke had posited a right to "punish another for any evil
he has done," a right that could be exercised by anyone in the absence of
civil society. "[E]very man," he wrote, "hath a right to punish the
offender, and be executioner of the law of nature."l41 This "very strange
doctrine" is restated nearly word for word in Cato's Letters,142 but it is
also modified in a number of interesting ways. Cato emphasizes, for
instance, that "this primary Law of Nature and Nations" applies not only
to individuals in the state of nature, but also to extant governments acting
in a legal vacuum:
tho' National Governours should never enact any positive Laws, and
never annex particular Penalties to known Offences; yet they would
have a Right, and it wou'd be their Duty, to punish those Offences,
according to their best Discretion, and much more so, if the Crimes
committed are so great, that no human Wisdom cou'd foresee that
any Man cou'd be wicked and desperate enough to commit them.143
Similarly, the Letter to Licinius Stolo argued that the right to chastise
Aislabie and his co-conspirators derived not from municipal laws but from
"Reason and Nature." The example given is instructive: there is no
question that a man who dammed up or diverted the course of the Thames
would be sentenced to death by Parliament, not for breaking some esoteric
ordinance, but "in virtue of a Charter from God" to eradicate violent
pests." Even where the law is silent Parliament may speak, and it finds its
voice in the strict dictates of natural law.145
In an essay printed the week of the crash, Daniel Defoe took this a step
further: natural law might not only substitute for legislation but even
supersede it where the rush of events has rendered existing rules obsolete.
Thus, even assuming that the bubble companies were licensed to act as
they did by existing statutes, "Laws to do Evil are, Ipso Facto, void in
their own Nature." They cannot shield "Robbery and Deceit" from the
retribution of natural justice.'" This was particularly true, Trenchard
141. John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT II § 7-8,
169-71. (1698).
142. See Ronald Hamowy, Cato's Letters, John Locke, and the Republican Paradigm, in 9 HIST.
POL. THOUGHT 273, 282 (1990) ("Cato argues this view in clearly Lockean terms").
143. Gordon, I CL (XI), supra note 2, at 87-88.
144. A MEMORIAL OF THE CONTRACTANTS WITH MR. AISLABIE, IN A LETTER TO LICINIUS STOLO
55 (1721). For an argument along similar lines, see Gordon, I CL (XI), supra note 2, at 89.
145. Cf Gordon, 2 CL (XLII), supra note 2, at 289 (". .. the violation of what ought to be a law, is
a crime even when there is no law. The essence of right and wrong does not depend upon words and
clauses inserted in a code or a statute-book, much less upon the conclusions and explications of
lawyers; but upon reason and the nature of things, antecedent to all laws.").
146. Defoe, supra note 8.
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added, since bubble financiers had helped to draft the very laws under
which they now sought shelter. "Treasons from the Nature of Things
themselves," he wrote, "antecedent to all Laws that call them so," remain
criminal "tho' Laws gained by Subornation should call them
otherwise."l47 In an age where privileges and protections were sold to the
highest bidder, no statute could be treated as sacrosanct.
Second, radicals cloaked themselves in the mantle of 1688 and the high
principle of parliamentary supremacy.'48 Because Parliament is the sole
arbiter of the content and limits of the law, they maintained, it is a
solecism to call any action taken by Westminster "lawless." The
anonymous author of Salus Populi Suprema Lex advanced this proposition
most boldly: "This supreme Legislative Power is circumscrib'd by no
rules, nor subject to any Law but the eternal laws of Reason: and the
fundamental Law of all Government, viz. Ne quid detrimenti Respublica
capiat, To preserve the Commonwealth, is its only Rule."' 49 As a
correspondent for Mist's Journal observed, tauntingly, "Kings have been
forced to fly and abdicate for less Offences, for lighter Oppressions; and
shall Directors escape?"' The ground-norm established by the revolution,
after all, was that Parliament could act on its own authority to rescue the
state in times of emergency. If Jacobites delivered this argument with a
smirk, commonwealthmen were perfectly sincere in identifying extra-legal
punishment with revolution principles: "It was not by the Forms of
common Justice below, that they declar'd the Throne vacant at the late
Glorious Revolution, and King William the lawful King ... no, it
depended on this Maxim, That the Parliament of England.. might
constitute a Government for the Preservation of the Whole."' No one
who accepted the revolution settlement could credibly complain of
illegality in the suppression of rogue bankers.
Proponents of parliamentary supremacy sought to invest this unbounded
discretion in a concrete juridical form: the trial of the South Sea
defendants in Parliament, on charges of treason, via the bill of attainder.'52
147. Trenchard, I CL (XII), supra note 2, at 94. "Subornation" is rendered as "subordination" in
the Hamowy edition, likely a mistranscription. Cf 2 Gordon, supra note 45, at 34; Trenchard, I CL
(XVII), supra note 2, at 124 (Feb. 18, 1721).
148. H.T. Dickinson locates the "notion that the legislature was sovereign" in an intramural
debate between revolution and conservative Whigs. The first faction "had no qualms" with this
principle; the latter resisted the idea that Parliament could modify or repeal the Act of Union, the Bill
of Rights, or Magna Charta. Not until the Septennial Act of 1716 did a "majority of Whigs explicitly
[accept] the sovereign authority of Parliament," and even then, many continued to resist its full
implications. See H.T. DICKINSON, LIBERTY AND PROPERTY 82-83 (1983).
149. SALUS POPULI, supra note 139, at 36.
150. "Philo Britannus", Letter XXXVII, in MISCELLANY, supra note 8, at 109. The Journal was
the leading organ of Jacobite opinion, and Mist himself was convicted of criminal libel in February
1721 for articles insulting German Protestants in the Palatinate.
151. SALUS POPULI, supra note 139, at 38.
152. See DEFOE, supra note 138, at 7 (". . as the whole Power of Government is in the
196 [Vol. 29:2
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Advocates of this measure recited a long list of precedents, from the
generals condemned for surrendering prematurely during the Hundred
Years War, to the proscription of the Earl of Strafford in 1641, to the
drawing and quartering of a subject who killed a foreign minister in self-
defense in 1370.113 Notably, none of these actions fell within the ambit of
treason law, as defined by the statute of 25 Edw. III, which restricted
treason to a number of discrete offenses against the person and dignity of
the king.154 And yet in the 370 years since its passage, Parliament had
frequently surpassed these boundaries in order to neutralize threats to the
collective.
Now there was nothing in [these cases] to make it Treason by the
Statute, nor could such a Procedure be justified by any thing but the
Necessity of it. The Publick Faith however, and the Law of Nations
requir'd it. . . . 'Tis evident our Parliaments have constantly exerted
such a Power, as the Exigency of the Occasion seem'd to require.
And we may observe, from the Examples produc'd, that they have
not only inflicted the highest Punishment for Facts which were not
prohibited by an express Law. . .but have, in several Instances,
declar'd Crimes to be greater, than by the Laws actually subsisting
they were declar'd to be. 15
When Parliament acts in times of exigency it carries the law with it.
And its jurisgenerative power extends beyond punishing unknown
offenses, to the character and nature of the trial it conducts. Ordinary
courts are bound by "the Letter of the Law," by which too often "not only
the Guilty will escape Punishment, but even the Innocent may suffer by a
scrupulous adhering to Forms."156 But in the extraordinary instances in
which Parliament reconstitutes itself to try high crimes, these restrictive
rules of evidence and procedure no longer obtain, and conviction can be
secured without satisfying the common law burden of proof. As support,
Thomas Gordon recalled the speech of Francis Bacon during his own 1621
impeachment in the House of Lords: "their Lordships are not simply
Judges, but Parliamentary Judges; that they have a further Extent of
Legislature, it is their undoubted Right to proceed by Attainders in all Cases where it shall be
necessary; of which Necessity they are the only proper Judges").
153. GORDON, supra note 114, at 54-57; SALUS POPULI, supra note 139, at 10-35. During the
reign of Richard II a man killed the Genoese ambassador after a quarrel in the street; although it was
stipulated that the man had acted in self-defense, he was nevertheless attainted and killed on grounds
of state necessity.
154. The Treason Act of 1351 did, however, contemplate that Parliament might judge cases of
treason not provided for in the narrow range of the statute. See Trenchard, I CL (XII), supra note 2, at
97.
155. SALUS POPULI, supra note 139, at 35-36; cf JOHN G. BELLAMY, THE TUDOR LAW OF
TREASON 11 (1979).
156. SALUS POPULI, supra note 139, at 37.
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Arbitrary Power than other Courts; and are not tied by ordinary Course of
Courts, or Precedents in Points of Strictness and Severity.""s7
Parliamentary attainder, particularly when conducted in conditions of
crisis, licensed a radical departure from the substance and process of
ordinary criminal trial."'
The bill of attainder was hardly an obscure feature of English
constitutional life; it had been invoked most recently in 1715 against
Bolingbroke, at the behest of Walpole and Stanhope, for his dalliance with
the Pretender on the death of Queen Anne.159 Nevertheless, its proposed
extension from sedition to financial crime excited furious controversy.
Critics argued, first, that the attainder had historically been abused to
silence dissenters and to purge unpopular politicians. Aislabie insisted this
was the case in its most famous usage, the execution of Strafford in 1641,
a quixotic effort to "appeas[e] the deluded People" with the busy
pageantry of a show trial. 16 0 Other writers took a more measured line,
allowing the legitimacy of attainder in cases of treason, while resisting the
"wild and boundless" construction given to it by the patriots.16 1
Charlewood Lawton, a former agent of William Penn, signaled agreement
with the "great Sense and Spirit" of radical arguments pro punitio, but
cautioned that any attempt to retrofit the bill of attainder would be
counterproductive. First, because inordinate punishments would shroud
the guilty in a fog of pity and martyrdom, leading the public to forget their
heinous crimes. And second, because untethering the bill of attainder from
cases of rebellion, assassination, or invasion would risk converting it to a
routine weapon of party-political conflict, with each new government
sending its predecessor to the scaffold in a revolving reign of terror.' 62
Radicals denied their proposals hollowed out the rule of law and opened
a path to despotism. The people, they replied, can easily distinguish
between action taken by Parliament in a "true" emergency, to punish
"unheard of Crimes, or. . .unthought of Abuses," from the unjustified or
157. GORDON, supra note 114, at53. In context, Bacon is petitioning the Lords to use their
substantial discretion to grant him leniency. Cf. FRANCIS BACON, TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE THE
LORDS OF PARLIAMENT, IN LETTERS OF S' FRANCIS BACON 270 (R.S. ed., 1702). See also DEFOE,
supra note 138, at 8-9
158. Compare these passages with Gordon's much more equivocal discussion of the bill of
attainder in THOMAS GORDON, THE JUSTICE OF PARLIAMENTS 33-37 (1725) following his Damascene
conversion to the administration side. See esp. 34 (". . if I am not mistaken, such forcible Objections
have been rais'd in Discountenance of [attainder, extraordinary trials], as ought to make every
Ministry apprehensive how they bring them into Practice").
159. Indeed, Aislabie had voted for it, as his critics gleefully observed. Cf. Trenchard, I CL (XX),
supra note 2, at 142-43 (expressing disappointment that more of the ministers of James 11 had not been
tried for treason, and that Harley and Bolingbroke had not been tried and executed in 1714).
160. AISLABIE, supra note 76, at 6.
161. HAMMOND, supra note 17, at 9.
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self-interested invocations of these same powers. Appropriately, this point
was made in the idiom of financial fraud:
To pretend, that because the Publick, upon some new, and unforeseen
Emergency, makes a Law with Retrospect for the Punishment of
unheard of Crimes, or for correcting unthought of Abuses, that
therefore People may suspect the Publick will afterwards to so
without any just Cause or Pretence, is a way of Reasoning worthy
only of those fair Traders, who pretend to demand ten Times the
Value of the Thing they sold, because an Innocent Man was induced
by the Fraud of a Third Party to promise it. 163
Another author reassured the public that "such Emergencies will [rarely]
happen in a State well govern'd," comparing Parliament's temporary
arrogation of the executive power to the highly unusual circumstances in
which "the General of an Army is now and then to fight with his own
Hands, like a common Soldier."l" The body that commands the courts can
certainly take their place, but we should not fear that this will become an
everyday occurrence.
163. A REPLY TO A MODEST PAPER, CALL'D, REASONS FOR MAKING VOID FRAUDULENT AND
USURIOUS CONTRACTS 1 (1721).
164. SALUS POPULI, supra note 139, at 44.
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Figure 2. "The Bubblers Funeral Ticket for the Directors of the South Sea
Company", George Bickham the Elder. Printed in London, February
1721. Adapted from a satirical engraving, published September 1720 by
the same author, on the bankruptcy of the Mississippi Company in France.
The inscription turns the poster into a ticket to a hanging: "You are
desir'd to accompany the whole Body of S.S. Directors from ye Great
Bubbling house in the Broadway to ye three Legged Tree near Padington
on Fryday the of February 1721 by 11 a Clock in the forenoon exactly.
Note there will be a Funeral Sermon being preached there by P.P.P. who
has been a noted sufferer by being too busie with Capital Stock. "165
The third radical appeal went even further: paradoxically, Cato and his
allies maintained, only extraordinary and uncompromising punishments
could guarantee the rule of law. In part this was because official sanctions
forestall private retribution and popular justice-the inevitable efforts of
"a brave Nation, impatient of Oppression. . .to redress [its] own
Grievances" when the state retreats.166 But there was a more perceptive
165. For additional detail, see 1708, The Bubblers Funeral Ticket, in CATALOGUE OF PRINTS,
supra note 38, at 574-75.
166. EUSTACE BUDGELL, A LETTER TO A FRIEND IN THE COUNTRY 46 (1721); cf.. Gordon, 1 CL
(III), supra note 2, at 46; [THOMAS GORDON], THREE POLITICAL LETTERS TO A NOBLE LORD,
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idea at work here as well: upholding the rule of law meant ensuring that it
was not circumvented by mere technicalities or lawyer's tricks. Surely, an
editorial in Mist's Journal'6 7 reasoned, "the Law cannot be so wholly of
this Cobweb Texture, as only to intrap feeble Flies, and not. . .pernicious
Hornets."'68 It is this spectacle of unequal justice, in which ordinary
highwaymen are condemned while privileged bankers go free, that breeds
contempt for the law.'69 Thus "rule of law" may depend, paradoxically, on
castigating elites who have struck at the heart of the republic while
managing to remain within the bounds of legality.
This vision of a rule of law upheld through extrajudicial proceedings
was drawn out at length in Cato's Third Letter:
A man robb'd in his House, or on the Highway, receives from the
Law all possible Satisfaction. . .By this salutary Method, Vengeance
is at once taken for the Crime committed, and a terrible Example
made of its Author, to prevent its Repetition. The Law is the great
Rule in every Country, at least in every free Country, by which
private Property is ascertained, and the Publick Good, which is the
great End of all Laws, is secured; and the religious Observance of this
Rule, is what alone makes the Difference between good Laws and
none. The Terrour and Sanctity of the Laws, are shewn by the
Execution of them.170
Law is a capacious concept, and is not exhausted by punctilious
adherence to what Gordon derisively termed "the Niceties of Form,"' 7' nor
by the fetishization of catch-words like ex post facto or Magna Charta.
CONCERNING LIBERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 1.11 (1721)(citing Grotius).
167. Mist's essay is an extended riff on Gordon's Francis, Lord Bacon, further evidence of the
proximity of Jacobite and Old Whig positions on popular accountability. For the origins of this
connection in the disillusionment of radical Whigs with the settlement of 1689, see Mark Goldie, "The
Roots of True Whiggism", 9 HisT. POL. THOUGHT 195, 228 (1980). For the interchangeability of Whig
and Jacobite arguments during the first phase of the South Sea crisis, see ANON, THE CENSOR
CENSUR'D: OR, CATO TURNED CATLINE 2 (1722). To see how the Jacobites and Old Whigs diverged
on this same topic, see "Fleta", Mist's Weekly Journal (London), Sept. 23, 1721; Trenchard, I CL
(XVIII), supra note 2, at 132 (Feb. 25, 1721). The Jacobites and dissenting Whigs would break
decisively over the Atterbury Plot; see Gordon, writing as "Crito", in the BRITISH JOURNAL (London),
July 27, 1723.
168. "Philalethes", Letter L (1722), in MISCELLANY, supra note 8, at 154. Cf SALUS POPULt,
supra note 139, at 4 ("Shall petty Thefts and Robberies be punished with Death, and yet the Plunderers
of the Publick, the Robbers of three Kingdoms, escape it?"); Gordon, I CL (XX), supra note 2, at 155;
Gordon, 2 CL (XXXVI), supra note 2, at 258 (July 8, 1721) Gordon, 2 CL (LVII), supra note 2, at 388
(Dec. 16, 1721);Gordon, supra note 45, at 2; CHARLES JOHNSON [DANIEL DEFOE], A GENERAL
HISTORY OF THE ROBBERIES AND MURDERS OF THE MOST NOTORIOUS PYRATES 142-43 (1724).
169. SALUS POPULI, supra note 139, at 2 ("Examples of Punishment are such necessary
Admonitions, that without them, Law itself, and the Lawgivers, become the general Subject of
Contempt. . ."); MIST'S WEEKLY JOURNAL (London), July 14, 1722; Trenchard, 1 CL (XX), supra
note 2, at 139-40.
170. Gordon, 1 CL (III), supra note 2, at 30.
171. Gordon, supra note 45, at 42.
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The end of a constitution is a just social order, not a compendium of rules
to be obeyed for their own sake. And, the radicals hastened to add, it does
no honor to law to respect only its outward forms, while disregarding the
deeper principles of fairness it was enacted to serve. The response to great
and unprecedented crime cannot be lynch law and rule by the rabble. But
neither can it be impunity for the powerful and liability for the weak if the
social order is to have any legitimacy at all.
These were not airy philosophical arguments; they were among the most
urgent questions of social order facing England. In a trial that captivated
the nation in 1722, a man named Arundel Coke was arraigned for
arranging the assault and disfigurement of his brother-in-law. A
blacksmith testified that Coke had solicited his help in committing the
attack by arguing that the impunity of "the South-Sea Gentlemen" ought to
free ordinary citizens, too, from the strictures of law and morality.172 The
fierce populism of Trenchard, Gordon, and their many allies in arguing for
"inflicting extraordinary Punishments on extraordinary Offenders,"173
then, was undergirded by their deep appreciation for the fragile and
paradoxical character of law and legitimacy.
Court Whigs paid tribute to this politics of emergency by standing it on
its head. It was precisely because the condition of public credit was so
fragile, Walpole declaimed in a speech in Parliament, that legal questions
of guilt and punishment ought to be indefinitely deferred. The
monomaniacal pursuit of justice might be appropriate in ordinary times,
but in conditions of emergency it risked distracting Parliament, inducing
capital flight, and tipping the nation into a depression. Pragmatism would
have to be the order of the day; rule of law cannot trump national survival.
... if the city of London were on fire, they did not doubt but all wise
men would be for extinguishing the flames, and preventing the
spreading of the conflagration before they inquired into the
incendiaries; that in like manner, Public Credit having received a
most dangerous wound, and being still in a bleeding condition, they
ought to apply a speedy remedy to it; and that afterwards they might
inquire into the cause of the present calamity.174
172. THE TRYAL AND CONDEMNATION OF ARUNDEL COKE ALIAS COOKE ESQ; AND OF JOHN
WOODBURNE LABOURER, FOR FELONY 15 (1722) (Testimony of Carter: "said he.. .do you think you
could cut five or six Mens Heads off without Scruple of Conscience? I told him, No; it was too much
for a Man's Conscience to bear. Said he. . There are those above who have done ten times worse. I
suppose, Sir, said I, you mean the South-Sea Gentlemen. Yes, said he so I do; they have ruined
Families, and begger'd Gentlemen: To cut Mens Heads off is but a Trifle to them."); cf Gordon, CL
(XCIII), supra note 2, at 662 (Sept. 8, 1722) ("Coke of Bury was hanged for attempting one murder:
Had he.. .murdered a million, he might have been recorded for a hero"); JOHN DENNIS, VICE AND
LUXURY PUBLICK MISCHIEFS 72-73 (1724),
173. SALUS POPULI, supra note 139, at 39; cf Gordon, I CL (Preface), supra note 2, at 11
174. Debate in the Commons on the Motion for Address (Dec. 8, 1720), in 7 COBBETT, supra
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Cato replied incredulously to this gambit in the pages of the London
Journal: "What mean some Men by saying, we ought to extinguish the
Fire, before we enquire into the Incendiaries? Are they some of
them?. . .The Truth is, the House is already burn'd down, many are burn'd
to Death, and all are miserably scorch'd. . .All we can now do, is to build
the House again, if we can; and hang those that fired it, which are sure we
ought.""' For all of their mutual antipathy, Cato and Walpole now shared
a span of common ground: until the economic crisis subsided, ordinary
legal processes would have to be suspended. In this exchange we see the
astonishing degree to which necessity now operated as the lingua franca of
British politics.
C. Common wealth
Joseph Addison devoted the third issue of The Spectator, his tri-weekly
magazine of arts and letters, to a fantastical dream about the national bank
and public credit. In the dream, Addison finds himself lost inside a great
palace.
I saw ... a beautiful Virgin, seated on a Throne of Gold. Her
Name ... was Publick Credit. The Walls ... were hung with many
Acts of Parliament written in Golden Letters ... the Magna
Charta ... the Act of Uniformity ... the Act of Toleration ... [and]
the Act of Settlement.. .The Lady seemed to set an unspeakable
Value upon these several Pieces of Furniture. .. 176
Although Credit sits in seemingly unassailable sovereignty her
constitution is in fact highly delicate, subject to "Momentary
Consumptions" that wax and wane with the stability of the nation and the
market. She is accosted, and temporarily overthrown, by an army of
"hideous Phantoms," headed by the Old Pretender. The frightened queen
faints, and instantly her priceless gold reserves are replaced with worthless
paper scrip. Only the late arrival of Liberty, Moderation, and other muses
of the Glorious Revolution restores her to health and solvency. "'Addison
dreamt of a dynamic commercial society dependent upon the ordered
liberty of the British constitution, symbolized by the Magna Charta
note 59, at 684; cf "Le Connu", Letter to [Hon. John Molesworth], Jan. 3, 1721, in REPORTS ON
MANUSCRIPTS, supra note 57, at 290; APPLEBEE'S ORIGINAL WEEKLY J. (London), Jan. 7, 1721.
175. Gordon, 1 CL (VII), supra note 2, at 62-3 (Dec. 17, 1720)., Cf Trenchard, I CL (IX), supra
note 2, at 70 (Dec. 31, 1720). Cato and Walpole were restaging, with uncanny precision, debates from
the previous century over the limits of the royal prerogative, which often turned on whether the
common law right to pull down a house on fire established a more general right of emergency action,
and if so, to whom it belonged. Compare J. Coke, Speech in the Commons, Mar. 22, 1628, in 2
COMMONS DEBATES 1628 65, (ed. Robert C. Johnson 1977); Sir William Jones, "Ship-Money", in 3
STATE TRIALS, supra note 83, at 1181.
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hanging prominently in Credit's antechamber. Its photographic negative
was the continental absolutism of James III, who appears in the parable
clutching "a Spunge in his left hand" in place of a crosier, symbolizing the
dissolution of contracts and the repudiation of the national debt.'78
Like Addison, Whigs and Tories alike believed England's robust regime
of property rights was the linchpin of its thriving free economy. But within
a decade of Addison's dream, splinters of both parties began to call loudly
not simply for targeted expropriation, but for the voiding of all contracts in
South Sea stock and a return to the status quo ante. Addison's staunchest
admirers could now contemplate, if not quite endorse, the fatal expedient
of a "sponge" to wipe the nation's debts: while it was "a heavy necessity,
attended with many sorrowful circumstances.. even a great calamity is
eligible, in comparison of a greater."17 9 The disintegration of the stock
market and the breakdown of social order put new pressure on the old
formulas of liberty, property, and Magna Charta, bringing to the stage
solutions that had previously seemed ultra vires.
The first and most obvious solution was the dispossession of those
thought to be responsible for the crash, and the division of their property
among injured members of the public. "True Lover of His Country"
recommended that every transaction in South Sea stock made by the
Directors in their personal capacity be nullified, and any gains from these
trades "seized for the Use of the whole Company." This would have the
additional virtue of making "void vast Numbers of Contracts and
Bargains," no doubt "a considerable Relief' to the many investors who
remained mired in debt.o80 The Tory MP Archibald Hutcheson, one of the
first to sound the alarm about the South Sea Company's delusional
projections, agreed with this policy of punitive confiscation, although he
was keen to ensure that not only the Directors, but also the Whig
cabinet-"those intrusted with the Administration of the Publick
Affairs"-felt its sting.'8' The arch-Jacobite Nathaniel Mist, reporting the
suicide of the Post-Master General James Craggs, snarled that death was
"an honourable Amends," but that "for his ill-gotten Goods and Estates
they are justly due to his Country, from whom he stole them. If you should
want, Gentlemen, some small matter of Form Ex-post-facto him."'82 But
the authors pressing for punitive expropriations did not concern
themselves overly with close questions of legal form; and when they did,
178. Cf A FULL AND AMPLE EXPLANATION, OF ONE KING JAMES'S DECLARATION (1716) (a
satirical poem).
179. Trenchard & Gordon, 1 CL (X), supra note 2, 77-78.
180. "True Lover of his Country", THE SOUTH-SEA SCHEME, AS IT NOW STANDS, CONSIDER'D 9
(1720).
181. Archibald Hutcheson, SOME FURTHER COMPUTATIONS RELATING TO SOUTH-SEA STOCK 3-4
(1721).
182. "King-Love", MIST'S WEEKLY J., Mar. 25, 1721.
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their reliance on precedents from the law of treason spoke volumes.'83
As plans for emergency intervention proliferated, more imaginative
forms of state intervention came into focus, detached from the moral
economy of crime and retribution. Thus a petition appeared in the London
Journal in February 1722 addressed to Lord Molesworth, the iminence
grise of dissenting Whigs, on behalf of "Thousands of unhappy
Englishmen, whom your Lordship will rescue from Death, Despair,
Prison, or Banishment." It pleaded with the Irish peer to sponsor a bill
extending full and unconditional bankruptcy protection to all investors
who found themselves "bond fide insolvent" and unable to repay loans or
stock purchase agreements contracted during the bubble. The justification
for consigning these contracts to oblivion was very plainly the dire state of
the nation-the rescue of those caught in the steel incisors of the free
market. Surely the quotidian laws of bankruptcy could be set aside in the
face of an economic depression.'84
Far more ambitious solutions proliferated in the press, tilting the law of
property and contract on its axis."' The most common suggestion was the
voiding of the Third and Fourth Subscriptions. Investment in the South
Sea Company had taken place between April and August 1720 in three
rounds of conversion of government debt to stock, and four waves of
direct sales to the public. The terms for both converters and purchasers
became progressively worse over time; while early investors could
purchase shares for £300, by late summer the price had risen to £1100.
Meanwhile, at its nadir in December, the stock traded for £124. This
imposed serious but perhaps manageable losses on early buyers, while
threatening later investors, particularly those who were highly leveraged,
with utter ruin.'86 Increasingly it was thought that the Gordian knot of
indebtedness might be sliced cleanly by turning back the clock to
midsummer and "mak[ing] void all Contracts upon Stock of any kind
enter'd into since the taking in of the THIRD SUBSCRIPTION by the SOUTH-
SEA DIRECTORS."'87 The staggering losses sustained by these later
183. See REASONS FOR MAKING VOID FRAUDULENT AND USURIOUS CONTRACTS 3 (1721), (after
1715 "several Acts were also passed, setting aside and annulling all Settlements or Alienations of
Estates.. .in Case the said Settlements or Alienations were made by any Person who should be
convicted or attainted of High Treason"). This was answered sharply in the circular THE
PERFORMANCE OF FAIR AND LEGAL CONTRACTS (1721).
184. "To the Right Honourable the Lord MOLESWORTH", LONDON J., Feb. 10, 1722. At the time
many still suspected that Molesworth was behind Cato's letters, then appearing weekly in the Journal;
see infra, note 215. Cf [Richard Molesworth?], Letter to Hon. John Molesworth, Jan. 27, 1721, in
REPORTS ON MANUSCRIPTS, supra note 57,, 296.
185. Interestingly, Trenchard and Gordon tended toward skepticism of economic interventions
that went beyond punishment of the guilty. See Gordon, 1 CL (VI), supra note 2, 58
186. See PAUL, supra note 28, at 47-50.
187. REPLY TO A MODEST PAPER, supra note 163, at 2; cf .RESTITUTION A LAW OF THE LAND, IN
RELATION TO THE THIRD AND FOURTH MONEY SUBSCRIPTION 1-2 (1721).
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investors made them potential figures of sympathy and solidarity. The
same was true for those bewitched by "time bargains", who now found
themselves obligated to purchase South Sea scrip at ten times its current
value, having made a losing bet on the stock's future movement at the
height of the frenzy. No one had intentionally misled them about the
company's prospects, but they were in error about "the real Value of the
Thing bought," and ought to be released from their imprudent promise. If
every forward contract could not be dissolved in this manner, they could at
least be canceled where they had yet to be executed.8 Eustace Budgell
noted that this had been the course of action preferred by the Dutch
Republic, which boasted "some of the best Laws for the Security of
Property" in Europe.'89
In light of the carnival of greed and bribery that made the bubble
possible, commentators began to think in terms of general amnesty. The
South-Sea Scheme Detected outlined a template for future legislation that
would "make void all Contracts for Stock Bought and Sold by any Person
beyond such a Sum, or above such a Price," at the discretion of
Parliament.190 And "Justitia", deigning to appear in the pages of Mist's
Weekly Journal, cast aspersions on all of the "South-Sea Contracts" as the
work of confidence-men and "scandalous Vermine." Here again, analogies
to disease performed crucial analytical work: South Sea stock was a
defective and dangerous product, akin to "a Parcel of Goods.. .brought
from an infected Place," and its buyers and sellers were either too vicious
to care or too gullible to notice. Every transaction from England's Plague
Year ought to be presumed illegitimate and overturned. "[I]f there be any
Contracts so depending with these confederating Bubblers," Lady Justice
peremptorily announced, it would be "inconsistent with Justice, Equity
and Reason, to believe such Agreements can be deem'd legal and
valid."l 91
The argument for abolishing contractual rights revolved around the
interlinked imperatives of exigency and reason of state. In other words,
legal authority derived from the law of necessity:
I shall. . . shew you what this Law is, and it is the Law of Necessity;
which Law, inasmuch as it can never be broke, is a tacit Law, and
188. [SIR DAVID DALRYMPLE], TIME BARGAINS TRYED BY THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 12, 28
(1720/1). Cf, HUTCHESON, supra note 182, at 9 (urging a one-year reprieve, for reasons of
"Compassion", on all contract suits related to "the South-Sea Phrenzy", quite close to what Walpole
and Parliament eventually agreed to). For the intellectual background, connecting to contemporary
debates over "intrinsic value," see DERINGER, supra note 41, chapter 5.
189. BUDGELL, supra note 166, at 21.
190. "Lover of his Country", THE SOUTH-SEA SCHEME DETECTED(2d ed. 1720), 21. Cf. "True
Lover of his Country", The South-Sea Scheme, as it now stands, consider'd (London: T. Bickerton,
1720), 27
191. "Justitia", Mist's Weekly Journal, Apr. 1, 1721, Issue 122.
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does not want Promulgation, as all other Laws do. . .Nay, this Law of
Necessity is a greater Law, and of an higher Nature than [statute law],
this Law being irresistible, the other not so, inasmuch as what is
commanded may be neglected and unperformed; and what is
prohibited, may be committed.19 2
This idea of legal necessity involved three familiar rhetorical moves.
First, the safety of the nation compels the exercise of extraordinary
governmental powers, because "in cases of extreme Danger, nothing must
come in competition with the general Safety," and the interest of a part can
never be an obstacle to "the Preservation of the Whole."l93 Second, the
situation is so novel that any response will necessarily exceed the
boundaries of the statute and common law, such that "to talk of Precedents
for a Case allowed to be unprecedented" is an absurdity.'94 Finally, doubts
about the legal authority are met with soaring panegyrics to parliamentary
supremacy-"The Legislature, Guardian to all, Judges of Right and
Wrong in unparallell'd and National Cases."95 Much of this is
indistinguishable from the political theory of emergency underpinning the
movement for "extraordinary" trials.196
"Necessity" became a device for surmounting ordinary rules and norms
in order to rebalance asymmetries of power that had been fixed and
sanctified by law. This move was aided by the revivification of an older,
medieval idea of "necessity," derived from the canon law and prominent
in sources from Aquinas to Grotius. According to this doctrine, those in
extreme need could break positive laws of property where the alternative
was hunger and death.' Publicists addressing the dispute over contracts
transformed this idea from an affirmative defense into a charter for
expansive state intervention.
[I]n case of War, every one is commanded to assist, either in Money
or Person; but by this Law of Necessity, the poor Man will pay no
Money, nor the Cripple serve in person; ... a poor Man offering his
Service, in any Degree, to work; none will imploy him; he may take
192. SOUTH SEA SCHEME, supra note 181, at 14-15.
193. SOME CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 35, at 34. cf. SOUTH-SEA SCHEME DETECTED, supra
note 191, at 26.
194. Anon, AN ANSWER TO THE REASONS FOR MAKING VOID AND ANNULLING FRAUDULENT AND
USURIOUS CONTRACTS 4 (1721).; see also REASONS FOR MAKING VOID, supra note 184, at 3 ("in this
unpresidented and extraordinary Case").
195. RESTITUTION, supra note 188, at 3; cf SOUTH SEA SCHEME, supra note 181, at 27
196. In the MEMORIAL, supra note 44, at 57, these threads were elegantly tied together; among
the charges it proposes for the Directors is forcing the state to resort to the "fatal ruinous Remedy, of
making arbitrary Assignments of Property." One emergency measure becomes compensation for the
other.
197. See Siegfried Van Duffel & Dennis Yap, Distributive Justice Before the Eighteenth Century:
The Right ofNecessity 449, 451-53, HIST. POL. THOUGHT (2011).
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Meat, &c. just sufficient to sustain Hunger, and he may plead this
Case in Bar to the Man from whom he took it. Now to apply this Law
to our Purpose. I have before taken notice, that One Hundred for One
will be undone [by enforcing the contracts]; by this Law of Necessity,
One must suffer to save the Ninety-nine.1 98
Here "necessity" functions as a metonym for the needs and desires of
the poor majority. This marks a shift in the vocabulary of necessity as it
had been framed since the English Civil War.' Although its main feature
is still intact-the subordination of municipal law and individual interest
to the overarching goals of the polity-the connection to interstate
competition has been severed. Where ordinary law would permit the
multitude to starve, or condemn it to watch impotently as its oppressors
elude justice, "necessity" compels its derogation by the state in the name
of public safety.
In reply, a chorus protested in unison that the cancellation of these
contracts on humanitarian grounds would mean the end of British liberty.
One author feared that it would sap "the very Foundations of Property,"
while another thought that it would tear "a wide Gap in our
Constitution."20 A third, in a piece titled Performance of Fair and Legal
Contracts, predicted a vertiginous spiral of measures ex post facto once
the legal norm was breached:
For if Property is altered by a law Ex post Facto upon particular
Motives at one time, that one Sort of Men may be reliev'd at the
Expence of another; it may, upon the same Motives, be altered
another time to relieve the last angered by that very Law Ex post
Facto and so ad infinitum, till the Fences of all Property are thrown
open, to make way for that Anarchy and Confusion which the
Enemies of our Happy Constitution wish for.20 1
Against the motto salus populi suprema lex they counterposed an
alternative, better suited to citizens of a free nation: est liber qui
gubernatur legibus cognitis. To be governed by known laws was to be a
freeman; to be bound by discretionary decretal authority, whether of a
prince or a parliament, was to be degraded to the status of a slave, or
worse-a Frenchman. "Were we, indeed, in France. . .where the Edicts of
198. SOUTH SEA SCHEME, supra note 181, atl5-16; cf SOME CONSIDERATIONS,supra note 35, at
5 ("poor Underling Wretches.. must steal, pilfer or plunder, for Necessity has no Law").
199. Consider, for example, the argument of the king's attorney in R. v. Hampden, where the
absolute right of the king to make requisitions from his subjects in time of war is defended on the
grounds that "Necessity is the Law of the Time and Action, and Things are lawful by Necessity, which
otherwise are not." Littleton, "Ship-Money", in 3 STATE TRIALS, supra note 83, at 926-7.
200. ANON, LAWS EX POST FACTO 1 (1720); ANON, A LETTER TO A MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT
7(1721).
201. FAIR AND LEGAL CONTRACTS, supra note 184, at 1.
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Law; are no longer a Fence to Property. . .we had something to fear: but
we, blessed be God, in Britain, in a free Country, where every Man's
Property has been guarded by the Laws of his Country hitherto."202
Two features of this debate speak to the distinctive conceptual
topography of emergency economic intervention. First, while criminal
prosecution would be (in theory) restricted to the guilty, a blanket
moratorium on contract enforcement would impoverish many morally and
legally blameless citizens. This sat ill with many. The Directors and their
abettors should be "Punish'd in the severest Manner," perhaps even with
attenuated due process, but it would be monstrous to permit "those who
are Innocent of Fraud to suffer" with them, even conceding that "more
[will] suffer by those Bargains standing, then otherwise."203 The second
point is closely related. Capital markets are by their very nature fragile
chains of paper instruments brought to life by a mysterious alchemy of
confidence and credit.204 To interpose the iron hand of the state might
dissolve that shared trust and send the market tumbling. Defoe noted that
"Credit is the Child of Liberty, she is born Free, is nourish'd by Honesty
and Peace, and is protected by Justice and Law." Vacating contracts by
parliamentary fiat in the name of rescuing the economy would be, in
effect, destroying the credit markets in order to save them.205
Most importantly, the abrogation of South Sea contracts would lay the
legal and intellectual groundwork for a similar repudiation of the national
debt, the great terror of postrevolutionary England.
Tho' this were true that more suffer by those Bargains standing,....
yet this at best is but what the Lawyers call Argumentum ab
Incommodo .... This, indeed, would be an excellent Preparative for
paying our publick Debts by a Spunge, and, in short, destroying all
the Fences of Property. May it not be said, and that with a great deal
of Truth, that Brittain is burden'd with Debt, and that it would be for
the good of the State to be free of Debt; and therefore considering the
Number of Creditors to the Publick is but small in Comparison to the
whole Nation, the Debt ought to be paid with a Spunge. This would
202. LAWS Ex POST FACTO, supra note 201, at 1.The contrast of servus and liber homo is, of
course, the hallmark of the "republican" idea of liberty, associated today with the work of Quentin
Skinner and Philip Pettit. We will return to this theme in Part IV, infra; for now it is enough to note
some of the policies this language was being mobilized to support in 1721.
203. Id. at 1; cf. FAIR AND LEGAL CONTRACTS, supra note 184, at 1.
204. See, e.g., ADAM SMITH, 2 AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 86 (1776) . (R.H. Campbell and A.S. Skinner eds., 2005).
205. Defoe, THE DIRECTOR (London), Oct. 28, 1720. Cf FAIR AND LEGAL CONTRACTS, supra
note 184, at 1.Defoe was a leading expositor of the new financial culture. See, e.g., Simon Schaffer,
"Defoe, natural philosophy and the worlds of credit", in NATURE TRANSFIGURED: SCIENCE AND
LITERATURE, 1700-1900 13, 28-30 (1989). I am grateful to Michael Rosen for the reference.
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be by no means such a stretch as overturning of legal Bargains.. .206
If Parliament can repeal the myriad private bargains made in Exchange
Alley by citing the precarious national safety, surely it can strike its own
debts on the same principles, and by the same prerogatives. But in slipping
free of its bondholders Britain would enter a new bondage: an absolutist
political economy in which no private property is more than provisional,
and every transaction is subject to the surveillance of the central state. The
"Fences of Property" would be uprooted, and the power of the government
would be boundless.
We might seem to be back in Addison's fable, where the Sponge is the
insignia of Stuart absolutism and Magna Charta is the bulwark of a free
and prosperous economy. But we should remember that the army that
dethrones Public Credit n the famous allegory is led not only by the Old
Pretender but also by "the Genius of a Commonwealth," while Credit is
ultimately restored by the advent of "Liberty, with Monarchy at her right
hand."2 07 This pairing would prove prophetic.208 In the maelstrom of 1720-
21 the suspension of civil liberties, the erection of extraordinary tribunals,
and the disruption of property relations would come to be understood as
the hallmarks of a specifically republican reason of state.
III. COMMONWEALTH
At a tense meeting of the Commons on December 8, 1720, with the
Bank's proposed rescue of the South Sea Company hanging in the
balance, the venerable "revolution Whig" Viscount Molesworth rose to
speak. It was premature, he thought, to discuss saving the Company
without first deciding on the punishment of its executives. And it was
imperative that they not evade proper punishment for formalistic or
technical reasons. Molesworth, a distinguished historian and political
theorist, punctuated this point with a classical allusion:
in his opinion, they ought, on this occasion, to follow the example of
the ancient Romans, who having no law against parricide, because
their legislators supposed no son could be so unnaturally wicked,....
made one to punish so heinous a crime, as soon as it happened to be
committed; and adjudged the guilty wretch to be thrown alive, sewed
up in a sack, into the Tyber. Concluding, That as he looked upon the
contrivers and executers of the villainous South Sea Scheme, as the
parricides of their country, he should be satisfied to see them undergo
206. LAWS EX POST FACTO, supra note 201, at 1; cf LETTER TO A MEMBER, supra note 201, at 8;
"Somersetshire",supra note 133.
207. [Joseph Addison], THE SPECTATOR (London), Mar. 3, 1711, at 6.
208. Gordon, I CL (XXVIII), supra note 2, at 202 ("others as plainly prove [Cato] a flaming
Jacobite, and an arrant republican"); cf CRUICKSHANKS & ERSKINE-HILL, supra note 6, at 83-8.
210 [Vol. 29:2
46




If the Viscount of Swords was only half-serious in urging the revival of
this gruesome ritual, he was deadly earnest in demanding extreme, extra-
legal punishments for those he judged guilty of triggering the financial
panic. And, crucially, he issued his incendiary appeal in the distinctively
republican lexicon of ancient Rome.
The radical Whigs were not republicans-at least, not in any
straightforward sense. Nor did they possess a monopoly on neoclassical
ideas of law and government.2 10 But it was accepted on virtually all sides
that to espouse extraordinary measures and punishments beyond the law
was to sound in the key of commonwealth. Financial reason of state was
associated not with Stuart absolutism, but with the popular turbulence of
the Roman republic.211 At a time when the invocation of "emergency
powers" is nearly always associated with sublimated royalism, the
curtailing of democratic norms, and the targeting of vulnerable
populations, it is vital to remember how tightly it has been linked,
historically, to populism, republicanism, and the punishment of elites.
Although Molesworth's speech on parricide has been mocked by
generations of historians as parliamentary penny dreadful, it is worth
noting its enormous impact on the radical political literature. Only a week
after Molesworth's speech in the Commons, the term "parricide" appeared
in Cato's Letters for the first time, where it quickly became a favorite
epithet for the directors.2 12 The Eleventh Letter, published in January
1721, copied Molesworth's speech almost verbatim,213 fueling speculation
209. Debate in the Commons on the Motion for Address (Dec. 8, 1720), in 7 COBBETT, supra
note 59, at 683. Parricide was not formally interdicted until the Lex Cornelia De Sicariis and the Lex
Pompeia de Parricidiis, both dating from the last half-century of the republic.
210. See REED BROWNING, POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS OF THE COURT WHIGS 210-56
(1982), esp. 219, on the disjuncture between the "Ciceronian" self-image of the Court Whigs and the
"Catonic" outlook of the opposition.
211. Cf Quentin Skinner, "Augustan politics and constitutional thought", in 2 VISIONS OF
POLITICS 344, 357 (2002) on the self-conscious republican revival "in the years surrounding the crisis
of the South Sea Bubble," which included the republication of Neville's edition of Machiavelli and
Ludlow's Memoirs. There was nothing particularly unusual about the left edge of Whig opinion being
attacked for "savor[ing] very much of a commonwealth"; see PINCUS, supra note 13, at 363. What is
noteworthy is that the tag of "republican extremism" was now being applied, not to the defense of
liberty, property, and free trade, but to their abrogation in the name of the collective good. For a highly
conventional interpretation of the place of Rome in Cato's Letters, emphasizing anti-corruption and
the rule of law and neglecting to mention the dictatorship, Catiline, or Machiavelli, see MORTIMER N.
SELLERS, AMERICAN REPUBLICANISM: ROMAN IDEOLOGY IN THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION I1I-
17 (1994).
212. Gordon, I CL (VII), supra note 2, at 63; Gordon, I CL (X) at78; Trenchard, I CL (XII) at
94; Gordon, I CL (XXI) at 155. Cf Trenchard, I CL (XII) at 99. The association of treason and
parricide was not, of course, unique to Molesworth; indeed, prior to 1720 it was most often used to tar
radical Whigs as supporters of the regicide. Predictably, this was turned around after 1688. See, e.g.,
MERCURIOUS PRAGMATICUS, Nov. 21, 1648; LONDON GAZETTE, Sept. 27, 1683; REVIEW OF THE
STATE OF THE BRITISH NATION (London), June 28, 1712.
213. Gordon, I CL (XI), supra note 2, at 88-89.
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that "Cato" was the Viscount's own nom de plume.214 The author of
Considerations on the Present State of the Nation conceded that England's
parlous situation could not "be remedy'd at all, without breaking in on our
present Laws," but took solace in a comparison with "the Romans, who for
many Ages had no Law to Punish Parricide; it never entring into the
Minds that any could be guilty of so villanous a Crime."215 Likewise, the
pamphlet Salus Populi Suprema Lex denied "that the Old Romans acted
unjustly, in making an Example of the first Parricide, by the most
extraordinary Punishments, though there was no Law against him." 216
Within weeks Molesworth's provocation had become a standard feature of
radical Whig polemic, a vivid illustration of the principle that even a free
government might sometimes act beyond the law.
The symbolic field of "parricide," particularly when evoked with Latin
accents, recalled for many of Molesworth's contemporaries the civil
disorders of Catiline, branded a "traitor and parricide" by Cicero in his
celebrated orations of 63 BC.217 Educated Britons were intimately familiar
with the details of Catiline's attempted coup, 218 and "Catiline" was used as
a shorthand for conspiracies against the national constitution, with
translations of Cicero and Sallust often serving as commentary on current
events.219 It is unsurprising, then, that Thomas Gordon published a new
214. Gordon, I CL (Dedication [1725]), supra note 2, at 8 ("It may be proper here to mention
another mistake which has generally prevailed; that a noble peer of a neighbouring nation, now dead,
had a chief, at least a considerable hand in Cato's Letters"). See also [Daniel Defoe], THE DIRECTOR
(London), Jan 13, 1721; "Fabricius", READ'S WEEKLY JOURNAL OR BRITISH GAZETEER, Apr. 29,
1721; William Wishart, Letter to Lord [Molesworth], Oct. 13, 1722, in REPORTS ON MANUSCRIPTS IN
VARIOUS COLLECTIONS , supra note 57, at348; W. [Walter] Molesworth, Letter to Hon. John
Molesworth, Nov. 9, 1721, in id. at 326; Sir J. Vanbrugh, Letter to [Lord Carlisle], Apr. 22, 1721, in
MANUSCRIPTS OF THE EARL OF CARLISLE, supra note 54, at 33; CHARLES BECHDOLT REALEY, THE
LONDON JOURNAL AND ITS AUTHORS 241 (1935); APPLEBEE'S WEEKLY J. (London), Sept. 2, 1721;
MIST'S WEEKLY J. (London), May 20, 1721.. But see Abel Boyer, The Political State for June 1721, in
21 POLITICAL STATE OF GREAT BRITAIN 633 (1721) ("the Committee sent for Mr. Gordon, the reputed
Author, of Cato's Letters. . .").
215. SOME CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 35, at 58.
216. SALUS POPULI, supra note 139, at 36.
217. See, e.g., Cicero, In Catilinam 1.14, 1.7 (64 BC) (C. Macdonald trans. 1976).
218. Gordon ascribed the English enthusiasm for Sallust to its status as "a School-Book: Boys
learn him together with the Latin Tongue." See THOMAS GORDON, THE WORKS OF SALLUST,
TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH vii (1744).
219. In 1611 Ben Jonson's play Catiline His Conspiracy was performed for the first time; it
contained numerous allusions to the recent Gunpowder Plot. In 1683 a translation of Sallust's
Catilinarian Conspiracy appeared in English as PATRIAE PARRICIDA: OR THE HISTORY OF CATILINE
AGAINST THE COMMON-WEALTH OF ROME (Caleb Calle trans., 1683). The Epistle Dedicatory
denounced the "Plots and Conspiracies" of extremist Whigs, "of which Catiline is but the Model."
Similarly, the Jacobite rising of 1715 prompted the publication of CICERO'S SECOND ORATION
AGAINST CATILINE, APPLIED TO THE PRESENT TIMES (1715), as well as THE ROMAN CONDUCT IN
QUASHING CATILINE'S CONSPIRACY, TAKEN FROM THE ORIGINAL LATIN OF SALLUST (J. Fergusson
trans., 1715). In 1722 Benjamin Hoadly would make eager use of the exemplum in his "Britannicus"
letters advocating the suspension of habeas corpus; see "Britannicus", London J., November 3, 1722
("The Parliament of Rome immediately, without any One Dissent or Protest. . .pass'd an
Act.. suspending the Roman Habeas-Corpus-Act. . ") and November 10, 1722 ("the Senate,
immediately and unanimously, gave extraordinary Powers to the Consuls; particularly to confine
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history of Catiline's conspiracy in 1720,220 and discussed it in his later
essay, Francis, Lord Bacon: "This Conspiracy. . resembles It in its
Consequences: nay, is bigger, we may say, of Mischeif than That of
Catiline, by as much as the Ruin of a whole Country is a more pernicious
Piece of Villany, than the Burning of any single City." 22 1 At a pivotal
moment in Gordon's narrative, Catiline (like Sunderland) is narrowly
acquitted on charges of extortion, and the provincials he despoiled fall into
despair: "they saw these triumphant Robbers, laughing at Justice, and
shining in Gold and Purple, spurning and insulting the People whose
Wealth they were drest in." This was, quite plainly, South Sea Britain in
Roman costume.222
The principle lesson of Cataline's story, as laid out in a 1716 article in
the Flying Post, was that "the most polite Nations, have in extraordinary
Cases, thought themselves oblig'd to act with unrelenting Justice against
Traytors."223 It was, in other words, a primer on emergency government
for a free people. In the course of suppressing the conspiracy, Cicero and
the Senate engaged in a flurry of extralegal measures, including the
execution of several distinguished citizens without formal trial or right of
appeal. When Caesar expressed discomfort with these actions, it was Cato
who insisted that they were necessitated by the unprecedented facts of the
conspiracy, dismissing solicitude for the rule of law as softhearted naYvet6.
Gordon's depiction of the episode made his sympathies clear:
[Caesar's] palliating Speech contain'd Reasons for sparing the
Conspirators, upon pretence that the Laws had provided no
Punishments for such Crimes as theirs; ... and that tho' the
Greatness of their Crimes had exceeded all Imagination, yet he would
have them punish'd no otherwise than as the Laws had provided....
CATO perceiv'd the Cunning and Design of this Harangue, and
answer'd it by a fine Oration ... [giving] Reasons from the Nature of
their Crimes, as well as for the Safety of the Commonwealth, why
they should every Man be cut off.224
A decade earlier Addison had portrayed Cato as a principled defender of
Persons, and to prepare an Army; exactly answering to what has been just now agreed to in the present
Parliament"). For a fuller survey, see Rob Hardy, A Mirror ofthe Times. the Catilinarian Conspiracy
in Eighteenth-Century British and American Political Thought, Int. 14 J. CLASSICAL TRAD. 431
(2007).
220. [THOMAS GORDON], THE CONSPIRATORS; OR, THE CASE OF CATILINE (5" ed. 1721) (2 vols.).
221. Gordon, LORD BACON, supra note 114, at v; cf Gordon, 1 CATILINE, supra note 221, at x.
222. Gordon, 1 CATILINE, supra note 221, at 56-57. Compare Gordon, I CL (III), supra note 2, at
46 ("mean sharpers, that swagger in the plunder of their country"); Trenchard, 3 CL (LXIX) (Mar. 10,
1721), supra note 2, at 502.
223. FLYING POST (London), Jan. 26, 1716.
224. Gordon, 2 CATILINE, supra note 221, at 22. Compare Sallust, THE WAR WITH CATILINE 52
(42 BC) (J.C. Rolfe and John T. Ramsey eds., 2013).
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individual liberty, rhapsodizing the mos maiorum and pointedly rejecting
torture as illegal: "Meanwhile we'll sacrifice to liberty./Remember, 0 my
friends, the laws, the rights,/The generous plan of power delivered
down,/From age to age, by your renowned forefathers.".225 But Gordon's
Cato, no less historically accurate, was in tune with the tenor of the times.
Gordon was hardly the only commentator to press this connection. In
the midst of a tirade against the Company, a columnist for Read's Weekly
Journal reproduced a Latin excerpt of Cicero's In Catilinam, and rendered
a rather free translation:
For as the great Orator Cicero says a little further of Catiline the
notorious Conspirator, Ad mortem te, Catilina, duci, jussa consulis,
jampridem oportebat; in te pestem istam, quam tu in nos omnes
jamdiu machinaris. Which I thus render, with a little Variation. Long
since, ye South Sea Villains, ye should have been led by the Consul's
Order to Execution; upon your own Heads should have been turn'd
that Destruction, which ye have been so long contriving against us.226
Others expressed similar sentiments. When the Post-Master General
committed suicide after being implicated in the spreading scandal, Mist's
Weekly Journal hoped to see the Treasury "resuming the Estate of so
desperate a Catiline to our Isle."2 27 "Britannicus", writing in the same
venue, expressed his admiration for "a most popular Pamphlet called
Catiline, or the Case of the Conspirators," but added that he analogy to
modern times was even more apt than its author realized: Catiline's
rampage would have been impossible without the silent backing of Marcus
Crassus, an unscrupulous financier who exploited his high public office to
build an immense private fortune.228
In an age where "liberty" was still defined with reference to the Roman
Codex,229 the extra-judicial killing of the Catilinarians was a reminder of
emergency government's distinguished pedigree. Radical pamphleteers
did not hesitate to conscript Cicero and Cato into their campaign for a
populist politics of necessity.
The Romans, who of all other Nations, both understood Liberty the
225. Joseph Addison, CATO, A TRAGEDY 111.5.71-74 (1713).
226. READ'S WEEKLY JOURNAL OR BRITISH GAZETEER (London), Feb. 18, 1721
227. "King-Love", supra note 183 . His South Sea gains were, indeed, confiscated after his death
under the terms of the Sufferer's Bill.
228. "Britannicus", MIST'S WEEKLY JOURNAL (London), May 27, 1721. Discrediting the Whig
administration (and not just the Tory directors) perfectly suited the Jacobite program, though many
radical Whigs were typically just as willing (at least, before the Atterbury Plot) to look behind the
South Sea Company to its political masters. See, e.g., Gordon, I CL (V), supra note 2, at 52 ("others
have directed the directors").
229. See, e.g., Gordon, 3 CL (LXXI) (Mar. 31, 1722), supra note 2, at 517, speaking of Rome:
"The spirit of the people, like that of their state, breathed nothing but liberty."
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best, and liked it the most, reckoned that sort of Justice was never to
be departed from; but that their Laws might be superseded, to punish
uncommon Offenders... In Catiline's Conspiracy, when the Senate
consulted what o do with Cethegus, and the other Conspirators. . .it
was resolved to break the Porcian Law, and put them to death, before
the Assembly rose. This Porcian Law had secur'd all the Roman
Citizens from capital Punishments; yet a few years after it had past [it
was broken].. .This was the Behaviour of a People, who were not
naturally cruel or savage; but, on the contrary, who taught the rest of
the World Humanity: And, doubtless, the Necessity of the State made
an Apology for those rigorous Proceedings.230
If fundamental Roman law could be set aside in times of turmoil, why
not the basic laws of England? Whatever the voices of reaction might say,
the defeat of Catiline was proof that the temporary suspension of
constitutional norms did not necessarily augur a freefall into despotism.231
The same idea lay behind Cato's repeated exhortation to kill the sons of
Brutus. Throughout the Discorsi Machiavelli stresses the importance of
restraining oligarchic conspirators against liberty with lethal force; he
names this policy "killing the sons of Brutus," after the famous incident in
Livy's History of Rome in which the consul Lucius Junius Brutus
supervises the execution of his own sons for plotting with the exiled
Tarquin kings. When faced with an intransigent class of proud aristocrats,
Machiavelli instructs, expanding on Livy's laconic text, "there is no
remedy more powerful, nor more valid, more secure, and more necessary,
than to kill the sons of Brutus"-that is, to visit exemplary punishment on
them following a political trial.232
The message was evidently received by Thomas Gordon, who presents
the annihilation of the South Sea party as a characteristically
Machiavellian ritorno alprincipio:
Machiavel tells us, that no government can long subsist, but by
recurring often to its first principles ... He tells us, that as a tyranny
cannot be established but by destroying Brutus; so a free government
is not to be preserved but by destroying Brutus's sons. Let us
therefore put on a resolution equal to the mighty occasion: Let us
230. SALUS POPULI, supra note 139, at 38.
231. Whether this is a faithful reading of the history of the late republic is, of course, a separate
matter. Sallust hints strongly that the opportunistic lawbreaking of 63 BC played a decisive role in the
constitutional breakdown that followed.
232. MACHIAVELLI, DISCOURSES ON LivY 1.16.4 (Harvey C. Mansfield & Nathan Tarcov trans,
1996); cf id. at III.1.3 ("Notable among such executions.. .were the death of the sons of Brutus. . ."),
111.3 ("That it is Necessary to Kill the Sons of Brutus if One Wishes to Maintain a Newly Acquired
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exert a spirit worthy of Britons, worthy of freemen who deserve
liberty. Let us take advantage of the opportunity, while men's
resentments boil high, whilst lesser animosities eem to be laid aside,
and most men are sick of party and party-leaders; and let us, by all
proper methods, exemplarily punish the parricides, and avowed
enemies of all mankind.2 33
Trenchard revisited this theme one month later in a corruscating essay
recommending exemplary punishment to strike fear into the hearts of
usurping elites who would defraud the public, lest their crimes be imitated
and compounded until the state is bankrupted and its misery permanent.
For support he conjured the indomitable spirit of Rome's revolutionary
generation, mediated by Machiavelli: "Valerius Maximus calls severity
the sure preserver and avenger of liberty. . .After the death of the sons of
Brutus, executed by the command of their own father, and in his presence,
we hear no more of any conspirators in Rome to restore the Tarquins."234
Mercy for great crimes guarantees their repetition. And only a periodic
bloodletting of optimates recalls a state to the purity of its revolutionary
principles.2 35
Roman models of emergency government also informed radical
defenses of unbounded state power and dictatorship. Cato's Eleventh
Letter, detailing the killing of Spurius Maelius by the dictator L. Quincius
Cincinnatus, makes this clear. Maelius might seem a curious target for
Cato's ire; his crime was not plundering the public, but rather distributing
grain to the plebeians in a famine. But a long tradition in Rome ascribed
this liberality to his hidden ambition to overturn the republic and have
himself declared king. The consuls, in Livy's narrative, wished to act, but
found themselves "restrained by the right of appeal" [constricti legibus de
provocatione], which made it almost impossible to secure the conviction
of popular demagogues. They needed a man who was "not just powerful,
but free to act and unbound from the strictures of law" [libero exolutoque
legum vinclis]. And therefore, per Gordon, they "created a dictator, an
officer with power, for a time, to suspend laws, and make laws." Gordon's
narrative betrays his presentist concerns:
[Maelius] knew that his villainies were out of the reach of the law,
and he did not dream of an extraordinary method of punishing them
by the Roman parliament. But he was deceived; and the dictator tells
the people, that being a sort of an outlaw, he was not to be proceeded
with as a citizen of Rome. . .Nor was his blood alone, says the wise
233. Gordon, 1 CL (XVI), supra note 2, at 121.
234. Trenchard, 1 CL (XX), supra note 2, at 142.
235. See, e.g., id. at 143,
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dictator, sufficient to expiate his guilt, unless we also. . .confiscate to
the publick use his estate and his treasures, the price and means of the
publick ruin.
Cincinnatus, in other words, enacted the full panoply of reprisals that
Trenchard and Gordon were now energetically agitating for in print. And
although its own constitution made no provision for a special magistrate,
England too might act by what Cato called "a power that was not
ordinary." Parliament, Cato assured his countrymen, "has reserved this
power to itself, and has an undoubted right to exercise it; and has often
done so upon extraordinary occasions."236
The cruel efficiency of the Roman dictatorship understandably appealed
to Whig reforners, but the radical literature also reflected the mixed
legacy of dictatorship in the commonwealth tradition.2 37 Just as Defoe had
protested that stock market speculators were, in an age of mobile capital,
the uncrowned kings of Europe, Gordon denounced "our Dictators in
Stock, and absolute Monarchs of the ALLEY' who had wrested the reins of
state from the people.23 8 He also wagered that you could "load all the
Gallows's (in England) with DICTATORS and Stock-Jobbers" without a
murmur of dissension from the nation.239 Like most of what appeared in
the London Journal, this juxtaposition quickly became a commonplace of
the opposition press. The New Year's Gift for the Directors lambasted
those who had "tyranniz'd more absolutely over the Properties of others,
than those Roman Dictators, who assum'd a Power of doing any thing
without the Senate's Authority."240 But this ambivalence about the
historical role of the dictatorship did not imply second thoughts about he
populist push for extraordinary powers. Rather, it spotlighted a third
modality of emergency politics in ancient Rome that might be adapted for
236. Gordon, 1 CL (XI) (Jan. 7, 1721), supra note 2, at 89-93; Livy. History ofRome 4.13-16 (9
BC) (B.O. Foster trans., 1919) cf Gordon, 4 CL (CXVIII) (Mar. 2, 1722), supra note 2, at 822. For the
influence of this account, see SALUS POPULI, supra note 139, at 40-43 as well as the tortured rejoinder
given in [Defoe], THE DIRECTOR (London), Jan. 13, 1721 (Maelius was not punished ex post facto for
his conspiracy against the state, but only for his armed resistance to the dictator's summons). On the
exemplum of Spurius Maelius in Roman political thought, and what it reveals about the classical "state
of exception," see Michble Lowrie, Spurius Maelius: Dictatorship and the Homo Sacer, in CITIZENS
OF DISCORD: ROME AND ITS CIVIL WARS 171 (Brian Breed et al. eds., 2010).
237. See, e.g., Trenchard, 4 CL (CXV) (Feb. 9, 1722), supra note 2, at 807; Trenchard, I The
Independent Whig (XII) 90 (Apr., 6 1720) (7" ed. 1743).
238. Thomas Gordon, Letter No. VII, in A COLLECTION OF ALL THE HUMOROUS LETTERS IN THE
LONDON JOURNAL 25, 26 (2 nd ed. 1721).
239. [Thomas Gordon], "Letter No. VI, id. at 27. In the 1725 edition, this line is changed without
explanation to "directors and stock-jobbers." It may be that, in the aftermath of the controversy with
Dr. Prideaux (to which we will return shortly), references to killing "dictators" flew too close to
regicide.
240. NEw-YEAR'S-GIFT, supra note 118, at 28. Cf Anon, The Secret History of the South-Sea
Scheme, in I A COLLECTION OF SEVERAL PIECES OF MR. JOHN TOLAND 404, 412 (1726) ("Not unlike
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contemporary use-the right of tyrannicide.
Historians have puzzled over the decision of Trenchard and Gordon to
ignite a polemical firestorm in December 1721 with their two-part defense
of the killing of Julius Caesar.24 1 As Ian Higgins notes, the "assassination
of usurping tyrants" was a pet Jacobite theme, and after 1715 literary
evocations of the Ides of March were often lightly disguised incitements to
regicide. "In this context," Higgins comments, "the defense of Caesar's
assassination in Cato's Letters was extraordinary."242 Gordon, obviously
pained by the charge of disloyalty, spent several pages of the 1725 Preface
defending the two letters and pledging his fealty to the Hanoverian
succession. "In answer to those deep politicians, who have been puzzled to
know who were meant by Cicero and Brutus," he parried, "I assure them,
that Cicero and Brutus were meant."243 But this self-serving interpretation
has failed to satisfy most scholars; Higgins is typical in reading the letters
on Brutus as a thrust at the High Church clerisy and the Stuart
Pretender.24
Nevertheless, an alternative interpretation is available. In the second of
Cato's Letters-and the first to address the bubble-retribution against the
Directors is said to share "the spirit of jealousy and revenge" that led the
Roman Senate to turn on Julius Caesar, as it ought to have turned on
earlier usurpers:
Caesar thought that he might do what he had seen Marius and Sulla
do before him, and so enslaved his country: Whereas, had they been
hanged, he would, perhaps, never have attempted it.... As never
nation was more abused than ours has been of late by the dirty race of
money-changers; so never nation could with a better grace.. .take its
full vengeance.245
The conceptual frame of tyrannicide must have seemed particularly apt
since the South Sea inquiry extended to the highest reaches of the British
241. Gordon, 2 CL (LV) (Dec. 2, 1721), supra note 2, at 367-76; Gordon, 2 CL (LVI) (Dec. 9,
1721), at 376-88; cf Gordon, 1 CL (XXX) (May 20, 1721) at 214-20 (introducing and translating a
letter from Brutus to Atticus).
242. Ian Higgins, "Remarks on Cato's Letters", in CULTURES OF WHIGGISM 128-47(David
Womersley ed., 2005), esp. 139 . The most arresting of these texts is ANON, CATO'S GHOST (1715), in
which the old republican returns from Elysium to seek the killing of George and the restoration of
James III. For a contemporary accusation that Cato's essays on Brutus were invitations to regicide, see
TINDAL, , supra note 130, at 28.
243. Gordon, I CL (1724 Preface) , supra note 2, at 13-17. For examples of this criticism from
mainline Whigs, see [MATHEW TINDAL], THE JUDGMENT OF DR. PRIDEAUX (1721); JOHN DENNIS,
JULIUS CAESAR ACQUITTED, AND HIS MURDERERS CONDEMN'D (1722); FAIR WARNING, supra note
137, at 74-75; [J. GAYNAM], CATO'S PRINCIPLES OF SELF-PRESERVATION AND PUBLICK LIBERTY
(1722).
244. Higgins, supra note 243, at 141. But see CRUICKSHANKS & ERSKINE-HILL, supra note 6, at
83 (letter from Chammorel, Secretary to the French embassy in London, optimistically describing
Gordon's translation of Brutus's letter to Atticus as a Jacobite incitement against George I).
245. Gordon, I CL (II), supra note 2, at 41-42.
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state-the Lord of the Treasury, the two Secretaries of State, and the
Chancellor the Exchequer-as well as the inner sanctums of the royal
palace. It was not always clear that those at the center of this network of
graft and subornation had broken the law, but then those laws had been
extorted from a supine Parliament, just as "the Senate was awed, and the
tribunes and people were bribed" into ratifying the acts of Caesar.246 "As
to legal process against Caesar," Cato added, "there could be none; omnia
Caesar erat!"24 7 But the empty forms of legality finally proved a hollow
shield against popular vengeance. And the Senate, once aroused from its
stupor, finally redeemed itself by reaffirming the fundaments of its
constitution and proscribing the enemies of its liberty.248 One needn't
strain to see the resemblance to the radical program of 1721.
The neo-roman theory of exceptional punishment horrified Whig
loyalists, who replied along three axes. First, the classical republics were
frequently lawless and authoritarian, and placed little value on the
personal liberties of their citizens. It would be an act of folly to exchange
the orderly constitutional freedoms of Britain for the anarchic and
arbitrary proceedings of the ancient world. Here "Fabricius", appearing in
Read's Weekly Journal, was exemplary:
[I]f new Forms of Government very frequent, if cutting one anothers
Throats every Day for Prerogative, if Laws made and abrogated as
the governing Consul pleases, if People must pinch their Guts to
oblige a penurious Coxcomb in Power, if ... the Mob must be made
Judges, are the Blessings which our English Cato admire in the
Commonwealth of Rome, what (in the Name of God) must his Curses
be? If these are the Blessings of a Commonwealth, Heavens grant I
may always be under the Protection of a King...
For wary moderates Rome was a nightmare of civil discord and legal
caprice, a burlesque of the ordered liberty England now enjoyed.250 Defoe,
for instance, expressed amazement that anyone might want to resuscitate
the Roman dictatorship, reminding his readers that the "Temporary
Tyrant, was converted into a successive constant Tyrant, and the dictator
chang'd into Imperator."25' And Charlewood Lawton wondered whether
246. Gordon, 2 CL (XLII) supra note 2, at 290.
247. Gordon, 2 CL (LV) supra note 2, at 372.
248. Gordon, 2 CL (LVI) (Dec. 9, 1721), supra note 2, at 381, 384.
249. Fabricius, WEEKLY J. OR BRITISH GAZETEER, Apr. 29, 1721; cf FAIR WARNING, supra note
137, at 19.
250. This had once been the opinion of Trenchard himself. See TRENCHARD [AND WALTER
MOYLE], ARGUMENT, SHEWING THAT A STANDING ARMY IS INCONSISTENT WITH A FREE GOVERNMENT
2 (1697) ("No Man can be imprisoned, unless he has transgressed a Law of his own making.. .so that
we enjoy a Liberty scarce known to the antient Greeks and Romans").
251. [Defoe], THE DIRECTOR (London), No. XXIX, Jan. 13, 1721. Cf FAIR WARNING, supra note
137, at 48 ("These Gentlemen might have leamt a better Lesson from their justly-admir'd Play of
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the same publicists who wished to retrieve constitutional curiosities from
the pages of Plutarch would also recreate the bizarre sexual and
educational practices of Athens and Sparta-their naked gymnastics and
pagan mating rituals.2 52 The studied imitation of Roman "liberty" would
lead to absurdity, where it did not unleash disaster.
The model for that disaster was ready to hand: the Interregnum.
Although Trenchard and Gordon trumpeted their loyalty to the 1688
settlement and disclaimed any association with the Commonwealth,253
their antagonists continued to suspect that behind the placid mask of a
revolution Whig was the wild rictus of a republican. Cato and his
auxiliaries seemed to be inciting not just reform but insurrection.254 In the
apocalyptic vision of the penman "T.R.", the propaganda of Cato was
theme music for an English jacquerie.
To insinuate to [the people], that . . . [those] from whom they can
only expect Justice, were Contrivers of their Ruin, . . . is to make
them desperate, and give them to understand, that they are left
without any Hopes of Relief, but what results from breaking the
Constitution,... and this is what common People ... must take this
Author's Meaning to be, viz. That ... if they do not like the Method
of proceeding, may take their own,. . . and then a Jack Cade, a Wat
Tyler, or a Massenelio, with 100000 of the Rabble at their Heels, may
be our Infallible Guides, to reform Abuses.
Once they have been persuaded that rights and liberties are a
smokescreen for corruption and class domination, the demos will not be
content with a change of parties, or a set of narrow reforms, or a promise
of limited redistribution. They will want to annex the state itself. For much
of the previous century, "breaking the Constitution" had been associated
with the excesses of Stuart absolutism; now it had become synonymous
with the rising up of the landless and dispossessed. This, concluded "T.R,"
"is the Blessed Doctrine of our Cato, but if he is so fond of a Roman
Name, I think a Cataline Suits him better. "255
Cato, as to the [lenient, legalistic] Punishment of the most notorious Offenders.").
252. LAWTON, THREE LETTERS, supra note 162, at 26; cf [Defoe], DIRECTOR (London), No.
XXIX supra note 252.
253. Cromwell, for instance, is generally a figure of opprobrium in the Letters, though it is not
always clear whether this is grounded on an objection to the English Commonwealth as such. For a
characteristically ambiguous reference, see GORDON, 3 CL (LXXVI) (May 12, 1722), supra note 2, at
558 ("Cromwell was once heartily in the principles of liberty, and afterwards more heartily in those of
tyranny").
254. See, e.g., [MATTHEW TINDAL], AN ENQUIRY INTO THE CAUSES OF THE PRESENT
DISAFFECTION 26 (1723).
255. "T.R.", WEEKLY J.OR BRIT. GAZETEER,.,Apr. 15, 1721; cf FAIR WARNING, supra note 137,
at 67-68 ("the Infallible Mob must undoubtedly be the Judges; for Wat. Tyler and his Council were
rare Arbitrators in these Matters; who are above Kings"); GAYNAM, CATO'S PRINCIPLES, supra note
244, at 15 ("'tis no wonder, that our Modem Cato should be such a Champion for Brutus, who dares in
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Although the peasant insurgencies of Jack Cade and Wat Tyler had long
haunted the ruling class, most observers traced the new populism to the
regicide republic of 1649.256 "Do's not their Cruelty and Thirst of Blood,
and evn' their voting their Fellow-Creatures to Die in the most exquisite
Torments ... smell Rank of the Old Republicans?," asked one
broadside.257 Applebee 's cryptically remarked that "England has seen
enough of these Things in former Days."258 Indeed, events seemed to be
following an eerily similar trajectory: puritanical denunciations of royal
and ministerial corruption, joined to the "extraordinary" trial of state
criminals to bypass their immunity from legal process. Here the Fair
Warning lived up to its name:
Now, is not this as like the Addresses of the Old Rebels and
Agitators, for bringing the GRAND Delinquent to Justice, (I believe
they call'd him Criminal too) as one Commonwealth's-man and
Traytor is to another? ... Nay, that they abhorr'd 'em as much as
their Forefathers, who made some of the same Outcryes against the
Court in King Charles the First's time.259
The beheading of Charles Stuart was the unspoken precedent for the
state of emergency to which radicals now aspired-not only in a general
sense, but in all of its grisly particulars.
Reestablishing the Republic, the assumed secret design of every
dissident,2 6 would necessarily mean replaying the Passion of 1649. Thus
the "Anticatonist" predicted that Cato's philippic against official
corruption was "but a Preludium to that of assassinating.. monarchy
itself, as has been once already the case." Whatever his pretensions to an
agenda of parliamentary reform and restricted prerogative, "the Doctrine
of KING-KILLING is at the Bottom of it all." 261 If the top-traitors behind the
financial crisis-still secure in their perches at Westminster, Whitehall,
a Monarchial Government commend the Insurrections of Wat Tyler and Jack Straw.").
256. "Regicide" was a standard charge made by Tories against mainstream Whigs in election
campaigns between 1688 and 1715. Part of what is notable here is its redeployment by mainstream
Whigs against he Whig dissent. See Nicholas Phillipson, Politeness and politics in the reigns ofAnne
and the early Hanoverians, in THE VARIETIES OF BRITISH POLITICAL THOUGHT, 1500-1800 211, 213
(J.G.A. Pocock ed., 1993.
257. FAIR WARNING, supra note 137, at 47.
258. "Somersetshire", APPLEBEE'S ORIGINAL WEEKLY J. (London), supra note 133.
259. FAIR WARNING, supra note 137, at 68-69. The full title, not incidentally, is What has been
may be: fair warning to the good people of England, against the Common-wealth principles
industriously propagated by the London Journal; cf Trenchard & Gordon, I CL (XII), supra note 2,
at8 1.
260. GAYNAM, CATO'S PRINCIPLESsupra note 244, at 33 ("I have plainly shewn, that all the
choice Means, and expedients used heretofore by the Rump to destroy the Monarchy and Church, are
exactly transcrib'd by the Author of Cato's Letters; and then judge ye, how fit such an one is to be a
Dictator."); cf DAILY J. (London), May 5, 1721.
261. Anticatonist, APPLEBEE'S ORIGINAL WEEKLY J., Dec. 16, 1721; cf TINDAL, ENQUIRY, supra
note 255, at 16; APPLEBEE'S ORIGINAL WEEKLY J., Jan. 7, 1721.
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and Exchange Alley-could not be brought to book by ordinary means,
any self-styled patriot would be justified in taking revenge on behalf of an
outraged nation. And they might strike first at the crown, the keystone of
the now discredited constitutional order. 262 In the shadow of these fears,
Cato's letters on Brutus and Caesar now seemed like a brazen confession
of intent. The Long Parliament had taken for granted that the king could
only be killed by the public executioner following a formal trial; now
Trenchard and Gordon seemed prepared to jettison even this minimal
safeguard under the aegis of an all-consuming reason of state.
Partisans of the status quo were equally aghast at the "republican" turn
in private property. Radical pleas to sequester the property of politicians
and bankers, revoke contracts in stock, and compensate those ruined by
the crash reawakened memories of the confiscations carried out by
Cromwell and his adjutants. The Fair Warning revisited this black chapter
of English history, and winked maliciously at Cato.
Then as to their Rapacity and Corruption, it was Universal: . . . 'Tis
notorious that the Church-Lands and the Crown-Lands were
swallowed by them, and almost unnumber'd Millions besides ... and
yet their Bel and Dragon still remain'd as voracious and unsatiable as
ever. These Dictators were as perfectly Liberi, exolutique Legum
vinclis, absolutely free from all Restraints of Law, as their own Lusts
cou'd wish, or as their Successors cou'd for themselves desire.2 63
Once liberated from the supervision of "Magna-Charta, and the Petition
of Right," the lupine Republic had eagerly devoured the worldly goods of
its subjects. "These," scoffed "Fabricius," "were the blessed Times of
Liberty and Property" under the Commonwealth, the halcyon days when
"Men could not truly call any thing their own."2
And now the nation was again redrawing the lines of private property to
suit the whims of the mob and its masters. "Somersetshire", a
pseudonymous contributor to Applebee's, railed against the proposal to
cancel all transactions in South Sea stock, what it disdainfully named a
"Spunge" for capital markets. Although the plan masqueraded as natural
equity and poor relief, Somersetshire was confident that it would only
exacerbate the "general Desolation" of the economy by deranging settled
expectations of property and law. It could only have been devised by those
Levellers "who were for pulling Men to Pieces, because they had more
262. See TINDAL, supra note 130, at 30 ("he represents the Commons as screening those Top-
Criminals he wou'd have assassinated."); FLYING POST (London), Dec. 14-16;1721 APPLEBEE'S
ORIGINAL WEEKLY J., Dec. 30, 1720.
263. FAIR WARNING, supra note 137, at 36-37.
264. Fabricius, WEEKLY J. OR BRITISH GAZETEER (London), May 6, 1721.
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These suspicions were confirmed when Cato took up the cause of
agrarian laws in the summer of 1721. Political liberty, Gordon stressed,
borrowing from James Harrington, cannot survive without a baseline of
economic equality.2' For his opponents it was a revealing moment. "What
could be the meaning of insisting so often upon the great Benefit of the
Agrarian Law among the Romans," Applebee's inquired, "but to inspire
the People with the Spirit of Levelling?"26 7 It was an agenda that was
anathema to the Anglo-Saxon constitutional order, and that evoked the
extraordinary powers available to republics-the Roman fasces and the
Parliamentary mace.
Although they drew on an array of republican sources and philosophies,
Trenchard and Gordon consistently preserved a space for an enlightened
monarchy, stripped of its corrupt appendages and reduced to its proper
limits. And they abjured any intention to "turn all the possessions of
England topsy-turvy, and throw them into average."268 The terms of
debate that they initiated are nevertheless telling: in a nation that had only
recently concluded a century of debilitating argument over the royal
prerogative, extra-legal measures were now universally thought to carry
the seal and signature of the commonwealth. The rights of Englishmen had
become the fortress of reaction,269 while a state of exception modeled on
the Roman dictatorship now seemed like the matrix of a free and
egalitarian future.
IV. VIOLENT WHIGS
The Cato Institute in Washington, D.C. is not named after the
legendarily incorruptible Roman Senator who resisted Caesar's rise to
power. Rather, its website helpfully explains, "Cato owes its name to
Cato's Letters, a series of essays published in 18th-century England that
presented a vision of society free from excessive government power."270
The Cato Institute is hardly alone in depicting the Letters as the font of a
265. "Somersetshire", APPLEBEE'S ORIGINAL WEEKLY J. (London), supra note 133. It is worth
noting that this view of the Levellers, widespread throughout the eighteenth century, is at odds with
the actual Leveller program. See Tim Harris, The Leveller Legacy: from the Restoration to the
Exclusion Debates, in THE PUTNEY DEBATES OF 1647 232, (Michael Mendle ed., 2001),.
266. Gordon, 2 CL (XXXV), July 1, 1721, 253-54; cf Trenchard, 3 CL (XCI), Aug. 25, 1722,
648. For Cato on the agrarian law, see ERIC NELSON, THE GREEK TRADITION IN REPUBLICAN
THOUGHT (2004), 1404. On Thomas Gordon's later musings on the agrarian law in his translations of
Sallust and Tacitus, see EDWARD G. ANDREW, IMPERIAL REPUBLICS 61-62 (2011).
267. APPLEBEE'S ORIGINAL WEEKLY J. (London), Sept. 2, 1721.
268. Trenchard, 3 CL (LXXXV), July 14, 1722, 614; cf. [Thomas Gordon], A Sermon preached
before the Learned Society of Lincoln's-Inn on Jan. 30 1732, in 3 THE INDEPENDENT WHIG 361-74
(2d ed. 1741). See also BLAIR WORDEN, ROUNDHEAD REPUTATIONS (2002), 152.
269. See, e.g., [Daniel Defoe], THE DIRECTOR (London), Jan. 13, 1721, ("Liberties of
Englishmen"); FAIR WARNING, supra note 137, at 49; see also HAMMOND, supra note 17, at 16.
270. About Cato, CATO INSTITUTE, http://cato.org/about (last visited Mar. 25, 2017).
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libertarian tradition, or as an advertisement for a minimalist government
that aggressively protects the rights of its citizens.271 For Ronald Hamowy,
the Letters are a celebration of "natural law, inalienable rights, and the
natural limits of government."27 2 For Michael Zuckert, their core concern
is the preservation of individual liberty and property by means of a
Lockean social contract.2 Bernard Bailyn takes perhaps the strongest
position, grouping Molesworth, Trenchard, and Gordon together in a
tradition of "extreme libertarianism" that helped to kindle the American
Revolution.274 For the radical Whigs, following this line of scholarship,
every incursion on property rights and due process had to be resisted
tenaciously, lest it become a precedent for further encroachments.
There is no question that the works of Trenchard, Gordon, and
Molesworth are thick with encomiums to "that precious Jewel Liberty,"
typically juxtaposed against the misery, deprivation, and slavery of
oriental and continental monarchies.275 The texts they published between
1689 and 1720 contain stirring tributes to freedom of the press,276 religious
toleration27 7 and habeas corpus,278 as well as the impassioned opposition
to standing armies that made Trenchard's reputation.279 Cato's Letters is
often viewed as the apotheosis of this tradition.
But the history reviewed in Part II complicates the reflexive
identification of Whig dissenters with individual rights. Throughout
Cato's Letters ringing endorsements of constitutional liberties and civic
privileges rest uneasily alongside agitation for treason trials and
271. Consider, for example, 2 MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, CONCEIVED IN LIBERTY 690 (2011),
http://mises.org/system/tdf/Conceived%20in%2LibertyVol2_2.pdffile=l &type=document ("The
great significance of Cato's Letters is that in them the wealthy John Trenchard and his young prot6g6
Thomas Gordon greatly radicalized the impact of Locke's libertarian creed. . .'Cato' proceeded to
argue with great force that government is always and everywhere the potential or actual aggressor
against the rights and liberties of the people"); David L. Jacobson, Introduction, in THE ENGLISH
LIBERTARIAN HERITAGE: FROM THE WRITINGS OF JOHN TRENCHARD AND THOMAS GORDON IN 'THE
INDEPENDENT WHIG' AND 'CATO'S LETTERS' xxxiii-xlvii (David Jacobson ed., 1965).
272. Hamowy, supra note 142, at 291.
273. MICHAEL ZUCKERT, NATURAL RIGHTS AND THE NEW REPUBLICANISM 297-319 (1994).
274. BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 35, 47, 77
and passim (2d ed. 1992),. Cf. ISAAC KRAMNICK, BOLINGBROKE AND HIS CIRCLE 251 (1968) ("Here
in Cato's Letters is a fully developed constitutional theory emphasizing fixed and definite
constitutional limitations on government and its leaders.").
275. ROBERT MOLESWORTH, AN ACCOUNT OF DENMARK, AS IT WAS IN THE YEAR 1692
(I 694)The phrase is repeated in TRENCHARD & MOYLE, STANDING ARMY, supra note 251, at 4.
276. Gordon, 2 Independent Whig 31 (2nd ed. 1741) (No. XXXV) (Sept. 14 1720),.
277. Gordon, 2 Independent Whig 34 (No. XXXVII), (Sept. 21 1720), id at 34. For the
Erastianism undergirding this toleration, see Trenchard, lIndependent Whig (XXIII), Apr. 20, 1720,;
supra note 238, at 100. Cf Robert Molesworth, Preface to the Second Edition of Frangois Hotman,
Franco-Gallia (1721), in AN ACCOUNT OF DENMARK, WITH FRANCO-GALLIA 188 (Justin Champion
ed., 2011),. The preface was included in the third volume of The memoirs ofJohn Ker in 1726, and
reprinted in 1775 under the title The principles ofa real Whig.
278. [JOHN TRENCHARD], A SHORT HISTORY OF STANDING ARMIES IN ENGLAND 5 (1698),.
279. TRENCHARD & MOYLE, STANDING ARMY, supra note 251, passim.
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exemplary punishments. And as we have seen, during the same period that
they wrote the Letters, Trenchard and Gordon authored an additional half-
dozen pamphlets and essays making the case for an indefinite suspension
of the law, while viciously mocking civil-libertarian appeals as alibis for
graft and plunder. A survey of modem scholarship on radical Whig
thought suggests four possibilities for making sense of these seemingly
discordant motifs.
One strategy, typified by the libertarian historian Ronald Hamowy, is to
flatly deny any contradiction. Cato's vociferous campaign against the
South Sea scheme was a natural extension of his Lockean liberalism-a
complaint against excessive state intrusion in free trade, set in motion by
corrupt insiders seeking to exploit their connections for financial gain.280
Their unwary victims were, essentially, robbed. The punishment of those
responsible is best understood not as "vengeance against those who
wronged the republic but justice in the name of the individuals who have
been injured"-that is to say, as a vindication of the individual right to
property!28 1 This is clever but ultimately untenable. The question is how a
purportedly "extreme libertarian" could so easily endorse the override of
Magna Charta and the infliction of punishments ex post facto in his zeal to
repress financial criminals; answering with talk about the injured property
rights of the victim is little better than a sleight of hand. It is telling that
Hamowy remains silent on the avowedly extralegal character of the
punishments contemplated by the radical Whigs, and makes no reference
to the voluminous writings of Thomas Gordon elaborating on the concept
of constitutional necessity. Refraining the "extraordinary" circumvention
of due process as a deduction from the axioms of classical liberalism is a
non-starter.
A second and more common strategy is to bracket the South Sea
writings as marginal within the overall scheme of the work.282 But this
280. Hamowy, "Introduction", in I CL, supra note 2, at xxxi-ii. Hamowy goes much too far when
he argues that radical Whigs objected on principle to any involvement of the state in banking and
trade. See, e.g., [JOHN TRENCHARD], A COMPARISON BETWEEN THE PROPOSALS OF THE BANK AND
THE SOUTH-SEA COMPANY (1720); [JOHN TRENCHARD], A LETTER OF THANKS FROM THE AUTHOR OF
THE COMPARISON BETWEEN THE PROPOSALS OF THE BANK AND THE SOUTH-SEA 16 (, 1720). The
notion that they objected to market activity only when it was improperly mixed with state power is
equally fanciful; see 2 GORDON, STOCK-JOBBING, supra note 97, at 83-85.
281. Hamowy, "Cato's Letters", supra note 142, at 281-82.
282. See ANNIE MITCHELL, THE CHARACTER OF AN INDEPENDENT WHIG 34 (2002) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University College London) ("Although the South Sea scandal provided the
impetus for the Letters, Trenchard and Gordon swiftly moved on to the wider issue of civil and
religious liberty..."); SRINIVAS ARAVAMUDAN, TROPICOPOLITANS: COLONIALISM AND AGENCY,
1688-1804 134 (1999) (".. after the writers' fury is vented on the South Sea Bubble, they theorize in a
more removed fashion"); Jacobson, supra note 272, at xxv ("Although the letters from 'Cato' began
with questions of immediate concern such as the fate of Gibraltar or the South Sea Bubble, they
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distinction is nearly as unworkable as Hamowy's classical liberal
acrobatics. Cato's contemporaries understood the South Sea writings as
central to the overall project, satirizing what they took to be the Letters'
ludicrous monomania:
If you talk to him of the happy Administration in the Beginning of his
Majesty's Reign, and the suppressing of a horrid and desperate
Rebellion; He cries out, South-Sea! Tell him of the glorious
Expedition to the Streights, the preserving the Balance of Europe,
and the securing to us the Trade of the Mediterranean; he has South-
Sea for you again. Mention to him the Quadruple Alliance ... to
maintain our Protestant Succession; and he bawls out South-Sea.
Name the several wise and happy Expeditions into the North, to keep
the Balance there, and prevent Insults on our Commerce, and perhaps
our Coasts; South-Sea is his Word still. 2 83
Indeed, the crash haunts the entire run of the Letters, both on its surfaces
and in its depths. The Seventieth Letter, published in March 1722, finds
Gordon railing against "the late execrable South-Sea conspiracy," and
expressing incredulity that his fellow citizens have not yet insisted on the
proscription of "all those who headed and abetted that destructive scheme,
or endeavoured to protect those who did." 284 The Ninety-First and Ninety-
Second Letters are devoted to the unique perils of monopoly corporations,
and feature a multi-page rant by Trenchard against "the ravages brought
upon us by the South-Sea project" and its imitators.2 85 And the One
Hundred Seventh Letter, "Of publick credit and stocks," laments that the
people of England "have been delivered into the ravenous and polluted
jaws of vultures and tigers" by the nation's continuing tolerance for
jobbing and stock manipulation.2 86 Far from backing away from the bold
position staked out in 1721, Cato trumpets his earlier advocacy, claiming
to be vindicated by subsequent events.287
Moreover, the financial crisis was not the only moment in Georgian
politics where radical Whig theorists demonstrated their readiness to hold
civil liberties in abeyance. Cato's Letters conclude with a series of
dispatches on the Atterbury Plot, a Jacobite conspiracy that was revealed
283. CATO TURNED CATILINE, supra note 168, at 2.
284. Gordon, 3 CL (LXX) (Mar. 17, 1722), supra note 2, at 511.
285. Trenchard, 3 CL (XCI), supra note 2, at 650-51; Trenchard, 3 CL (XCII) (Sept. 1, 1722),
supra note 2, at 653-61.
286. Trenchard, 4 CL (CVII) (Dec. 15 1722), supra note 2, at 757; cf Trenchard, 3 CL
(XCVIII)(Oct. 13 1722), supra note 2, at 702.
287. Gordon, 4 CL (CXXV), (Apr. 20 1723), supra note 2, at 868 ("The tender and slow
prosecution of the execrable managers, the gentle punishment inflicted upon them, and the obvious
difficulties thrown in the way of any punishment at all, were fresh provocations to a plundered and
abused nation, and fresh stimulations to the [Atterbury] conspirators."). Cf Trenchard, 3 CL (XCVII)
(Oct. 6 1722), supra note 2, at 696.
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and quickly quashed in the spring of 1722. A tide of repressive measures
followed, targeting non-jurors, Catholics and suspected Jacobites. Satirists
and ballad-writers were arrested. A special "supply" tax was levied on
England's Catholic citzens. Atterbury, Bishop of Rochester, supposedly
the conspiracy's mastermind, was tried and convicted in Parliament on a
bill of pains and penalties when the evidence against him proved too
circumstantial to survive in the courts. And onerous new regulations were
passed against poachers, thought o be covertly allied with the
Pretender.288
Each of these measures was backed enthusiastically by Thomas Gordon.
He inveighed against "treasonable Ballads, publickly sung in the Streets,"
and approved the prosecution of Tory pamphleteers who libelled the
administration and the Hanoverian dynasty.289 He sought a purge of
ideologically unreliable faculty and students from the universities.29 0 And
he professed to be utterly untroubled by the yearlong suspension of habeas
corpus initiated in October 1722.291 When those swept up in this dragnet
claimed a "Breach of the liberty of the subject," Gordon replied that the
penalties meted out to them were almost scandalously mild, and that "had
they been guilty of libelling a Government anywhere amongst our
Neighbours," they would have been locked away and forgotten in the
corner of a dark "Bastile."292 Gordon argued that Catholics and Jacobites
had no right to appeal to the "liberty of the subject," because their ultimate
aim was an absolutist monarchy where such rights did not exist. The bad
faith invocation of personal freedoms by a group committed to their
extirpation is a species of nonsense-"turning liberty upon herself'-and
can be decisively rejected without damaging the ideal of a free society.293
288. See CRUICKSHANKS & ERSKINE-HILL, supra note 6, at 153-70 (describing a series of
"arbitrary measures" taken against suspected Jacobites), 167 ("a tax of f100,000 on Catholics to pay
for an increase in the army"), 204 (Atterbury: "For whose Liberty is safe, if the H[ouse] of C[ommons]
may accuse any one, even when they own they have no Legal Proofagainst him?"), 211 ("the trial was
a show-trial"), 233 ("Walpole's brutal repression").
289. GORDON, 2 A SHORT VIEW OF THE CONSPIRACY 137, 139 (1723).
290. Gordon, 4 CL (CXXVII) (May 4, 1723), supra note 2, at 878-79.
291. Gordon, 4 CL (CXXV), supra note 2, at 868. Recall in this context Trenchard, I CL (XX),
142-43, advocating treason trials for Bolingbroke and Harley for allegedly conspiring with the
Pretender. On the 1722 suspension of Habeas Corpus, see [Various debates in the Lords and Commons
between 11 October and 26 October 1722], 8 COBBETT'S PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY 27-46 (1811).
See in particular the speech given in opposition by leading Tories in the House of Lords on October 11
at 29 (". . this Bill did, in effect, vest the ministers with an authority almost as arbitrary and extensive
as that of a Roman Dictator. . ."). The Tory alternative was a six-month suspension; the Habeas
Corpus Act had never before been suspended more than nine months at a time.
292. GORDON, supra note 290, at 139. Cf idatl59.
293. Gordon, 4 CL (CXXIX) (May 18, 1723), supra note 2, at 89;. cf Gordon, 4 CL (CXXV),
supra note 2, at 866-68 ("By their eternal designs and attacks upon us, they force us upon the next
means of self-preservation; and then complain of oppression, because we will not suffer them to
oppress and destroy us."); Trenchard, 4 CL (CXXX), supra note 2, at 901; see also "Britannicus"
[Benjamin Hoadly], reprinted in 8 COBBETT, supra note 292, at 29-36, 30 ("Otherwise, they always
argued, there must soon be an end of our establishment, and all our liberties; and that without this, the
2017] 227
63
Lebovitz: An Economy of Violence: Financial Crisis and Whig Constitutional
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
It is obvious, then, that Trenchard and Gordon's vehement writings on the
South Sea bubble cannot be dismissed as an anomaly. The dialectic of
civil liberty and reason of state, which structures so much of the Italian-
Atlantic republican tradition, confronts us with a genuine puzzle.
A third strategy acknowledges the dilemma and charges the Whig
dissenters with inconsistency, perhaps even hypocrisy, for their selective
oscillation between civil libertarian and authoritarian registers. This was
the conclusion of several of their contemporaries at the height of the South
Sea crisis, who professed to be baffled that self-professed Whigs could so
easily endorse the abrogation of essential rights and liberties. A writer for
Applebee's made precisely this point in a January 1721 editorial:
I remember when the Whigs were ... the Patrons of Liberty, always
claiming that no Man should suffer the Loss of Life and Limb but by
legal Prosecution, and by Sentence of the Law: But now ... how are
they for sentencing Men to the Scaffold, and to the Gibbet, as they
find their own Resentments give Cause, not as the Laws of the Land,
or as the Nature of the Crime, direct?294
Readers accustomed to ranging the Old Whigs in a tradition of civil
libertarianism and antistatism will be sympathetic to this assessment;
surely when these authors allowed for "extraordinary" action in
contravention of the written laws they were deforming the tenets of their
faith under the pressure of events.
In their pseudonymous 1721 essay The Sense of the People, Trenchard
and Gordon stood the charge on its head: the true betrayal of Whig liberty
would be not insisting on the punishment those responsible for the
financial crisis. Whig principles dictated retribution above all: "Whiggism
carries in it the very Notion of Liberty, and Love to our Country; and ...
the Punishment of public Horse-leeches, Parricides, must be the only Way
to settle Whiggism, and to lay a Foundation for the Happiness of future
Times." John Trenchard elaborated in the Thirteenth of Cato's Letters that
the foremost "principle of a Whig" was the imperative of surveilling and
punishing those who would plot against popular liberties. "Some will tell
us," Trenchard sneered, "that this is setting up the mob for statesmen, and
for the censurers of states. The word mob does not at all move me."295
Habeas Corpus Act itself must be much worse than mere dirty parchment or waste paper: for it must
be itself the very instrument and immediate occasion of that ruin, and loss of liberty, it was designed to
prevent."). There are deep resonances here with what is usually thought to be a distinctively twentieth
century phenomenon-so-called "militant democracy." Consider Karl Loewenstein, Militant
Democracy and Fundamental Rights, 1, 31 AM. POL. SC. REv. 417, 423-24 (1937).
294. APPLEBEE'S ORIGINAL WEEKLY J. (London), Jan. 7, 1721. For an example of radical Whig
rhetoric along these lines, consider JOHN TOLAND, THE STATE-ANATOMY OF GREAT BRITAIN 12 (7 1h
ed. 1717), 12 ("nothing is more consistent than Law and Liberty; nay, there cannot be any political
Liberty without Law").
295. Trenchard & Gordon, supra note 138, at 8; Trenchard, I CL (XIII) (Jan. 21, 1721), supra
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This rather striking definition of Whig "liberty"-popular acountability
for socioeconomic elites-was not an opportunistic invention of the
moment; it was a prominent leitmotif of radical political theory. Consider,
in this context, the comments of the dissenting Whig preacher Richard
West on the bloody repression of the 1715 Jacobite rising:
it is Nonsense to talk of Laws and Constitution, if any Man may
commit what is notoriously most prejudicial to his Country, and yet
escape with Impunity by screening himself behind Formalities. Such
an evasive Transgression of the Law, instead of justifying the
Criminal, should, by all the Rules of common Sense, enhance his
Guilt; since it necessarily implies him to be conscious, that what he
did was illegal and unwarrantable. In short, all Forms of Law, and I
may add [sic] Statutes, relating to the Adjudication or Trial of
Treasons, were intended as Barriers to the Liberties of the People
against the Incroachments of the Crown, and not to protect corrupt
Ministers from the Prosecutions of Parliament.296
One author who found this pattern of reasoning highly congenial was John
Trenchard, who cited West's pamphlet in the twelfth of Cato's Letters as
justification for Parliament to act "upon extraordinary occasions" to
suppress those he called "the publick enemies of our liberty and
prosperity."2 97 Radical Whig luminaries recognized no tension between
their spirited eulogies to the English freedom and their enthusiasm for
extralegal reprisals against i s enemies.
Given the inadequacies of these classical liberal accounts we might turn,
finally, to the framework of republican liberty, unearthed from the history
of political thought by Quentin Skinner and expanded into a systematic
philosophy by Philip Pettit. Rather than mere freedom from interference,
the keyword of republican liberty is independence, that is, freedom from
subjection to the arbitrary will of another. A variety of liberal-
authoritarian regimes might plausibly realize the "negative liberty" prized
by classical liberalism, but only active citizens in a well-constituted
republic possess a stable guarantee against the sudden and arbitrary
note 2, at 103-4 ("In truth, every private subject has a right to watch the steps of those who would
betray their country... This is the principle of a Whig, this the doctrine of liberty; and 'tis as much
knavery to deny this doctrine, as it is folly to ridicule it. Some will tell us, that this is setting up the
mob for statesmen, and for the censurers of states. The word mob does not at all move me... Blessed
be God, and thanks to our sovereign, who has given us a ministry that makes all these cautions
unnecessary.. by being foremost to pursue the guilty."). Of course, to say that Trenchard and Gordon
believed in Whig principles is not at all to say that they always believed in the Whig party; for their
advocacy of an alliance with "Country" Tories that would destabilize the existing party structure, see
Trenchard, 3 CL (LXXX), supra note 2, at 583-87 ("one party for liberty"); Gordon, 3 CL (XCVI),
Sept. 29, 1722, 687-93.
296. RICHARD WEST, A DISCOURSE CONCERNING TREASON, AND BILLS OF ATTAINDER 3 (1716).
297. Trenchard, I CL (XII), supra note 2, at 98.
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revocation of those freedoms.2 98 Without this ultimate security, the rights
enjoyed by individuals hang on the gossamer thread of sovereign
indulgence. Notably, for both Skinner and Pettit Cato's Letters represent a
crucial text in the development of this civic ideology.299 And so it is worth
asking whether their account, with its dedmphasis on individual rights and
its close attention to forms of government,300 better reflects the prismatic
political theory of the radical Whigs.
Unfortunately, the improvement over classical liberal accounts is only
marginal, because both Skinner and Pettit typically insist that republican
liberty necessarily incorporates the rule of law and a robust sphere of
protection for individual freedoms, equal (at least) to those available under
a regime of negative liberty. "The state," notes Skinner, "has a duty not
merely to liberate its citizens from . . . personal exploitation and
dependence, but to prevent its own agents, dressed in a little brief
authority, from behaving arbitrarily in the course of imposing the rules
that govern our common life."301 The claim here is that negative liberty is
necessary but not sufficient to constitute a free political life, since in the
absence of a free state those liberties will remain provisional and
precarious. The republican concept of liberty, as Skinner articulates it, is
designed to integrate and guarantee the classical ideals of negative
liberty.3 02
Pettit perceives more readily than Skinner that interference with
personal liberties can sometimes occur in the absence of domination-that
is to say, that in certain political configurations "negative liberty" and
"republican liberty" might enter into conflict. Thus in a 2002 essay Pettit
298. Quentin Skinner, The idea of negative liberty, in VISIONS OF POLITICS, supra note 212, at
186-212; SKINNER, LIBERTY BEFORE LIBERALISM 68-99 (1998); Skinner, Freedom as the Absence of
Arbitrary Power, in REPUBLICANISM AND POLITICAL THEORY 83-110 (Cecile Laborde and John
Maynor, eds., 2008); Philip Pettit, Negative Liberty, Liberal and Republican, 1 EUROPEAN J. PHIL. 15
(1993); PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM 51-79 ; Pettit, Keeping Republican Freedom Simple, 30 POL.
THEORY 339 (2002); PETTIT, ON THE PEOPLE'S TERMS 92-107 (2012).
299. Pettit, Negative Liberty, supra note 298, at 33 ("Consider, for example, this comment on
liberty from the eighteenth century republican tract which was published as Cato 's Letters. . ."); Pettit,
REPUBLICANISM, supra note 299, at 20, 29, 33; Skinner, LIBERTY BEFORE LIBERALISM supra note
299, at ix; Skinner, Arbitrary Power supra note 299, at 85, 91; cf Gordon, 2 CL (LXII), supra note 2,
at 430 ("Liberty is to live on one's own terms; slavery is, to live at the mere mercy of another").
300. See, e.g., Skinner, supra note 211, at 211 ("the essence of [Machiavelli's] theory [of
republican liberty] could be expressed by saying that the attainment of social freedom cannot be a
matter of securing personal rights"); PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM supra note 299, at 303-4 ("republicans
have no reason to think of rights-however richly reconceived-as the only resources whereby people
can be protected and assured of their non-domination"). But see MAUYRIZIO VIROLI, REPUBLICANISM 6
(2001) ("The truth is that liberal political theory has inherited a number of ideas from classical
republicanism, beginning with the fundamental principle that sovereign power must always be limited
by constitutional and legal norms. . .[and] that the main goal of political society is to protect the
individual, his or her life, liberty, and property.").
301. SKINNER, LIBERTY BEFORE LIBERALISM supra note 299, at 119.
302. See also VIROLI, REPUBLICANISM supra note 300, at 61 ("republicanism is a liberal theory
that is more radical and consistent than classical iberalism").
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gently rebukes Skinner for failing to grasp the relative priority of non-
domination over non-interference, that is, failing to appreciate that a
republican ought to prefer a scenario of "interference without domination"
to one of "domination without interference."303 Some forms of coercion-
paradigmatically for Pettit, the regulation of corporations and private
fortunes-may be perfectly compatible with a free society, particularly
where those concentrations of wealth threatens to overwhelm the civic
equality on which republican life depends. 3  Pettit thus gets closer to
accounting for the sharp swerves of eighteenth-century radical Whig
thought, but adds the crucial caveat that such coercion is legitimate only
where it is non-arbitrary, meaning where it proceeds according to fixed
rules, and remains subject to robust constitutional safeguards and counter-
majoritarian checks.30' This insistence on the "fair rule of law" " blunts
the potentially radical edge of Pettit's theory of civic freedom, ensuring
that it remains a variant on ordinary liberal constitutionalism.307
And so despite its potential, the account of "republican liberty" given by
its leading expositors cannot speak with any confidence to the paradoxical
character of radical Whig thought during the South Sea bubble: the
whiplash between unlimited panegyrics to individual and civic freedom,
and severe repression of enemies of the state.308 Gordon's 1722 Short
303. Pettit, Keeping Republican Freedom Simple supra note 299, at 344-45; cf PETTIT,
REPUBLICANISM supra note 299, at 22-23. Skinner has more or less accepted this criticism; see
Skinner, Arbitrary Power supra note 299, at 84; cf VIROLI, REPUBLICANISM supra note 300, at 47-52.
304. Pettit, Negative Liberty, supra note 299, at 34; PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM supra note 299, at
117, 140-3; PETTIT, ON THE PEOPLE'S TERMS supra note 299, at 91.
305. See Pettit, Negative Liberty supra note 299, at 29, 32, 37 ff. 39 ("the law constitutes what it
is to be free"); PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM supra note 299, at 31 ("If the conventional theory leads to an
ideally perfect democracy-a state in which all that the majority wishes to be law, and nothing else, is
law-then it leads to a form of government under which the arbitrary exercise of power is most
certainly possible"); id at 173 ("The first condition is, in James Harrington's phrase, that the system
should constitute an 'empire of laws and not of men'; the second, that it should disperse legal powers
among different parties; and the third, that it should make law relatively resistant to majority will.");
id. at 184 ("Will it help if we.. stipulate that any public decision that attracts majority support, or that
is in accord with a policy that attracts such support, is non-arbitrary? Surely not."); PETfilT, ON THE
PEOPLE'S TERMS supra note 299, at 221 ("The constitutional constraints require that government
should operate in accordance with due process, not ruling by ad hoc decree but via public, general and
prospective regulations. . different powers should be shared out amongst different, mutually checking
agents").
306. Pettit, Keeping Republican Freedom Simple, supra note 299, at 349.
307. Cf Francis Cheneval, Multilateral Dimensions of Republican Thought, in LEGAL
REPUBLICANISM: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 240 (Samantha Besson and Jos6
Luis Marti eds., 2009) ("The republican principle of non-domination is not substantively different
from claims of political freedom and political rights of participation expressed in the name of political
liberalism. Political liberalism does not deny legitimate and rule-based interference by the State. . .").
308. In writing about the English Civil War, Skinner rightly treats salus populi as the ubiquitous
shadow of republican liberty, recognizing that for neo-roman parliamentarians like Henry Parker it
was often precisely the settled rule of law that fostered conditions of unjust and arbitrary domination.
But, rather curiously, the insight that the realization of republican liberty may sometimes require the
suspension of the legal order and the destruction of liberal rights and privileges does not figure in the
political theory of "republicanism" as elaborated in either his or Pettit's signature texts. See 2
SKINNER, VISIONS OF POLITICS, supra note 211, at 308-43. On the centrality of "reason of state" to
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View of the Conspiracy underscores the distance between this outlook and
Pettit's rule-of-law constitutionalism:
to arm your Mind with Resentment against Traitors, remember
that ... a British Soul ought never to forgive an Attempt to ruin his
Country. 'Tis not our Cause only, but the glorious Cause of LIBERTY
that we fight.... But I need not dwell any longer upon this Subject,
to one who knows the Value of it so very well, whose Birth and
Principles have long since inculcated that old Roman Maxim in him,
That Slavery is worse than Death, and that to live is to be free.309
Gordon signed this pamphlet "CATO", and with good reason; he had
expressed nearly identical thoughts in the Twenty-Second Letter regarding
the South Sea ringleaders: "Whether the directors and their masters shall
be punished or no, is to me one and the same question, as to ask, whether
you will preserve your constitution or no; or, whether you will have any
constitution at all." The failure to liquidate these rapacious elites, he
warned, would sound the death knell of "old English liberty." 3io
This worldview is not in any sense alien to the history of republicanism;
it has been rightly dubbed Machiavellian,3 11 and both Trenchard and
Gordon displayed an impressive familiarity with the Florentine thinker.312
English republican thought, see also VICTORIA KAHN, WAYWARD CONTRACTS: THE CRISIS OF
POLITICAL OBLIGATION IN ENGLAND, 1641-1674 91-105, 257-78 (2004); RICHARD TUCK,
PHILOSOPHY AND GOVERNMENT, 1572-1651 222-32 (1993).
309. Gordon, supra note 290, at 157-58.
310. Trenchard & Gordon, 1 CL (XXII), supra note 2, at 158. Cf the sharp critique of Pettit on
elite accountability in MCCORMICK, MACHIAVELLIAN DEMOCRACY, supra note 232, at 150, and
Pettit's response in PETTIT, ON THE PEOPLE'S TERMS supra note 299, at 217 ff. 34.
311. See POCOCK, MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT supra note 132, at 469-72; VICKIE B. SULLIVAN,
MACHIAVELLI, HOBBES, AND THE FORMATION OF A LIBERAL REPUBLICANISM IN ENGLAND 245, 254
(2004); KRAMNICK, BOLINGBROKE supra note 274, at 245, 248. Cf. John P. McCormick,
Machiavellian Democracy: Controlling Elites With Ferocious Populism, 95 AM. POL. SCi. REV. 297
(2001); MCCORMICK, MACHIAVELLIAN DEMOCRACY, supra note 232, at 114-40.
312. See, e.g., Gordon, I CL (XVI), supra note 2, at 121 ("Machiavel tells us, that no government
can long subsist, but by recurring often to its first principles"); Trenchard & Gordon, 1 CL (XXII), at
156 ("The people.. are apt frankly to correct their own faults. Of which candour in them Machiavel
has given several instances. . ."); Gordon, I CL (XXIV) (Apr. 8, 1721), at 174-79 ("The people have
no bias to be knaves; the security of their persons and property is their highest aim. . The same can
rarely be said of great men, who, to gratify private passion, often bring down publick ruin."); Gordon,
I CL (XXXII), at 229 ("Machiavel says, Calumny is pernicious, but accusation beneficial to a state;
and he shews instances where states have suffered or perished for not having, or for neglecting, the
power to accuse great men who were criminals") and 230 ("Machiavel. . proves that a multitude is
wiser and more constant than a prince"); Trenchard, 2 CL (LX) (Jan. 6, 1722), at 416 ("The
appetites.. .of great men, are carefully to be observed and stayed"); Gordon, 3 CL (LXX), at 504 ("by
this struggle liberty is preserved, as water is kept sweet with motion"); Gordon, 3 CL (LXXII), at 529
(extract from Discourses 11.29, the vices of a people come from their prince); Trenchard, 3 CL
(LXXX), at 583 ("Machiavel tells us. . ."); Gordon, 4 CL (CXIX) (Mar. 9, 1722), at 828 ("Arbitrary
princes cannot, dare not, be grateful to elevated merit"); GORDON, supra note 166,, at 111.28 ("the
Roman People. .[determined] that no one should be Consul two years together.. And this Conduct
Machiavel commends. . ."); Gordon, supra note 221, at xi-ii (". . your Lordship is conversant with
Machiavel.. .1 shall therefore take the Liberty to produce a Remark of that discerning Man, in a
Circumstance very much resembling our present Case. In a City, he says, where the People happen to
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But perhaps the best schema for understanding the opposition thought of
Hanoverian Britain is sketched by Mark Goldie, who points to a
"divergence within whiggism" between two competing theories of the
Glorious Revolution. The first emphasized the ancient constitution and the
myriad rights and privileges of Englishmen, from Magna Charta forward,
sanctified by their long historical provenance and inviolable by the state.
The second view relied on "the more ambitious notion that the principle of
salus populi liberated the community to refashion its community as it
thought fit." The Whigs who subscribed to this second theory were far
more interested in establishing a free Protestant state than in closely
accommodating the rights and liberties of English citizens, and indeed
following the expulsion of James II they demanded the proscription of a
host of former Stuart collaborators suspected of disloyalty to the new
regime.313 The political vision they upheld was not at all authoritarian;
their ideal was a free state with a vibrant public sphere, accommodating
the free thought, free economic activity, and free worship of nearly all its
citizens. But it was also a self-consciously revolutionary regime that
recognized no contradiction between its aspirations to liberty and the
urgent imperative to surveil and subdue its internal enemies, inside the law
if possible, outside the law if necessary.314 And their definition of
"enemies" proved remarkably elastic, encompassing not only Jacobites
and Catholics but also corrupt politicians and reckless financiers.
It is not enough to say, with Skinner and Pettit, that the republican idea
be divided, one part having injur'd the rest, there remain but two Expedients. . The One, is by putting
the Ringleaders to Death; the Other, is by forcing them to be Friends. . .The Last of these Methods he
seems not to approve of. . ."); Trenchard, I Independent Whig (XII) (Apr. 6, 1720), supra note 238,
at90 ("Machiavel advises anyone, who would change the Constitution of a State. . .").
313. Goldie, True Whiggism supra note 167, at 209-10, 222. Cf Gordon, supra note 166, at 111.23
("Summum Imperium, is still in the People").
314. That the ground-norm of the "real Whigs" was securing the revolutionary regime of 1688
against its enemies can be seen in a little-noted passage from Molesworth's 1721 preface to Franco-
Gallia, supra note 278, at 193-94: "A Whig is against the raising or keeping up a Standing Army in
Time of Peace: but with this Distinction, that if at any time an Army (though even in a Time of Peace)
should be necessary to the Support of this very Maxim, a Whig is not for being too hasty to destroy
that which is to be the Defender of his Liberty. I desire to be well understood. Suppose then, that
persons, whose known Principle and Practice it has been (during the Attempts for arbitrary
Government) to plead for and promote such an Army in Time of Peace, as would be subservient o the
Will of a Tyrant, and contribute towards the enslaving of the Nation; should, under a legal
Government. . .cry down a Standing Army in Time of Peace: I should shrewdly suspect, that either
they like not the Hands that Army is in, or the Cause which it espouses; and look upon it as an
Obstruction to another Sort of Army, which they should like even in Time of Peace. I say then, that
although the Maxim in general be certainly true, yet a Whig (without the just imputation of having
deserted his Principles) may be for the keeping up such a Standing Army even in Time of Peace, till
the Nation have recover'd its Wits again, and chuses Representatives who are against Tyranny in any
Hands whatsoever; till the Enemies of our Liberties want the Power of raising another Army of quite
different Sentiments: for till that time, a Whiggish Army is the Guardian of our Liberties. . ." No
commitment of the Old Whigs was more basic than their opposition to peacetime standing armies, and
yet Molesworth was prepared to defer its realization until the revolution had become sufficiently
established, the dangers from abroad muted, and the people properly instructed in the principles of
liberty.
69
Lebovitz: An Economy of Violence: Financial Crisis and Whig Constitutional
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
of freedom gestures beyond the cramped ideals of negative liberty. The
radical Whigs aimed at something higher than those ideals, and remained
perpetually willing to dispense with individual rights and the rule of law in
order to check conspiracies against liberty and bridle predatory elites. And
if we consider the full sweep of the republican tradition and its
avatars315-from Cicero's violent invective against hostes rei publicae, to
Machiavelli's adamantine severity against "the sons of Brutus," to Henry
Parker's imprecations against "a dangerous, and desperate faction" that
must be repressed with the full measure of Parliamentary power-we
might ask whether unsparing vigilance against public enemies is in fact
the red thread that binds it together, the marrow of the tradition, the
second face of republican liberty. 16
CONCLUSION
"Nowadays a man must work within the law; it's just as much fun!"
These words are spoken with a malevolent twinkle by the gangster
Macheath in Bertolt Brecht's 1934 Threepenny Novel; having nominally
put his criminal past behind him, Mackie now operates a giant commercial
firm, where he employs the same cutthroat tactics he perfected in the
demimonde against his workers and business rivals. The joke is not that
Macheath habitually violates English law in the course of his corrupt
dealings, but rather that, as a friend, collaborator, and director of the
politicians who make and enforce legislation, he so rarely feels the
need.3 17
Brecht's contemporaries saw his caustic attack on the rule of law as an
obvious commentary on the failed Weimar Republic; Walter Benjamin
praised its thorough demystification of "bourgeois legality," while Carl
Schmitt thought it "an uncanny illustration of my thesis on the distinction
315. Following, e.g., PETTIT, ON THE PEOPLE'S TERMS supra note 299, at 2 ("Familiar from its
instantiation in classical Rome, the idea was reignited in medieval and Renaissance Italy; spread
throughout Europe in the modem era, sparking the English Civil War and the French Revolution. .").
316. CICERO, PHILIPPIcS 2.1, 5.21 (43 BC) (D.R. Shackleton Bailey and John T. Ramsey trans.
and ed., 2010); MACHIAVELLI, supra note 233, at 1.16, 111.1, and 1II.3; HENRY PARKER, A LETTER OF
DUE CENSURE.. TO LIEUT. COLL. JOHN LILBURNE 12 (1650). On the Jacobin republic as the highest
expression of classical republican ideals, see Keith Michael Baker, "Transformations of Classical
Republicanism in Eighteenth-Century France", 73 J. MOD. HIST. 32 (2001). For evidence that this is
how Cato s Letters were understood by the heirs of the French Revolution, see MARIA ALETrA
HULSHOFF, PEACE-REPUBLICANS' MANUAL 85-105 (1817) , a compilation of eighteenth century
radical republican sources, juxtaposing extracts from Cato 's Letters with a pamphlet from Babeuf
praising Robespierre.
317. BERTOLT BRECHT, THREEPENNY NOVEL 247 (Desmond Vesey & Christopher Isherwood
trans., 1957). Just above, Mackie outlines one of his recent schemes: "I sold a house which didn't
belong to me. . Childishness! That was really immoral because it was taking unnecessary advantage
of illegal ways and means. That can be done just as easily by putting up a row of jerry-built houses,
selling them on the instalment plan and waiting until the purchasers run out of money!. . all that
without the police having any excuse to interfere!"
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between legality and legitimacy."318 But much of this characteristically
"Brechtian" cynicism is in fact highly indebted to its original source: The
Beggar's Opera, John Gay's merciless satire of England after the South
Sea bubble. Gay sustained severe losses in the crash of 1720, and wrote
despondently of "The South Sea Rocks and Shelves where Thousands
drown'd./When Credit sunk, and Commerce gasping lay."319 He took his
revenge in the Opera, which gleefully depicts the ruling Whigs as an
unscrupulous band of robbers manipulating laws and markets to enrich
themselves with impunity. The Opera was an enormous success; its sequel
was banned from the London stage on the personal orders of Robert
Walpole.320
Throughout the Beggar's Opera, as in Brecht's adaptation, the concept
of "legality" is repeatedly undermined, not only by the unequal application
of justice between rich and poor, but also by the deliberate conflation of
political and financial power with the criminal underworld.321 Brecht's
political critique of the market state, then, traces its lineage to the first
financial crisis of the modem world, what one scholar has aptly named
"the big bang of financial capitalism."322 And if it is true that Brecht is the
poet laureate of our present age of precarity, sauve qui peut, and elite
lawlessness,323 this is another clue that we are still living in a world shaped
by the tumult of 1720.
The major task of this essay has been historical and empirical: to
recover the theory of liberty and emergency that developed in this time of
tumult, conspiracy, and populist rage. The paroxysm of 1720 was as much
constitutional as economic, and it inaugurated a sophisticated and
sustained debate on public power. But this event, and the political
literature that followed in its wake, may also prompt us to revisit and
rethink several entrenched ideas in the history of political thought.
This article suggests, first, a new interpretation of Cato's Letters, a text
318. WALTER BENJAMIN, UNDERSTANDING BRECHT 82-83 (Anna Bostock trans., 1998); Carl
Schmitt, 5.5.50, in GLOSSARIUM, AUFZEICHNUNGEN DER JAHRE 1947-1951, at 300-301 (Eberhard
Freiherr von Medem ed., 1991).
319. John Gay, A Panegyrical Epistle to Mr. Thomas Snow, in POETRY AND PROSE 280 (Vinton
A. Dearing & Charles E. Beckwith eds., 1974).
320. See JOHN O'BRIEN, HARLEQUIN BRITAIN 103 (2004); DAVID NOKES, JOHN GAY: A
PROFESSION OF FRIENDSHIP 433-44, 453-7 (1995); J.A. Downie, Gay's Politics, in JOHN GAY AND
THE SCRIBLERIANS 44-61, 59 (Peter Lewis & Nigel Wood, eds., 1989); Dianne Dugaw, "DEEP PLAY":
JOHN GAY AND THE INVENTION OF MODERNITY 34-35 (2001); Anna-Christina Giovanopoulos, Robert
Walpole und Jonathan Wild, in JOHN GAY'S THE BEGGAR'S OPERA, 1728-2004, at 147-67 (Uwe
Bdker, Ines Detmers, & Anna-Christina Giovanopoulos eds., 2006).
321. See, e.g., JOHN GAY, THE BEGGAR'S OPERA, AS IT IS ACTED AT THE THEATRE-ROYAL 11.1
(1728) (Jem. Why are the laws levell'd at us? are we more dishonest than the rest of mankind?).
322. See Larry Neal, The Microstructure of the First Emerging Markets in Europe in the
Eighteenth Century, in THE MANUFACTURING OF MARKETS 295-314 (Eric Brousseau & Jean-Michel
Glachant, eds., 2014).
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whose centrality to Anglo-American political theory is so often taken for
granted. According to the dominant narrative, the Letters exemplify the
civil libertarian tendencies of radical Whig thought; other schools follow
Pocock in depicting them as precociously anti-capitalist, preoccupied
above all with the preservation of "civic virtue." Neither account places
sufficient emphasis on their most striking feature: the repeated invocation
of extra-legal violence against the bankers and politicians responsible for
the spoliation of their country. Trenchard and Gordon were not democrats;
nevertheless, they thought it vital that great citizens who conspired to
bankrupt or betray the public be eradicated without pity, regardless of
whether "they can find out a By-way of slipping thro' the Statute-Law."324
Today, when Cato's writings on this topic attract any comment at all, they
are typically dismissed as newspaper bombast. A close reading of the
Letters, alongside the plethora of texts produced by Trenchard and Gordon
in the same period, underscores how serious they were, and how closely
connected this stance was to the circumvolutions of radical Whig thought
after 1688.
It presents, second, a missing chapter in the history of raison d'tat.
Over the past three decades, scholars have highlighted the economic
dimensions of reason of state, revealing the extent to which the
management of trade, manufactures, and public debt gradually came to be
assimilated to this pattern of thought and government. This paper proposes
that the same was true of financial markets: they were viewed by jurists
and publicists as spaces of immense potential promise, as well as threat
and danger. In response, a style of thinking emerged that we might call
"financial raison d'tat"-the belief that oligarchic traders and bankers
could be best brought to heel through aggressive surveillance and
"extraordinary" forms of punishment. Daniel Defoe first articulated this
new outlook in the two decades prior to 1720, but it only took its final
form after the crash, when the exigency of the times made it possible to
contemplate bold new permutations of parliamentary power. Every
significant contribution to the debate experimented with this new dialect
of state necessity, and many, such as the anonymous pamphlet Salus
Populi Suprema Lex, emblazoned it on their title page like a coat of arms.
It offers, third, a new perspective on contemporary debates in public
law. Although scholars typically assume that appeals to "economic
emergency" are an artifact of the early twentieth century and the
bureaucratic state, this article establishes its deep lineage in early modern
Europe. From the first appearance of financial markets they have been
understood as both a potent source of hegemonic power, and as a
destabilizing element that might call on new forms of public authority to
324. GORDON, LORD BACON, supra note 114, at 53.
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contain their destructive effects. The assertions of broad presidential
power that public law scholars have observed in the Gold Clause Cases
and the extralegal maneuvers of the Federal Reserve in 2008 find an
important antecedent in the Parliamentary debate that followed the first
financial crisis. And here the lesson of history may be unsettling: the
writers and politicians most closely associated with individual liberty at
the birth of financial markets saw no contradiction in suspending
constitutional guarantees when necessary to suppress and punish market
tumult.
Finally, this essay challenges a dominant interpretation of republican
history, elucidated most forcefully and famously by Philip Pettit and
Quentin Skinner. According to these eminent scholars, the nucleus of
republicanism was a "neo-roman understanding of civil liberty,"325 that is,
the belief that individual liberty can only be secured by a free state of
active citizens, governed by stable and reliable laws of their own making.
The radical Whig opposition of the eighteenth century is routinely cited as
a prime vector of this civic ideology. And yet, where republican histories
and ideas surface in Cato's Letters it is almost always as a symbol of
unbounded, extraordinary power and as as evidence that even, perhaps
especially, in a free state, the imperative of public safety stands above the
rights of citizens and the ordinary rule of law. And while Trenchard,
Molesworth, and Gordon could wax eloquently on free speech and the
evils of standing armies, their primary commitment was always to the
preservation of the postrevolutionary regime, and the vigilant repression of
its enemies at home and abroad. It is entirely correct to say that the radical
Whigs were fixated on public liberty and the avoidance of "domination."
What is still an open question is whether the historical idea of non-
domination that flourished between 1350 and 1800 is compatible with the
late twentieth century orthodoxies it is now taken to represent.
The United States housing bubble burst suddenly in September 2008,
precipitated by the sudden collapse of the Lehman Brothers investment
bank. The ensuing panic threatened the survival of every major American
financial institution, along with several of its largest industrial firms.
Public enmity against the finance sector, already running high in the face
of a deepening recession, was further provoked when the American
International Group, the recipient of hundreds of billions of dollars in
emergency public loans, announced it would pay $165 million in bonuses
to its notoriously reckless financial products division. In response the
House of Representatives passed, by an overwhelming margin, a ninety
percent tax on all bonuses paid at companies that accepted financial
325. SKINNER, LIBERTY BEFORE LIBERALISM supra note 299, at ix.
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support under TARP.326 The measure received an indifferent reception in
the White House, and quickly died in the Senate, but not before one
prominent critic of the new administration had his say. The tax was not
merely unwise policy or unconstitutional overreach, he maintained, but a
grievous affront to the most basic principles of a free government.
The rule of law requires that like people be treated alike and that
people know what the law is so that they can plan their lives in
accord with the law. In this case, a law is being passed to impose
taxes on a particular, politically unpopular group. That is a tyrannical
abuse of Congress's powers. And in addition, it is retroactive
legislation, changing the law upon which AIG and its employees had
relied. . .Selective taxation is tyranny. Ex post facto legislation
violates the spirit of the liberal order, even if a particular piece of
legislation can be "structured" to pass constitutional muster.
The author, inevitably, was David Boaz, Executive Vice President of the
Cato Institute.327
326. Edmund L. Andrews & Peter Baker, A.LG. Planning Huge Bonuses After $170 Billion
Bailout, N. Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2009), http://nytimes.com/2009/03/15/business/15AIG.html; Carl
Hulse & David M. Herszenhorn, House Approves 90% Tax on Bonuses After Bailouts, N. Y. TIMES
(Mar. 19, 2009), http://nytimes.com/2009/03/20/business/20bailout.html ("rattling Wall Street as
lawmakers rushed to respond to populist anger").
327. David Boaz, Selective Taxation is Tyranny, CATO INSTITUTE: CATO AT LIBERTY (Mar. 19,
2009, 6:19 PM), http://cato.org/blog/selective-taxation-tyranny.
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